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Summary
Within the last five to ten years we have experienced an incredible growth
of ubiquitous technologies which has allowed for improvements in several ar-
eas, including energy distribution and management, health care services, border
surveillance, secure monitoring and management of buildings, localisation ser-
vices and many others. These technologies can be classified under the name of
ubiquitous systems.
The term Ubiquitous System dates back to 1991 when Mark Weiser at Xerox
PARC Lab first referred to it in writing. He envisioned a future where computing
technologies would have been melted in with our everyday life. This future is
visible to everyone nowadays: terms like smartphone, cloud, sensor, network
etc. are widely known and used in our everyday life.
But what about the security of such systems. Ubiquitous computing devices can
be limited in terms of energy, computing power and memory. The implemen-
tation of cryptographic mechanisms that comes from classical communication
systems could be too heavy for the resources of such devices, thus forcing the
use of lighter security measures if any at all. The same goes for the implemen-
tation of security protocols. The protocols employed in classical communication
systems were not designed for the ubiquitous environment, hence their secu-
rity has to be proven again, leading to the definition of new protocols designed
specifically to address new vulnerabilities introduced by the ubiquitous nature
of the system.
Throughout the network security community this problem has been investigated
for some time now and this has resulted in some lightweight cryptographic stan-
ii
dards and protocols, as well as tools that make it possible for security properties
of communication protocols which are typical of ubiquitous systems. However
the abilities of the ubiquitous attacker remain somehow undefined and still under
extensive investigation.
This Thesis explores the nature of the ubiquitous attacker with a focus on how
she interacts with the physical world and it defines a model that captures the
abilities of the attacker. Furthermore a quantitative implementation of the
model is presented. This can be used by a security analyst as a supporting
tool to analyse the security of an ubiquitous system and identify its weak parts.
Most importantly this work is also useful for system designers, who wish to
implement an effective secure solution while developing their system.
Resume´
Inden for de seneste fem til ti a˚r har vi oplevet en utrolig vækst af allested-
snærværende teknologier, der har gjort forbedringer mulig p˚a flere omr˚ader,
blandt andet energidistribution og forvaltning, sundhedstjenester, grænseoverv-
a˚gning, sikker overv˚agning og styring af bygninger, lokaliserings tjenester og
mange andre. Disse teknologier kan klassificeres under navnet allestedsnærvær-
ende systemer.
Udtrykket Allestedsnærværende System daterer tilbage til 1991, hvor Mark
Weiser hos Xerox PARC Lab første gang omtalte det skriftligt. Han forestillede
sig en fremtid, hvor computerteknologi ville være smeltet sammen med vores
hverdag. Denne fremtid er synlig for alle i dag: begreber som smartphone,
skyen, sensor, netværk osv. er almindeligt kendt og anvendt i vores hverdag.
Men hvad med sikkerheden af s˚adanne systemer. Allestedsnærværende enheder
kan være begrænset af energi, computerkraft og hukommelse. Brugen af kryp-
tografiske mekanismer, der kommer fra klassiske kommunikationssystemer, kan
være for tung for s˚adant udstyr, og dermed tvinges man til at anvende sim-
plere sikkerhedsforanstaltninger, hvis nogen overhovedet. Det samme gælder
for gennemførelsen af sikkerhedsprotokoller. Sikkerhedsprotokoller fra klassiske
kommunikationssystemer er ikke designet til det allestedsnærværende miljø, og
derfor skal deres sikkerhed bevises igen, hvilket fører til definitioner af nye pro-
tokoller der er designet specielt til at modvirke nye s˚arbarheder indført ved den
allestedsnærværende karakter af systemet.
Dette problem er blevet undersøgt i netværkssikkerhedskredse i et stykke tid nu,
og har resulteret i nogle letvægts kryptografiske standarder og protokoller, samt
værktøjer der gør det muligt at kontrollere sikkerhedsegenskaberne af kommu-
iv
nikationsprotokoller, der er typiske for allestedsnærværende systemer. Men de
evner den allestedsnærværende angriber besidder er stadig udefineret og under
omfattende undersøgelse.
I denne afhandling udforskes karakteren af den allestedsnærværende angriber
med fokus p˚a hvordan hun interageren med den fysiske verdens og der defineres
en model, der inkluderer angriberens evner. Endvidere presenteres en kvantita-
tiv implementering af denne model. Denne kan bruges af en sikkerhedsanalytiker
som et støttende redskab til at analysere sikkerheden af et allestedsnærværende
system og identificere dets svage dele. Vigtigst, s˚a er dette arbejde nyttigt for
system designere, der ønsker at implementere en effektiv sikker løsning, under
udviklingen af deres system.
Preface
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It was the year 1991 when the term Ubiquitous Computing first appeared in the
literature.
“The most profound technologies are those that disappear. They
weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are in-
distinguishable from it.”
Mark Weiser, [63]
The author foresaw the evolution from the PC seen as a black-box to a reality
where computers are fully integrated with the environment. Following his work
in [64] and [65] Weiser combines ubiquitous computing with the concept of invis-
ible computing. The concept expresses the fact that we humans use technologies
which we are not aware of or that we do not directly perceive while we use
them. To make an everyday example: one of the biggest revolutions in the past
century, the 20th, was brought by the invention of television. While we watch
it, we do not think that images are carried through radio waves and translated
into visual stimuli by an electron beam (in old televisions) or by the stimulation
of a transistor which generates the correct combination of photons (in the most
modern apparatus). The same goes with printing technologies, automotive and
similar. The idea here is that we are not aware of the number of devices nor
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the type or the technologies involved in the process, simply because they have
become an active part of our everyday life.
Ubiquitous Computing (UC) is a term that defines the third era of modern
computing (cf. [41]). In the first era, many people were using single room sized
computers, called mainframes; this happened because of the costs of technology
and for its dimensions. The second era came with the invention of the Personal
Computer (PC), a desk-size device meant for one person. The third era, ubiq-
uitous computing, is the one that we now live in: we use multiple devices, PCs,
tablets, smartphones etc. and we are barely aware of the underlying technology
that interconnects them. The thing that differentiates these three eras is the
number of devices. Figure 1.1 shows a conceptual graph of the evolution of the
three eras with respect to the number of devices (source [41]).
                                 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Time
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
D
e
v
ic
e
s
MainFrame (one computer, many people)
PC (one person, one computer)
Ubiquitous Computing (one person, many computers)
Figure 1.1: The Three Eras of Computing - Source [41]
In the early stages of his research, Weiser developed the first ubiquitous system,
the ParcTab Ubiquitous System [62]. Together with his research team, he defined
the dimensions of devices composing it being inspired by the units of length
inch, foot and yard. An inch-sized device is a device that easily fits into a
pocket and that can be forgotten around (very much like a smartphone today),
a foot-scale device is something bigger that can still be carried around (e.g.
modern tablets) while a yard scale device is something that cannot be moved (a
television for example). The ParcTab Ubiquitous System was composed of three
interface devices: the inch size ParcTab, the foot size ParcPad and the yard size
3Liveboard. These devices were interconnected through an InfraRed wireless
network and they could access any kind of resources or applications: mail,
shell, calendars, memo, documents, control of heating and air-conditioning etc.
Furthermore the ParcTab Ubiquitous System had location protocols in place so
that it was possible to locate every device within the network, along with the
person carrying it.
Ubiquitous computing has evolved from Weiser’s work and nowadays it com-
prises several technologies like pervasive computing, ambient intelligence, aug-
mented reality, physical computing, internet of things and many more. Such
technologies are used for a variety of applications, including:
• Health care, to remotely monitor the status of patients, to run a therapy,
to give access to patients’ data whenever needed.
• Smart homes, home environments which react to the activity of the people
moving and living in them.
• Building sector, to monitor the integrity of infrastructures such as bridges
or buildings.
• Energy, to regulate the energy distribution throughout an energy distri-
bution network to minimise energy losses.
• Border surveillance, to monitor trespasses over a monitored area. [59].
• Military, for real time monitoring of battlefields and soldiers conditions,
both psychological and clinical [20].
The systems based on ubiquitous technologies are composed of small and diverse
devices that can be limited in terms of energy, computing power and mem-
ory. Furthermore, due to the technological evolution we have witnessed in the
last decade, these devices are usually fully interconnected through wireless/ra-
dio networks that possibly span large uncontrolled areas. Figure 1.2 shows an
overview of the current and most common wireless communication technologies,
these are classified by data rate, range of communications and mobility of the
devices.
As wireless technology has become more and more accessible to everyone, the
need for security has become a primary issue. In addition cybercrime activity
has increased significantly within the last five years, while international and
national institutions has recently started to address the problem by issuing
guidelines and best practices for corporations working in the public sector or
for government infrastructures. The UK was one of the first countries that
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Figure 1.2: Wireless Communication Technologies Overview
issued official guidelines to address cyber security for the private sector [25].
According to a report published by the European Network and Information
Security Agency (ENISA) [44], recently cyber criminals have become interested
in mobile devices and ubiquitous environment, hence the issue of securing these
devices has become even more pressing.
1.1 Motivation of this Work
When it comes to Ubiquitous Computing, implementing security is not an easy
task, for each property we add (e.g. integrity, authentication etc..) the overhead,
in terms of computing power and energy used to transmit supplementary bits,
can significantly decrease the energy of a device, thus making systems useless in
practice. For this very reason there has been extensive research to develop new
cryptographic algorithms, which are lightweight as regards the above mentioned
considerations; this led to new standards such as [36].
Furthermore there are applications where the security level is not required to be
the highest and this level may depend on the context the system is operating in.
In [60] for example the authors define a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) mes-
saging system where the security level depends on the available energy. When it
comes to defining such systems, where the security conditions can be relaxed, a
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natural question arises: “What is the acceptable security level?”. This question
can be seen as the synthesis of a series of other questions like:
• What is it that needs to be protected/secured?
• What are the losses if security is compromised?
• What is the outcome in terms of overall security if one or multiple parts
of the system are independently compromised?
In order to answer these questions and ultimately support the development of
ubiquitous systems under the restrictions mentioned earlier, the need for a study
and a characterisation of the attacker capabilities arises.
1.2 The Attacker in the Ubiquitous Environment
As ubiquitous systems are highly integrated in the environment surrounding
them, their behaviour depends on the context they are immersed in. The at-
tacker can therefore influence a system on multiple front lines, those pertaining
to the cyber world, which mainly characterise classical approaches to attacker
modelling, and those involving the interaction of the attacker with one or mul-
tiple devices from a physical perspective. The latter is not an entirely new
concept, social engineering for example is a similar one: here the attacker gets
information through her social interactions, hence she goes beyond the cyber
world, getting to the real one and exploiting her social dimension.
Another aspect that needs to be taken into consideration is that the attacker
can attack a system both at a protocol and at a cryptographic level. This means
that in addition to exploiting protocol weaknesses, the attacker may have the
ability of breaking the encryption of a system by exploiting vulnerabilities in
the implementation or in the encryption algorithm itself. The WEP (Wireless
Equivalent Privacy) case is a well known example of an encryption algorithm
broken in numerous ways (for example see [61]). Other well known encryption
standards show some weaknesses, the AES itself seems vulnerable for example
to a class of attacks called related keys attacks [16], which have a reduced time
and memory complexity with respect to the naive brute force attack. The
cipher is still secure in terms of practicality of the attack, the National Institute
of Standards and Technologies still approves of its use [9]; nevertheless this
example shows that the even the strongest cipher may be compromised by a
cryptographic attacker to some extent.
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With respect to her physical dimension the attacker may tamper with devices
and access their memory, thus getting hold of data as well as cryptographic
keys or identities. In the case of energy constrained devices, the attacker may
also reduce their energy or control it by increasing or decreasing the amount
of energy or by switching the device off and on. The attacker may as well
reprogram a device to change its behaviour for a specific purpose or inject a
malicious device into the system.
1.3 Scope of the Thesis and Contributions
The scope of this thesis is to define an attacker model which takes into account
both the physical and cyber aspects. Furthermore, as ubiquitous computing
systems may be subject to different levels of security, the security analyst has
to be able to perform a quantitative analysis of a system; part of this thesis
is devoted to researching a method to quantitatively assess the security of a
system.
The approach taken in this thesis is that the attacker is defined by three prop-
erties: interventions, presence and time, which we call dimensions. These di-
mensions define what the attacker can do, where she does it and for how long.
Furthermore basic actions the attacker may carry out are defined. These ac-
tions classify what are the attacker abilities with respect to the communication
channel, the physical interaction with devices and finally with respect to cryp-
tography. In the perspective of a quantitative model, the strength of the attacker
is also discussed; this is important as systems requirements may differ depend-
ing on the application. Military applications for example should be designed to
face strong and motivated attackers, while an environment monitoring systems
may not face similar attackers ever in their lifetime.
In addition to the model definition, a quantitative probabilistic model is defined
and implemented. The purpose of this is to produce a tool that may be used
as a support to perform a security analysis of a system. It is important to say
that the experience of a security analyst is still needed, the quantitative model
is intended only as a support for the analysis.
Throughout this thesis arises the problem of modelling the ability of the at-
tacker to eavesdrop a communication from a wireless device. To deal with this
problem, a probabilistic model is implemented, this can be used to compute the
probability of eavesdropping a transmission. The model accounts for the mo-
bility of the parties involved, which can be either deterministic or probabilistic,
the nature of the transmission technology, and the geometry of the space the
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parties move in.
1.4 Related Work
In this section relevant related work is mentioned. As in the case of attacker
models in classical communication systems, there is a large body of work (here
with respect to ubiquitous systems), so the presentation here will only discuss
the most significant ones. In addition in the literature it is possible to find some
documents which address some of the physical features of the attacker.
Classical attacker models often assume cryptography as a secure black box and
model attackers as entities which control the network. The Dolev-Yao attacker
(defined in [29], 1983) is a well known example of a powerful network attacker:
she can control the network and hence intercept, replay or destroy messages;
this attacker can also perform encryption and decryption, but she can get hold
of cryptographic keys only by learning them from a third party. It is probably
the best known attacker model in the network security community.
In the literature it is also possible to find other models that provide the attacker
with some cryptographic ability. The Bellare-Rogaway model [13] augments the
attacker with the ability of initiating new authentication sessions and to discover
keys in a probabilistic fashion (i.e. coin toss).
The Rubin-Shoup model [55] extends the Bellare-Rogaway model to deal with
the introduction of a new technology, the Smart Card, by defining probabilistic
oracles that can be queried by the attacker. This extension was needed as the
SmartCard has no timing functionality hence it cannot verify the freshness of a
message. This is probably the first example where the physical dimension of the
attacker begins to emerge, as the idea here is that attacker can query the smart
card separately and independently from the system for instance by stealing it
for a short time.
In [23] Creese et al. approach the problem of whether the Dolev-Yao attacker
is still appropriate for ubiquitous systems. They conclude that the ubiquitous
nature of the system may need to assume the existence of multiple communi-
cation channels which are subject to different threat models. In their analysis
they also specify that the attacker may be restricted in her actions, specifically
it is unlikely that the attacker may perform multiple actions that may interfere
with each other, at the same time: they consider the example where the attacker
may overhear messages or be able to destroy them by some sort of jamming,
but not do both things at the same time. In [22] the same authors refine their
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threat model to perform a security protocol analysis which takes into account
the existence of multiple channel in the presence of restricted attackers.
Basin et al. in [10] and afterwards in [11] present a formal model for modelling
and reasoning about “physical security protocols”. These are protocols that
exploit physical features to securely perform tasks such as localisation and time
synchronisation. Specifically the authors formalise physical properties such as
communication, location and time, taking into account for example how much
time a message takes to be dispatched between nodes given their distance and
the communication medium. This model can be used to verify security proper-
ties of protocols, but in terms of cryptographic abilities it has the same restric-
tions as the Dolev-Yao model.
Furthermore again Basin et al. in [12] discuss the problem of devices which
have been compromised by an attacker. Specifically they deal with the leakage
of cryptographic material (e.g. long term keys) that the attacker may use to
get access to confidential data. In their work they developed a framework that
keeps track of compromised data, so that it is possible to assess to which level
the security of a system is threatened. This is still done at a protocol level, i.e.
knowing some cryptographic keys and having compromised some nodes, what
are the information that the attacker could get from a protocol execution.
An idea worth mentioning which can be used to understand attacker capabilities
is attack trees [54]. These are representations of attacks as a tree, the root node
is the attacker goal while the child nodes represent attacker sub-goals, needed
to achieve the root goal. Kordy et al. in [39] and [40] expand attack trees to
include defence strategies as well. This makes representation of attacks more
effective as defences are represented as well, together with attacker abilities that
aim to defeat them.
To the knowledge of the author there is no quantitative model that addresses
the attacker, as it has been defined within this work, in its entirety. This makes
this work even more important and the motivation for it stronger.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is divided into seven chapters, an introduction (this chapter), four
core chapters, a chapter summarising results and containing final remarks, the
conclusions and three appendixes. At the end of each chapter there is a brief
summary of the contents of the chapter. The thesis is organised as follows:
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• Chapter 2 defines the attacker model by:
1. Introducing the modelling methodology.
2. Identifying the attacker dimensions.
3. Defining the relationship between them.
At the end of the chapter two case studies are also proposed.
• Chapter 3 addresses the problem of the quantitative implementation of
the model by:
1. Finding the appropriate modelling language.
2. Explaining how it works and how a model can be checked with it.
3. Explaining how the model was implemented.
• Chapter 4 addresses the problem of defining the probabilities for the at-
tacker actions. Within this chapter the aforementioned eavesdropping
model is defined and implemented.
• Chapter 5 shows the quantitative analysis of the two proposed case studies.
• Chapter 6 discusses the results and illustrate how the model can be used
by security analysts and system designers. In addition it compares the
thesis to the related work.
• Finally Chapter 7 draws the conclusions and discusses future work.
The appendixes include a small specification of the modelling language, speci-
fications about the eavesdropping model and the abstract of papers published
by the author.
1.6 Conventions and Intended Audience
Throughout this manuscript several conventions are used, to make the process
of reading more fluent and the contents more understandable:
• Literal conventions:
– The attacker is always referred to with a female gender (e.g. she, her
etc.).
– The analyst is always referred to with a male gender (e.g. he, him
etc.).
– The author of this thesis is also referred to as the writer. The writer
may obviously play the role of the analyst when required.
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• Notations:
– P (A) refers to the mathematical probability of event A happening.
– P (A|B) refers to the conditional probability of A happening given
that B already happened.
– A→ B refers to the transition from state A to state B.
– A9 B means that it does not exist a transition from state A to state
B.
As for the audience, the reader is expected to have a general knowledge about
network security and security in general. Particularly he should have a general
knowledge of cryptography, protocol theory, and the OSI model in general [34].
The reader should have a good knowledge of probability theory and a basic
knowledge of Markov models. Finally this thesis, specifically Chapter 2, can be
read also by people who do not have any knowledge about security and may
want to know about threats in ubiquitous systems as they are involved in the
design or implementation process of them.
Chapter 2
The Attacker Model
This chapter defines the attacker model. The first section describes the method-
ology by addressing two questions: is it possible to define a comprehensive
attacker model for such a plethora of systems associated with Ubiquitous Com-
puting? Moreover, does it make sense to do this? Section 2 defines the attacker
model and Section 3 presents an initial qualitative analysis of two cases of study.
Part of the work described in this chapter has already been published in [26], [28]
and [27].
2.1 Defining a Methodology
Before going into the methodology, a simple idea may help to explain the
methodology: Historically security was born to protect communication that
needed to be private and confidential. The content of this communication ranges
from innocent private messages to military orders, political strategies etc., in-
formation whose disclosure would have changed the balance of power between
opposite forces. Methods of concealing messages went from folding the message
and hiding it in secret places, to letter substitution performed according to a
secret scheme (e.g. classic alphabetic and polyalphabetic ciphers like the Caesar
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Cipher). The attacker then tried to unveil messages and, when this succeeded,
new and more secure systems were defined in order to address the new threat.
Figure 2.1 illustrates this Attacker System Causality Loop where current attacker
capabilities evolve and new ones emerge in each cycle. This dynamics can be
related to technology development or simply to the attacker being smarter. This
results in the evolution of the systems to address the newly discovered security
issues. If we call the set of abilities/capabilities of the attacker an Attacker
Model, it should be clear how the design of a system and its security is closely
linked to the Attacker Model and vice versa. Indeed security goals are also
defined regardless of the attacker’s existence (e.g. the content of a letter should
be known only to the intended receivers or the illness affecting a patient should
be known only to the doctors and relevant medical staff), but in this work we
are only interested in the SystemDesign↔ AttackerModel relationship.
SECURE
DESIGN
TECH
DEVELOPMENT
ATTACKER
MODEL
Figure 2.1: Attacker System Causality Loop
To put it into the contest, the writer would like to give an example of three runs
of the loop within recent history of security.
Loop One - In 1983 Dolev and Yao wrote a well known paper[29] where
they formally defined an attacker model, the “Network Attacker” (described
informally in [48]), where an omnipotent attacker controls the network over
which messages are exchanged. This attacker does not have any power over the
cryptographic functions used by the communication processes, apart being able
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to perform encryption/decryption given that the key is known.
This model is a milestone in the history of security, nevertheless it relies on very
strong assumptions, among which:
• The attacker does not have any cryptoanalytical capability.
• The attacker does not have any “physical” dimension.
Loop Two - Starting from the first assumption, the Dolev-Yao model does
not deal with an attacker having cryptoanalytical skills, which would allow her
to find e.g. specific cypher-plaintext pairs or encryption/decryption keys. In
1993 Bellare and Rogaway in [13], defined a model based on the random oracle
paradigm, which connects cryptographic theory to cryptographic practice. This
model depicts a scenario where the attacker is able not only to control the
medium, but also to initiate new authentication sessions. Here participants are
represented as oracles which can be run by the attacker. Within this model it
is possible for an attacker to “open” sessions (discover keys) in a probabilistic
fashion (i.e. coin toss), and a protocol is said to be secure as long as the attacker
is not able to create or modify a message that would be afterwards authenticated
by the system.
Loop Three - In the 90s and more prominently in the 2000s, a new device
made it into the world as “secure repository” of cryptographic material: the
Smart Card [35]. Although several patents about SmartCards appeared in the
late 70s, this technology became extensively used with mobile phones in the
90s and with payment systems (e.g. EMV [31]) between the late 90s and early
2000s. The security of such devices has been very much discussed both in
terms of physical and protocol security. As a matter of fact the mere inclusion
of the smart card into the system has produced in some cases severe security
breaches due to the nature of the smart card device (see for example [46]).
In 1996 Rubin and Shoup in [55] extended the Bellare-Rogaway model, and
enabled it to deal with the use of Smart Cards. Specifically they modelled
Smart Cards as probabilistic oracles and, within the model, they defined also
the possibility for the attacker to know messages exchanged between smart card
and a communication process at any time. The main difference between smart
cards (i.e. Rubin-Shoup model) and computer based (i.e. Bellare-Rogaway
model) key exchange mechanisms, is that a smart card cannot keep track of
time, and it always acts as independent identity.
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2.1.1 Problem: How to Define a Universal Model for Such
Diverse Systems?
As the field of Ubiquitous Computing is enormous and its applications virtually
infinite, attacker modelling would seem rather an impossible task at first glance.
This is mainly due to the fact that the technologies involved are numerous (too
many protocols and cryptographic primitives), and even worse they increase
every year both with standard and proprietary solutions; the task of modelling
a general system itself could be unfeasible. Moreover even if a general model
could be produced, the chances are its applicability to real cases would be of no
use due to its generality.
Thinking about this complexity and variety, when defining an attacker model
for such systems one needs to take into account the following:
• The space of variables and features that come out has to be kept to a
minimum as it could easily explode.
• The resulting model, although very detailed and precise, could be impos-
sible to implement and/or analyse.
Therefore the need for a strong and sound methodology which addresses the
above issues step by step arises.
2.1.2 Solution: Inductive Approach
As security is ultimately about taking theory into practice, and attacking is
mostly about practice, a practical approach seems the most suitable one. In
order to identify the attacker the writer decided to use an Inductive approach:
first an attacker model for a subset of Ubiquitous Systems is defined, possibly
the ones that are more critical or where deployment of security is somehow
troublesome; then the model is expanded and tailored according to the system
one wants to analyse.
Defining the attacker, in practice, translates into answering questions like:
• What are the attacker’s capabilities, i.e. what is an attacker able to do?
• What is the attacker environment, i.e. where is she located?
• How much time does she have to perform an attack?
• What goals does the attacker have?
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• How skilled is the attacker?
• How motivated is the attacker for performing her actions?
Moreover considering how systems are designed helps in understanding attacker
strategies and give us a clearer picture of the attacker (remember the concept
expressed in Figure 2.1).
Looking at current trends and emerging technologies, and after considering what
are the systems that are more critical in terms of security, the writer decided to
use three types of systems as a basis for the inductive approach:
• Body Area Networks for healthcare applications.
• Legacy Wireless Sensor Networks.
• Energy Harvesting Wireless Sensor Networks.
Hence from the analysis of these systems, an attacker model is defined. This
can be then extended to ubiquitous systems in general.
These systems are a good and representative starting point, as they have strong
similarities as well as differences:
• Similarities
– They are composed of individual nodes communicating through radio
waves.
– Most devices are constrained in terms of memory and computing
power.
– Both systems are designed to monitor an object (e.g. environment
for WSN and vital signs for BAN) and perform actions based on
collected data.
• Differences
– Energy:
 WSNs have more stringent energy constraints.
 For BANs energy is not that critical since devices can often be
easily recharged.
– Space:
 WSNs are distributed over a larger area than BAN, from ' 50m
up to several kilometres.
 When WSNs are scattered over a large area, nodes usually do
not get recovered (mainly for economical reasons).
 BANs are located on the person and their application focus on
the body and on the immediate surrounding environment.
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– Duration:
 WSNs are designed to last for years, EH-WSNs can last virtually
indefinitely.
 BAN nodes’ energy lasts for days (sometimes even less than a
day).
– Technology:
 Opposite to BAN, WSNs have usually a more complex Data
link and Network layer1 as they need for example to implement
routing algorithms and they often use non-standard solutions.
 BANs make wide use of standard technologies which are more
common (e.g. Bluetooth and recently NFC).
2.2 Identifying Cyber Physical Attacker
The attacker domain has changed radically since computer science and computer
security have been born. After reading Chapter 1 and the first part of this
Chapter, it should be clear to the reader that attackers have a physical dimension
as well as a cyber one. But what does this mean practically speaking? How do
we identify and define this physical dimension?
In the following part of this section we are going to discuss it by defining three
dimensions: Intervention, Presence and Time (a similar approach has been
taken by Benenson et al. in [15] and [14]). Section 2.2.1 defines Presence and
Time while Section 2.2.2 Defines Intervention by first identifying the atomic
actions the attacker can make.
The writer afterwards will explain how the three dimensions interact with each
other and how are they to be interpreted with respect to attacker strength.
2.2.1 Presence and Time
Presence and Time are two dimensions which identify the attacker in space and
time. As the attacker is cyber-physical, these two dimensions have a physical
and a cyber connotation as well. These are closely linked as a physical feature
can be directly related to a cyber one, moreover a physical feature can enable
a cyber one and vice versa. Physically tampering with a device for example
enables the cyber control of it, while the remote control of say a smoke detector
1As in the OSI model in [34].
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could raise a fire alarm, as the attacker was there herself pushing the alarm
button. Therefore, while considering these dimensions, one has to take into
account this cyber-physical aspect.
Presence - Defines to what extent and over which area the attacker exerts
some influence or control. As we have already seen in Chapter 1, Ubiquitous
Systems can be schematised as a set of nodes interconnected by a network;
within this schema presence is defined to be either local, distributed or global.
Figure 2.2 gives a graphical representation of presence.
Local                 Distributed                 Global
Figure 2.2: Presence
Presence is strongly dependent on the system at hand, more significantly than
other dimensions. It is not easy to differentiate between local, distributed or
global attacker in a Body Area Network, where all the devices are separated by
tens of centimetres. This is clearly not the case for wireless sensor networks,
where the typical device-to-device distance goes from meters to hundreds of me-
ters, so identifying presence is more straightforward. Moreover in Body Area
Networks, looking at the fact that every device performs a specialised operation
(e.g. a temperature sensor, a heart meter, glucose meter or an insulin pump),
compromising one sensor could very well mean that the whole system is compro-
mised, thus getting a localised action to produce a global effect. On the other
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hand, in systems such as Wireless Sensor Networks, there are more devices in
terms of number, and more of a kind (e.g. more than one temperature, humidity
or pressure sensor, more than one routing node, more than one processing node
etc.), therefore the compromising of one does not imply the compromising of
the whole; moreover security is usually dealt with by a distributed dynamic ap-
proach (e.g. key distribution algorithms based on master keys and peer-to-peer
session keys). The main difference between WSNs and BANs is that the latter
are seen as a whole system, which needs all its parts to function properly, while
in the former each device can be seen as independent, and its existence is not
critical to the correct operation of the network.
Time - Complementing Presence, Time expresses the time span which the
attacker needs or uses or has at her disposal to perform an attack. It is not
merely a problem of defining the passing of time strictly in terms of seconds,
minutes or hours (seconds for a system could mean hours or days for another
e.g. finding a 40-bit key takes much less time than a 128-bit one). In this
work Time is generically identified as time-frames that are labelled either as
short-span, long-span or multiple-spans (see Figure 2.3). The first two relate to
a continuous time interval that can be either “long” or “short”. Multiple-spans
refers to the case where an attack needs multiple related intervals to be carried
out (e.g. replay attacks).
Short-Span
Long-Span
Multiple-Spans
Figure 2.3: Time
In some cases multiple-spans can also be a combination of short-spans and long-
spans. To give a simple example think about a replay-attacks: it happens over a
multiple-span, a combination of eavesdropping and transmitting actions which
can be regarded as short-spans. One of the case studies in Section 2.3 will give
a more detailed and practical example of this.
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2.2.2 Atomic Actions and Interventions
At this point Intervention is the only dimension that remains to define. It is the
key dimension of the model as it describes the actions an attacker can perform.
In order to better understand intervention and relate it to specific systems,
the writer identified a set of Atomic Actions. These are the basic bricks of
intervention. Depending on the system at hand, one can derive the forms of
intervention in a relatively straightforward manner by identifying the atomic
actions that apply to it through the analysis of their feasibility.
Atomic actions fall into into three sets:
• Medium/Channel.
• Physical.
• Cryptography.
Medium/Channel atomic actions are those that the attacker performs on the
communication channel or the medium (e.g. the electromagnetic domain for
radio based communication systems). Some of them are typical of the Network
Attacker (as in [29]), they are actions that solely interact with messages and/or
data sent over the channel: listen, inject, intercept, destroy, modify.
The other two atomic actions of this set are: localise, selective block of
destination/source communication links. The first one is the action of lo-
calising a device. It is different from system to system and implies a combination
of listen and some knowledge about the geometry of the environment. The
second one is very interesting, it refers to the ability of blocking the communica-
tion in one way only, whenever the attacker needs it. This can be very powerful
in presence of asynchronous communications.
Physical atomic actions aim to define the actions the attacker can perform in
the physical world. These are: tamper, switch on/off (e.g. by removing
and inserting battery), decrease energy, increase energy, crash device
and forge sensor reading. Indeed these actions are not exhaustive, tamper
for example means that the attacker accesses the device hardware and tam-
pers with it, but the outcome of this actions could be numerous. An attacker
could tamper with the device to get access to its memory, to reprogram it
or to perform some sort of cryptographic actions (e.g. side channel attacks).
Switch on/off, decrease energy and increase energy concern with physi-
cal actions that influence the power and energy of the device. It is important
to stress the “physical” component in this case, since the energy of a device
could be decreased also by using Medium/Channel actions (e.g. inject traffic)
to force devices to lose energy by transmitting; decrease energy instead has
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to be physical (e.g. direct discharge of a battery, or interference with the energy
harvesting unit). Finally crash device is the physical destruction of a device
while forge sensor reading refers to the case where the attacker forges the
reading of a sensor for example by warming up a temperature sensor or alarming
a smoke detector.
Cryptography is a set of atomic actions concerning cryptographic abilities of the
attacker. These are either:
• Mathematical: the attacker has cryptoanalytical abilities.
• Resource based: the attacker has the resources to perform heavy cryp-
tographic operations like factorisation or brute forcing of long keys ([57]
discusses the key length against attacker’s resources).
• Technical: the attacker exploits hardware vulnerabilities or insecure im-
plementations. [7] is a striking example, here the authors managed to
bypass the physical security protection of the target device (a device used
both for military and civilian application), and discover the access key and
get full read/write access to the secure protected memory.
Cryptography atomic actions are summarised in break encryption (e.g. key
attacks), find key (e.g. by SPA, DPA [37]), exploit insecure crypto imple-
mentation (weak random number generator or re-keying methods, side channel
attacks).
The role of atomic actions is to give a better understanding of interventions and
help to identify the abilities needed by the attacker to perform them, especially
when it comes to apply them to very different systems.
Intervention - As already specified in Section 2.1.2, this work bases on BANs
and EH-WSNs since these are more critical, as they have limitations which
affect their secure design. Nevertheless the interventions specified here can be
extended to other systems. There are nine forms of intervention:
i. Destruction: the attacker can destroy one or more devices2.
ii. Eavesdropping : the attacker can receive and store messages sent between
devices.
2Here the term device is generic for BAN and WSN where it refers to nodes or sensors.
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iii. Data Knowledge: the attacker can acquire the data stored on one or more
devices (e.g. by dumping the whole memory).
iv. Disturb/Partial Data Modification: the attacker can partially modify data
on a device (without direct access to the memory e.g. by injecting data
into the network).
v. Full Data Modification: the attacker can fully modify data stored on a
device (with direct access to the memory).
vi. Reprogramming : the attacker can reprogram a device.
vii. Device Injection: the attacker inserts new devices into the network.
viii. Energy Reduction: the attacker can reduce the device energy, or control
its depletion rate.
ix. Energy Control : the attacker can exploit the energy level of a device in a
malicious way.
Some of them express rather simple actions (e.g. destruction), while others
can be more complex depending on the system at hand. Interventions can be
composed to achieve more complex and different purposes depending on the
attacker will.
Destruction Is the most simple and basic intervention: the destruction of a
device. It happens when a device ceases to exist within a network or a
system. Although it seems a pretty physical intervention it is not; it could
very well be that the device is believed to be destroyed by the system but
in fact its connection has been severed somehow (e.g. by taking out the
battery, depleting its energy, DoS attack, the node moved out of range).
Anyway the outcome of this is that the very same device will never come
back into the network or system.
Eavesdropping Is the act of listening to the communication channel. It is
the only passive intervention: the attacker does not alter the system in
anyway if he just overhears communications. It could indeed happen that
eavesdropping is the result of another active intervention, e.g. a node
reprogrammed to relay messages to the attacker; nevertheless this inter-
vention reflects the fact the attacker gets hold of a packet. Furthermore
eavesdropping a packet does not mean that its contents are intelligible: it
could very well be that messages are encrypted and the attacker does not
have the key nor the abilities to decrypt it. Nevertheless the attacker could
be able to get other information out of the messages such as source and
destination, type of message, traffic characteristics. Starting from that,
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using statistical methods such as traffic analysis, she could recover more
detailed information about e.g. network topology or the role of specific
devices. Eavesdropping is also the first step in several attacks as it is used
to probe networks for devices and physically locate them.
Data Knowledge Expresses the ability of knowing part or even the whole
content of the memory of a device. This can be done either by dumping
the memory of the device or by extracting the value from the environment.
The contents of the memory of a device depend on its activities and on
the environment it is surrounded by. Now, depending on the value the
attacker wishes to know, in some cases this could be evaluated from the
environment (e.g. the temperature value stored in a sensor). It could also
be that the attacker gets hold of cryptographic material (e.g. keys, nonces,
identities, etc.), thus giving her legitimate access to the system.
Disturb/Partial Data Modification Is the act of modifying part of the data
stored in the device memory by disturbing the legitimate functioning of it.
This is done without direct access to the memory of the device. The value
is fed into the memory by changing the corresponding logic or physical
value. In the case of a temperature sensor for example, a disturbing action
would be to change the local temperature of the sensor thus producing a
false information. To give an example regarding logic layers, an attacker
could tamper with routing tables or exploit MAC protocols by injecting
false data into the network.
Full Data Modification Is the ability to completely modify the data mem-
ory3 of a device. Contrary to Disturb/Partial Data Modification, this
intervention assumes that the attacker has physical access to the device.
Needless to say that this is a very powerful intervention: modifying the
whole memory of a device could radically change its behaviour. Thinking
about security only, a device could be forced into accepting another one
as legitimate, and therefore exchange confidential data with it.
Reprogramming Is by far the most powerful, intrusive and possibly danger-
ous intervention: the reprogramming of a device. When an attacker is
able to carry it out, she is in complete control of a legitimate device and
the actions she can take are limited only by her own imagination apart
from the device specifications of course. Reprogramming could be done
locally, with direct access to the device, but it could very well be the case
that legitimate remote mechanisms are exploited (e.g. firmware upgrades
as in [58]). Surely reprogramming can be also used to achieve other inter-
ventions, but this will be explained better in Section 2.2.3.
3This is the memory that contains the data. The memory containing the program is
assumed to be a different one.
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Device Injection Is the injection of new devices in the network or the system
in general. This means that the attacker is able to have the system accept
a new device, with all its implications: the device is authenticated and
trusted, a legitimate part of the system. This intervention is as powerful
as Reprogramming, since an injected device’s behaviour depends on its
programming, which in this case is decided by the attacker; but there
is more to it. A reprogrammed device still has the same hardware as a
legitimate one. In the case of an injected device this is not true anymore.
The attacker could choose a device which has a different hardware and
therefore different capabilities. Even just a more capable processing unit or
more memory could give the attacker a substantial advantage, especially in
systems where devices are limited by design. Like Reprogramming, Device
Injection could very well be a step to carry out more complex attacks;
again we will see more in Section 2.2.3.
Energy Reduction With this intervention the attacker aims to reduce the en-
ergy of a device. This reduction can be partial or complete, depending
on the attacker goals and on the system resilience. The reduction can be
the result of direct (i.e. on-device) or indirect approaches. In the first
case the attacker would need to have physical access to the device whilst
in the latter she would reduce energy by stimulating device activity (e.g.
transmission, computing, actuators). This intervention together with En-
ergy Control, comes prominently into the picture with systems composed
by energy constrained devices, and more generally with systems whose
behaviour strongly depend on the energy available. This is the case of
WSNs and EH-WSNs where nodes have limited energy which they need
to measure out accurately, especially when it comes to security: the exe-
cution of cryptographic primitives has an energy overhead that can easily
kill the energy supply of the device. The analysis of the energy cost of
cryptography and communication has been researched throughout the last
ten years. [51], [24] and [56] show that the cost of computation is often
negligible with respect to the cost of transmitting and receiving data (i.e.
the overhead due to the secure implementation).
Energy Control While energy reduction expresses the ability of reducing the
energy of a device, Energy Control completes the scenario by adding the
ability to control the amount of energy of the attacked device, that is not
only its depletion but its increase as well. This intervention is a direct
consequence of the development of energy harvesting technologies. The
fact that a device has a variable energy supply changes the rules of the
game completely. While before a node was supposed to last for a limited
amount of time, now it can last more, virtually forever. Moreover more
complex and heavier cryptographic solutions can now be employed, given
that the device has sufficient energy to do this when the time comes.
At a first sight it could seem that energy harvesting produces stronger
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security and does not weaken it. Unfortunately that is not true as the
author argues in [26], [28] and [27]. To give an example, Taddeo et al. in
[60] present a EH-WSN system that provides QoS in secure and energy
preserving communication. Here messages are defined by two properties:
• Priority: from low to high.
• Security: from low to high, with different combinations of properties
(e.g. confidentiality, integrity etc.).
A message is sent only when the node has the right amount of energy to
do so (with respect to all other messages). Highest priority messages are
sent first, with the most secure policy possible according to the energy
available. Now by exploiting Energy Control or Energy Reduction the
attacker could force the device to send out HighPriority/HighSecurity
messages with a lower security characteristic, effectively changing the mes-
sage from HighPriority/HighSecurity → HighPriority/LowSecurity,
violating the security policy. This is a small but powerful example of what
can happen if a system is not securely designed against a correct attacker
model.
Interventions are modular. The attacker may have a subset of them or the
whole, depending on her strength, and each and every one of them comes with
a cost4.
After reading about interventions, it should be clear to the reader that each
and every one of them represents the result of a series of atomic actions that
together lead to the corresponding intervention. These actions are different
for every system, e.g. approximate localisation of a device through Eavesdrop-
ping in a BAN is very much different from that in a WSN: BAN are short range,
highly localised systems, therefore when you have detected a device you are in
its proximity, more notably the whole system is there; whilst when it comes to
WSN, localising a specific node requires more complex operations (e.g. triangu-
lating the signal) and, since signal spreads through a wider area, even more time
depending on the resources at the attacker’s disposal. Thinking about more pe-
culiar interventions, Energy Control and Energy Reduction depends very much
on the type of energy source the devices have.
2.2.3 Relationships Between and Within Dimensions
In the first part of this section the author has defined the attacker’s dimensions,
namely the space and time domain she moves over and the actions she can
4See Section 2.2.4.
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perform. What remains to be discussed is how dimensions interact with each
other and what assumptions or implications each element may have with respect
to the attacker’s identity. Moreover interventions deserve a further analysis for
several reasons:
• They constitute the most complex dimension.
• They describes the actual abilities of the attacker (i.e. what she can and
cannot do).
• Some interventions may very well depend on others.
Presence and Time
Presence and Time can be analysed either independently (i.e. the value of one
is fixed while the other changes), or by relating ones value to the others. This
concept is shown in Figure 2.4.
Time
P
re
s
e
n
c
e Time Constant
P
r
e
s
e
n
c
e
 C
o
n
s
ta
n
t
(a)
Time
P
re
s
e
n
c
e
I D
(b)
Figure 2.4: Presence and Time Relation
In the case of Figure 2.4a, Presence and Time are unrelated to each other. With
respect to Presence, going from local to distributed and global makes the attacker
more and more powerful since she is able to exert her influence over a larger part
of the system. On the other hand, with respect to time, going from short-span
to long-span enables the attacker to more complex attacks5, and gives her a
better knowledge about the system and the data it encompasses.
Looking at it from another angle (Figure 2.4b), Presence and Time can be
related in an inversely (I) or directly (D) proportional fashion. Specifically:
5In this analysis multiple-spans are enabled by long-spans.
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• Direct proportionality between Time and Presence is the most obvious
relation: the wider the area the attacker influences, the more time she
has at her disposal. Extending the area of influence requires a stronger
attacker, therefore it seems only natural that she is allowed for more time
too (Figure 2.4b line “D”).
• On the other hand, considering that an attacker might want to go un-
detected, influencing a large part of a system (possibly the whole) for a
long time, would most likely be noticed right away. Therefore the attacker
might prefer another approach: either influence a big area for a short time
or do it on a small area for a long time (Figure 2.4b line “I”).
At this point it is possible to make a first remark about the attacker’s strength.
It is shown in Figure 2.5: the strength grows together with Time and Presence.
That means that an attacker needs to be stronger if she wants to expand is
temporal or spatial influence.
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Figure 2.5: Attacker’s Strength with Respect to Presence and Time
This strength can be quantified in terms of resources the attacker has at its
disposal, but we will see more about this in Section 2.2.4.
Interventions
While reading about Interventions, the thought that Interventions are not inde-
pendent between one another has probably crossed the mind of the reader. As
a matter of fact some of them present similarities (e.g. Energy Reduction and
Energy Control): one intervention may well be a mandatory step for the real-
isation of another (e.g. localisation through Eavesdropping and Destruction)
or a consequence of another. Moreover the strength of an intervention could
be augmented by another one. For example having Energy Reduction together
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with Eavesdropping (which enables localisation), strengthens the first one by
allowing the attacker for local energy reduction. In fact, without localising the
device, the attacker would have less means to carry out Energy Reduction (e.g.
generate false traffic).
There are three relations that link together interventions:
• Consequence: an intervention is the consequence of another one.
• Strengthen/Support: an intervention augment the strength of another one
by supporting it.
• Imitation: an intervention have an effect that imitate another intervention
without the need for this to be carried out.
Table 2.1 details the connection between each intervention. Each intervention
of the first column is linked to one in the first row by one of the three defined
relations.
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i. Destruction / S
ii. Eavesdropping S / C S S S S S S
iii. Data Knowledge / S S S S
iv. Disturb/Partial
Data Modification
/ S S S
v. Full Data Modifica-
tion
/ S S S
vi. Reprogramming I C S S / S S S
vii. Device Injection S S S / S S
viii. Energy Reduction I I /
ix. Energy Control I I /
S - Strengthen/Support, I - Imitation, C - Consequence
Table 2.1: Relationship between interventions
To explain Table 2.1:
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1. Destruction: can support device injection by favouring the insertion of a
new device into the system in order to provide for the disappearance of
the destroyed device.
2. Eavesdropping : has a relationship with all the interventions since is needed
as a first step to discover devices, and then to monitor them as a further
step. Specifically it can support Destruction by locating the device, the
same goes with Full Data Modification and Disturb/Partial Data Modifi-
cation. By monitoring the network, the attacker could gain information
about the functioning of the system that she can then use to reprogram a
device or to inject one in the network. Finally eavesdropping can support
also Energy Control and Energy Reduction, depending on the specific im-
plementation of energy saving algorithms. Furthermore if the attacker can
make sense out of the data (i.e. they are not encrypted or the attacker
can decrypt it), this could bring to Data Knowledge.
3. Data Knowledge: can support Reprogramming and Device Injection in the
same manner that eavesdropping does. Similarly it supports also Energy
Control and Energy Reduction as the memory could store data about the
power and energy usage policy of the node.
4. Disturb/Partial Data Modification and Full Data Modification: can sup-
port Device Injection by forcing the system to accept a particular node.
With respect to energy, to modify the data of a device could mislead the
device into using its power in an anomalous manner, thus resulting in
Energy Control or Energy Reduction.
5. Reprogramming : as a reprogrammed device behaves at the attacker’s will,
this intervention can be related to all the others. Specifically it imitates
Destruction since a reprogrammed device, although physically the same,
can be seen as a complete new device, thus the old one ceasing to ex-
ists. A reprogrammed device can relay messages, enabling Eavesdropping.
Furthermore it can support all other interventions, apart Full Data Mod-
ification which requires physical access to the device.
6. Device Injection: very similar to reprogramming, has the same relation-
ship with all the interventions apart Destruction: as the injected device
is physically a new device, it does not imitate destruction as Reprogram-
ming does.
7. Energy Reduction and Energy Control : these two interventions imitate
Destruction, since they can deplete the energy of a device, and Distur-
b/Partial Data Modification, since changing the energy level of a device
interferes with its normal operations.
2.2 Identifying Cyber Physical Attacker 29
2.2.4 Considerations over the attacker strength
In this section the author wishes to make some considerations and remarks about
the attacker strength, so that the reader is aware of this aspect, specifically how
the attacker’s strength influences the model, and how much the design of a
system strongly depends on the assumptions made about the attacker strength.
When it comes to design and implement security in a system, one has to consider
two things:
1. The attacker model, which we extensively talked about in the previous
part of this chapter.
2. The attacker strength and how this interacts with the model.
It is common practice to quantify the attacker’s strength by the money she puts
into resources (see [57, Chapter 7]). This is indeed a very convenient way since
one does not have to focus on computing power, memory, time or other resources
alone, but one assumes that these resources can be acquired somehow with a
common mean (e.g. money). This method becomes very effective when it is
possible to quantify exactly the strength needed for a specific attack. This is
the case of cryptography and cryptographic keys, where the amount of resources
needed to find a specific key can be physically expressed in terms of memory and
time. Table 2.2, taken from [57], shows a classification of attacker’s resources in
terms of money and type of technology the correspondent attacker uses.
Attacker Budget Hardware
“Hacker” 0 PC(s)
< $400 PC(s)/FPGA
0 “Malware”
Small Organisation $10k PS(s)/FPGA
Medium Organisation $300k FPGA/ASIC
Large Organisation $10M FPGA/ASIC
Intelligence Agency $300M ASIC
Table 2.2: Classification of the Attacker in Terms of Resources - Source [57]
Before considering the strength of the attacker with respect to her actions (i.e.
atomic actions and interventions), it is only logic to start from the dimensions
over which these actions are carried out: Presence and Time. In Section 2.2.3
the writer already gave a classification of the attacker strength in terms of
Presence and Time now looking at Table 2.2 it is possible to make further
considerations with respect to the type of attacker.
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Considering presence this is the case where the physical and cyber features of
the attacker part away from each other. Weak attackers (i.e. Hacker) surely do
not have the resources to be in multiple physical locations at the same time,
whereas strong attackers do (i.e. large organisations and intelligence agencies).
On the other hand a weaker attacker could still get to have a global cyber control
over a system.(e.g. through malware or botnets).
With respect to strength, time has to be analysed from two perspectives:
• Time as a measure of the period during which the attacker controls the
system.
• Time as a measure of the physical time needed for an attack.
In the first case the strength of the attacker is directly proportional to the time,
in the second case it is quite the opposite. For example to find a key back
in 1996, an hacker needed 222 days to break a 45 bit key while an intelligence
agency would have done it in 73 days for a 75 bit key (source [57],[17]). On the
other hand thinking about controlling a system, the stronger the attacker, the
longer the time she is able to exert her control.
After having considered strength against presence and time, interventions and
atomic actions come along. The outcome of every intervention depends very
much on the attacker’s strength: it is closely linked with how much the inter-
vention can benefit from an attacker that is stronger with respect to time or
presence or both. In the case of an attacker who wants to perform traffic analy-
sis, eavesdropping a network with a global adversary for a short time would be
less effective than a local or distributed adversary, which is able to eavesdrop
for a considerable amount of time. Similarly having a global attacker that exert
Energy Reduction for a short time is definitely more threatening than one that
does it locally for long time.
Ultimately is the attacker strength with respect to atomic actions that matters6.
These are very much quantifiable since each action requires specific resources,
depending on the system, which can be classified with respect to strength levels.
Medium channel actions for instance, as well as physical, can be quantified on
the hardware the attacker uses e.g.: type of antennas, computing power, memory
dimension etc. Cryptographic actions instead require perhaps a different type of
resources, from computing facilities up to laboratories (e.g. for power analysis).
Knowing about attacker strength and how it affects the model is very important
when someone wants to perform a quantitative security analysis of a system, as
the work done in this thesis aims to do. This will be clearer in Chapters 3 and
6Remember that interventions are composed by atomic actions.
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4.
2.3 Case Studies: Qualitative Analysis
In this Section two case studies are presented, an insulin pump system (defined
in [43]), and a WSN for area monitoring (defined in [52]).
2.3.1 The Insulin Pump System
The Insulin Pump system is composed of five wirelessly interconnected devices:
the insulin pump, a remote control, a glucose meter, a continuous glucose sensor
and a PDA. By looking at interventions and their interactions, Disturb/Partial
Data Modification is the major threat for this kind of systems: by forging false
commands an attacker would be able to modify insulin doses. Eavesdropping can
lead to Disturb/Partial Data Modification (see Table 2.1), and with respect to
Eavesdropping it is possible to: (a) listen on data by finding the frequency and
get the suitable hardware (easy according to [43]), (b) read and understand data
since no encryption is used.
Going further to Disturb/Partial Data Modification, it is possible to forge and
send false commands to the system since: (c) the PIN is sent in clear, (d) the
parameters of the CRC, which is an integrity check algorithm, can be easily
found.
By looking at atomic actions, the designer would have been aware of these
threats by considering listen for (a) and (b), and inject for (c) and exploit crypto
implementation for (d) although CRC is not a cryptographic algorithm per se,
anyway finding its parameters is similar to finding secrets of hash functions or
digital signatures. The issue about the counter, found in [43], is not a major
threat as long as (a,b,c,d) are addressed, on the contrary it is a normal practice
to accept counter values higher than the last received one in remote radio control
systems since it is very likely that a counter increases just because the remote
control is triggered while the receiver is out of range.
Up to now, our approach helped us to find major threats which were already
known in [43], but the analysis goes further on. Assuming the designer has
fixed (a,b,c,d) by proper and efficient measures (e.g. ensuring confidentiality by
using lightweight cryptography standards like [36]), our attacker model prompt
us to explore other possibilities. Looking at Data Knowledge or at cryptographic
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atomic actions, like Differential Power Analysis (DPA [37]), it could be possible
for the attacker to get hold of cryptographic keys or achieve Reprogramming thus
bringing back (a,b,c,d) all together. What we want to stress here is that 100%
security can not be accomplished. It is only a matter of what level of security
the designer wants to achieve. In this case, if for the attacker is impossible,
or better very unlikely, to get hold of a device, than the designer could simply
ignore further threats. Besides it would be strongly recommended that every
insulin pump system has an independent set of keys, so that if one system is
compromised, all others are still safe.
2.3.2 FleGSens, a WSN Area Monitoring System
The FleGSens system [52] is a WSN for monitoring trespasses in an area under
surveillance. It is composed of two main kind of devices: gateways and sensors.
Gateways receive the transmissions from the sensors, organise data and relay it
to the control centre. Sensors are scattered throughout the surveilled area, they
are equipped with an infrared sensor to detect movements.
The system makes use of AES-128 block cipher which is used only to authenti-
cate messages, this means that data are sent in clear (as for the insulin pump)
but they cannot be forged without knowledge of the key. Each sensor stores
a key preshared with the gateways which is used to authenticate each message
sent by the sensor.
Within FleGSens there are two protocols in place that were designed to strengthen
the system both in terms of efficiency and security:
• Trespass Detection Protocol.
• Node Failure Detection Protocol.
The first one organises neighbouring nodes in small clusters which gather collec-
tive information about trespasses and send it in one transmission only. This is
done for several reasons: to prevent one event triggering traffic flooding and to
avoid false positives due for example to animals or similar sporadic events. To
do this a sensor recognise a movement as a trespass only if two movements are
detected within a variable time usually set to 10 seconds. Therefore if a sensor
registers two movements more than 10 seconds apart, it disregards them.
The second protocol is needed to detect node failures, so that failed nodes can
be repaired or replaced. It is important to note that this protocol would mark as
failed also nodes that have been destroyed or whose battery has been depleted
or taken off.
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There are also other protocols among which localisation protocols, that enable
sensor localisation to know where a trespass has happened, and routing protocols
which establish multiple routes between sensors and gateways to ensure that
messages reach the destination.
Looking at the interventions the attacker might carry out several threats: she
could make her way through the network by depleting the energy of the nodes;
this can be achieved by replying old messages, thus making nodes waste energy
in the processing. Thinking about a more elaborate threat, the attacker might
reprogram a device, getting hold of the cryptographic material. With a repro-
grammed device she could then tamper with the routing algorithms, triggers
false alarms or overload the communication system. She could also get the lo-
cation of the nodes through the location protocol and exploit this information
in some way. As messages are only authenticated and not encrypted, some of
these threats could be achieved simply by eavesdropping the packets from safe
distance.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter the author defined the attacker model. First a methodology
based on the inductive approach was discussed. Specifically the attacker model is
developed around WSNs, EH-WSNs and BANs. After the model is introduced.
The attacker is defined by three dimensions: Interventions, Presence and Time.
The relationship between the dimensions is then discussed in connection with
the attacker strength. At the end of the chapter two case studies are introduced.
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Chapter 3
Quantitative Modelling
In this chapter an implementation of the attacker model is presented. The first
part of the chapter introduces the modelling language, the PRISM Language,
while the second specifies how the model is implemented and how properties
can be analysed within it.
3.1 Choosing a Suitable Modelling Language
In Chapter 2 the attacker model which this work is based on was introduced, the
next step is to choose a proper modelling technique, namely a suitable modelling
language and a model checker.
To achieve this, it is necessary to:
1. Draw a list of requirements that the model has to fulfil.
2. Investigate what classes of models fall into the requirements.
3. Find a suitable modelling language that models those classes.
that
Looking at the model, concerning the requirements, it is clear that:
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• The three dimensions have to be explicitly or implicitly modelled.
• A way to quantify the security of a system, or its parts, should be provided.
• The attacker strength has to be taken into account.
• As some Atomic Actions have a probability of success (e.g. eavesdropping
a transmission) the model should be able to implement this probabilities.
From this list there are two terms that are directly or indirectly underlined:
quantitative and probabilistic. Looking at the dimensions: Time is a quantity,
Presence is a quantity, the success of an intervention can be expressed in terms of
probabilities. The security of a system can be quantified through the probability
of violating one or more parts of it and with respect to the attacker a system
provides different levels of security according to her strength (cf. Table 2.2).
Furthermore as ubiquitous systems devices can be defined in terms of the tech-
nical resources or energy constraints they have, a quantitative model would be
able to make use of these information. Finally one has to take into account
that different systems require different levels of security: in [33] for example, a
detection grid for cane toads is defined. This is a system used to monitor the
whereabouts of cane toads for scientific purposes; clearly such a system does not
have the same security requirements as systems for health care, sensor networks
for military applications or border monitoring (e.g. [59]), therefore a suitable
modelling language should allow for a quantitative analysis that can express a
measure for the security level of a system.
Looking at the requirements we can consider four classes of models which could
be useful to describe the type of systems which this work focuses on, namely Dis-
crete Time Markov Chains, Continuous Time Markov Chains, Markov Decision
Processes and Probabilistic Timed Automata.
Discrete Time Markov Chain
A Markov Chain is a mathematical system that models the transitions from one
state to another. In a Discrete Time Markov Chain every transition accounts for
a time unit, and time is a discrete integer value. The main property of Markov
chains is called memorylessness, it means that every state of the chain depends
only on the previous one. Furthermore Markov Chains have other properties
depending on the type of system described, these are:
• Reducibility: a chain is irreducible if is possible to get from any state to
any state, otherwise is said to be reducible.
• Recurrency: a state j is said to be recurrent if the probability of going
back to it (possibly after an infinite time) is equal to 1. It is positively
recurrent if the time to return to j is finite. A state j is an absorbing state
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when is not possible to leave it. A state j is said to be periodic if there
exists an integer k such that it is possible to return to j in a number of
steps which is a multiple of k.
• Ergodicity: a state is said to be ergodic if it is not periodic and it is
positively recurrent.
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Figure 3.1: Discrete Time Markov Chain
Figure 3.1 shows an example of a DTMC. A probability of occurrence is assigned
to each transition. Notably the probabilities of the transitions originating from
the same node need to sum to one.
Continuous Time Markov Chain
A Continuous Time Markov Chain models stochastic processes where time is
continuous and the time spent in a state follows an exponential distribution (see
Formula 3.1).
f(t, λ) = λe−λt, t ≥ 0 (3.1)
Transitions between states are specified by a rate λ which is a parameter for the
exponential distribution; it expresses the number of transitions per time unit
(e.g. seconds or minutes).
Figure 3.2 shows an example of a CTMC. Whenever there are two or more tran-
sitions originating from a state, the time spent in a state follows an exponential
distribution where the rate is given by the sum of all outgoing transition rates:
the time spend in state B for example is given by an exponential distribution
with parameter λ2 + λ4. It is still possible to compute a probability of taking a
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Figure 3.2: Continuous Time Markov Chain
transition, this is given by:
P [Tk] =
λk∑n
j=1 λj
(3.2)
where Tk is transition k. Taking the CTMC in Figure 3.2 for example, the
probability of going from B to A is given by1:
P [t+  = A|t = B] = λ4
λ2 + λ4
Memorylessness still applies: given the state at a time t, the evolution of the
system is independent of the events which happened before t.
Markov Decision Process
A Markov Decision Process is a formalism used to model systems that show
both probabilistic and non-deterministic behaviour.
“Nondeterminism is an essential tool to capture several different aspects of sys-
tem behaviour:
• unknown environment : if the system interacts with other components
whose behaviour is unknown, this can be modelled with non-determinism;
• concurrency : in a distributed system comprising multiple components op-
erating in parallel, non-determinism is used to represent the different pos-
sible interleavings of the executions of the components;
1In the equation t +  with  very small is used to represent a point in time after the
transition from the state the system was at time t.
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• underspecifcation: if certain parts of a system are either unknown or too
complex to be modelled efficiently, these can be abstracted away using
non-determinism.”2
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Figure 3.3: Markov Decision Process
An example of an MDP is shown in Figure 3.3. It is similar to a DTMC, as
time is discrete (i.e. a transition happens after one unit of time is passed)
and probabilities are assigned to transitions. The only difference is the non-
determinism, which is expressed by multiple sets of choices coming out from a
state, within each set the probabilities sum to one. In Figure 3.3 for example,
originating from state B there is a non-deterministic choice between states (C,A)
with probability (P1, 1− P1) or state D.
Modelchecking MDPs takes two steps: first all non-determinisms has to be
resolved, then the model is checked as a DTMC. How non-determinism can be
resolved is shown in Section 3.2.
the last state. over the last k states.
Probabilistic Timed Automata
A Probabilistic Timed Automaton is a Markov Decision Process augmented with
clocks and constraints on clocks. Clocks are real values that measure the passing
of real time. There can exist multiple clocks and they can be independently
reset. A state or a transition can be constrained to a specific range of values of
a clock.
Figure 3.4 shows an example of a PTA: x is a clock, each state is labelled with
a constraint on the time, it is possible to be in state A only when x < 2, a
2Quoted from [32].
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Figure 3.4: Probabilistic Timed Automata
transition from A to C and D can happen only when x > 1 and when the
transition happens the clock is reset to zero (x := 0). Transitions are also
labelled with probabilities.
To model DTMCs, CTMCs, MDPs and PTAs the writer chose the PRISM
language and model checker. PRISM is known for its efficiency, the complexity
of the models which it can address and its reliability; it has been widely used in
the research community for diverse applications, ranging from real-time systems,
communication and multimedia protocols, to game theory, power management,
biology and security. It has a well structured property language which inherently
supports time, both discrete and continuous (depending on the model class). It
was for these reasons that the writer decided to use it in this work.
Compared to other modelling languages, in the literature there is another one
worth mentioning in comparison with PRISM: MODEST [18]. MODEST is a
modelling language for stochastic timed systems. “It combines concepts such as
non-determinism, probabilistic branching, real time and continuous probability
distributions in an orthogonal way such that precisely defined subsets of the
language correspond to well-known models that are amenable to model-checking,
for example Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTA) or Continuous-time Markov
Chains (CTMCs).”3
The positive feature about modest is that properties of the model, such as
continuous time, non-determinism etc. can be added orthogonally to the model,
then depending on the combination of these, the model has to be checked with
a suitable tool. This results in a complex modelling language to handle and also
in the need of multiple tools. Furthermore MODEST makes use of PRISM and
the PRISM language to check some models.
3Quoted from http://www.modestchecker.net/.
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Hence PRISM was chosen for several reasons:
1. Models examined in this work can be modelled with PRISM: it seems
natural to use PRISM directly so that models can be built and checked in
a more efficient, complete and coherent way.
2. PRISM has its own tool which provides a comprehensive framework for
building the model, its analysis and modelchecking.
3. PRISM provides for a well structured and defined use of rewards struc-
tures4 which are crucial for the analysis of the model.
3.2 Introducing PRISM
PRISM [42] is a probabilistic model checker, a tool used for formal modelling
and analysis of systems which exhibit a probabilistic, non-deterministic and
real-time behaviour. It supports Markov models in the form of Markov deci-
sion processes (MDP), discrete-time Markov chains (DTMC), continuous-time
Markov chains (CTMC) and probabilistic timed automata (PTA). The model
is defined using the PRISM language, a state-based language based on the Re-
active Modules formalism of Alur and Henzinger [5]. After the model has been
specified, desired properties can be analysed. Such properties can express ques-
tions like: “What is the probability that the system is attacked before data
are successfully transmitted?”, or “What is the probability of the system being
secure as long as the session is active?”. Such properties express quantitative
measures and therefore the model needs quantitative data as input, which is
taken from real systems specifications, or by modelling some parts of the sys-
tem (see Chapter 4).
When a PRISM model is built it is characterised by three parameters:
• States: the total number of states the model has.
• Init states: the number of initial states of the model.
• Transitions: the number of transitions between defined states.
These express the size of the model and the feasibility of its analysis. They
can easily grow exponentially depending on the implementation; this fact has
to be taken into account if one wants to define a model and check it against
some properties: if a model is too big then its modelchecking is not feasible. In
this case the model can be simplified by expressing it in another set of spaces
and transitions, or by performing statistical model checking. This is achieved
a sampling technique: a large number of random paths through the model are
4These will be introduced in Section 3.2.
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generated and the result of the given properties is evaluated on each run giving
an approximately correct result. For a detailed description of statistical model
checking please refer to [49].
As PRISM models express probabilistic and non-deterministic behaviour, it is
not possible to define exhaustively the model presented in Chapter 2, simply
because parts of the model have non-stochastic, unpredictable states. This
becomes clear when you think about reprogramming: PRISM can tell what is
the likelihood of a device/node being reprogrammed, but after that the outcome
of this action is obviously not predictable. On the other hand the purpose of
this work is to express the probability of a device being reprogrammed; after
that, other means of analysis need to be used to deal with this.
With respect to DTMCs, CTMCs, MDPs and PTAs, there are some remarks to
make on how PRISM models them:
1. DTMCs and MDPs: time is a discrete integer value.
2. CTMCs and PTAs: time is a continuous real value.
3. DTMCs and MDPs: transitions are assigned with probabilities, PRISM
checks whether these sum to one.
4. CTMCs: transitions are assigned with rates. The sum of the rates of the
transitions originating from the same node define the time spent in the
node itself, following the exponential distribution in Formula 3.1.
5. PTAs: transitions are assigned with probabilities and clock constraints
which identify the region of time where the transition happens.
Finally about non-determinism, PRISM resolves it through the use of Adver-
saries. An adversary is a resolution of the non-determinism of a model. An
adversary can be:
• Deterministic or randomised : the choice is either determined or made at
random.
• Memoryless adversary or Finite-memory adversary : each non-determin-
istic choice is based either over the last state only or over the last k states.
When checking MDPs, PRISM performs the analysis against all possible ad-
versaries and then, depending on the type of property checked, it reports the
minimum and the maximum probability of the event described by the property.
A PRISM model is composed of one or more modules which can interact with
each other. A module is defined by a number of local variables, that identify its
state, and a set of commands which specify its behaviour. The global state of
the whole model is determined by the local state of each module. Modules can
interact with each other by synchronising specific transitions, or by allowing a
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transition given the local state of another module e.g. module A variable x can
increase by one if and only if variable y of module B is true.
1 // definition of model type
2 dtmc || ctmc || mdp || pta
3
4 // global variables
5 global y : [1..10] init 1; // integer
6 global b : bool init true; // boolean
7
8 // constants
9 const int radius = 12; // integer
10 const double pi = 3.141592; // double
11 const double area = pi * radius * radius; // double
value computed by the given formula
12 const bool yes = true; // boolean value
13
14 // module definition
15 module dummy
16 x:[0..6] init 0; // local variables
17
18 // Commands
19 [] x!=6 -> 1:(x’=x+1);
20 [reset] x=6 -> 1:(x’=0);
21 endmodule
22
23 // Formula
24 formula double_x = x*x;
25
26 // Command structure:
27 [label] guard -> rate:( update)
28 [label] guard -> probability :( update)
Listing 3.1: An Example of a PRISM Model
Listing 3.1 shows a simple PRISM model, it comprises:
1. Line 2: model type, it has to be either ctmc, dtmc, mdp or pta.
2. Lines 5-6: global variables (these can be changed by any module).
3. Lines 9-12: constants values.
4. Lines 15-21: definition of a module, it contains local variables and a set
of commands.
5. Line 24: definition of a formula it comprises a name and an expression. It
can be used anywhere in the code as shorthand for the expression.
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The behaviour of module “dummy” is very simple, its state is identified by an
integer variable x which increases from 0 to 6 every step and at 6 resets to 0. A
command is composed by a label, a guard that expresses a condition that has
to be satisfied, and a set of updates which occur with a specific probability or a
rate (if it is a CTMC).
This work mainly concerns with DTMCs, MDPs and CTMCs, as these are the
suitable techniques for modelling the most common scenarios in the attacker
model this thesis deals with.
3.2.1 Properties and Rewards Structures
Once a model has been defined within PRISM, it can be analysed using property
specifications that can be augmented with reward structures. A reward structure
is simply a variable which increases or decreases by a user defined value. The
same reward can refer to multiple states or transitions, and have different values
for each one of them. In the case of Energy Control or Energy Reduction for
example, a reward structure can be used to get a probabilistic measure of how
many times the attacker managed to modify the energy level of a device or what
its average energy level is when exposed to such an attacker.
Listing 3.2 shows an example of a reward structure. Looking at the first two
rewards, imagine a model whose states are identified by a variable x, the model
is a DTMC: the reward “time” counts the overall time spent in the system
by summing the time spent in each state (multiplying it by one), the reward
“time by x” counts the time spent in each state multiplied by the number of the
state, this could express for example a computing process where the processing
time is directly dependent to a variable.
For the third and fourth reward imagine a model where an eavesdropper is mod-
elled, reward 3 counts the number of eavesdropped transmissions by counting
the number of times the transition [success_eavesdropping] is taken. Reward 4
counts the number of trials the eavesdropper does by counting the successful
eavesdrops plus the failures. Note that the failures are counted by passing
through a state, this is possible since time is discrete (i.e. the model is either
a DTMC or MDP). Reward 4 is an example of how a reward structure can be
composed of different events (being in a state or performing a transition).
Once a model has been defined along with rewards structures, it can be analysed
through the definition of properties. There are three type of properties identified
by three operators:
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1 // the model is a discrete time markov chain
2 dtmc
3
4 // Reward 1
5 rewards "time"
6 true : 1;
7 endrewards
8
9 // Reward 2
10 rewards "time_by_x"
11 true : x;
12 endrewards
13
14 // Reward 3
15 rewards "eavsdropped"
16 [success_eavesdropping] true :1;
17 endrewards}
18
19 // Reward 4
20 rewards "trials"
21 [success_eavesdropping] true :1;
22 [fail] true :1;
23 endrewards
Listing 3.2: An example of a PRISM Rewards Structure
• The P operator: expresses properties over the probability for an even-
t/state, or a set of events/states, to occur.
• The S operator: expresses properties over steady state probabilities (i.e.
probability of being in a state or set of states in the long run).
• The R operator: expresses properties based on rewards structures.
Each operator is then completed by a path expression which defines (a). “Space”:
a set of states or transitions, (b). “Time”: a time reference in which the property
has to be computed. In this work we are mainly focused on P and R operators
since in the long run every system can be compromised.
Listing 3.3 shows an example of properties, based on the rewards structures in
Listing 3.2. Property 1 computes the probability of having at least one eaves-
dropped transmission in the first 5 time units (e.g minutes or hours). Prop-
erty 2 is a reachability reward property: it computes the reward accumulated
along a path until a specific state is reached. In this case it computes the
expected number of eavesdropped transmissions until a failed eavesdropping
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1 //T is an integer representing time
2 const int T
3
4 // Property 1
5 P=? [F<T atk_eavesdropped_sta=true]
6
7 // Property 2
8 R{" eavesdropped "}=? [F fail=true]
9
10 // Property 3
11 R{" trials "}=? [C<T]
Listing 3.3: An example of a PRISM Properties List
occurs. Property 3 computes the cumulative number of trials before time T.
A complete resume´ of the PRISM Language is given in Appendix A.
3.3 Model Implementation
This section describes how the model is translated into Markov Models and im-
plemented in PRISM. Interventions are directly modelled into PRISM modules
as each intervention can be broken down to a series of step by step actions,
that can be defined by a probability, or a rate. Presence and Time are mod-
elled following a different approach. They are used to compute the transition
probabilities for the interventions modules. This is done for a very simple but
relevant reason: if presence and time were to be modelled explicitly the space
state would grow exponentially,resulting in a model impossible to check. On the
other hand, when analysing a system, is only reasonable to do some assumptions
about the attacker e.g. what are her strengths in terms of presence and time,
or what kind of action she is able to perform in a specific environment. With
these assumptions the model size is small enough so that it can be checked.
Furthermore an analysis performed against some specific values of presence and
time shortens the time needed to analyse the system considerably.
The section is organised as follows: the first part describes how interventions
are modelled while the second part discusses about time and presence.
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3.3.1 Modelling Interventions
As PRISM makes use of modules it seems only natural to model each interven-
tion as one independent module or an independent set of modules, so that when
they have to interact, this can be done by synchronising commands or guarding
the state of another module. The entire state space of each intervention module
(IM) can be divided into four sets:
1. INIT: a set of initialisation states that express the enabled abilities of the
attacker,
2. START: a set of states that mark the beginning of the Intervention,
3. ACT: a set of states which describe the intermediate actions or states that
compose the intervention,
4. RES: a set of final states that represent the successful or unsuccessful
fulfilment of the intervention.
Each IM is defined as a Markov Decision Process, where the non-deterministic
behaviour is expressed by a choice between parallel intermediate actions which
separately and independently contribute to the same intervention. Figure 3.5
shows an example of a state machine for a generic intervention module. Here
states are generally labelled as INIT, START, ACT and RES. An INIT state
may develop into two or more branches. Each branch begins with a START
state. Furthermore a non-deterministic choice is highlighted: here probabilities
independently sums to 1 (P1 + P2 and P3 + P4). It could also be that there are
not intermediate states, and the intervention is simply successful or unsuccessful.
This is for example the case for Eavesdropping.
The remainder of this section describes PRISM state machines for every inter-
vention form. Whenever required a state is divided into two states Ai,S and
Ai,F which respectively express Success or Failure of an intermediate action.
Please note that each set of transitions from a state to another has a set of
probabilities which sums to one.
Destruction
Figure 3.6 shows the state diagram of the module. The first possible transition
goes either from INIT to A0,1 or A0,2 (i.e. a non-deterministic choice). P1 is
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Figure 3.5: PRISM Intervention Module
the probability of localising a device, hence state A0,1 expresses the physical
localisation of a device. From there, A1,S expresses the successful physical
destruction (e.g. crashing) of a device. Back to the INIT state on the other
branch, P2 is the transition probability that enables state A0,2 which expresses
the ability to destroy a device with other means which do not require exact
localisation (e.g. electro magnetic pulses). This transition probability may very
well be equal to 1 since either the attacker has this ability or she does not.
Finally A2,S represent the successful destruction of a single device while A3,S
the destruction of multiple devices. Clearly for each transition, T0,1, T0,2 and
T0,3, we must input a probability, which is strictly dependent on the system
specifications, this is discussed in Chapter 4.
Eavesdropping
The state diagram of this intervention is shown in Figure 3.7. P1 expresses the
transition probability of being able to eavesdrop messages. As P2 for Destruc-
tion, it could very well be 1, but it could also be that it is a real probability. This
happens when the ability to eavesdrop comes from other actions (“source ac-
tion” e.g. a reprogrammed device which forward all data to the attacker). In this
3.3 Model Implementation 49
A0,1
A0,2
P1
P2
A
1,S
A
1,F
A
3,S
A
3,F
A
2,S
A
2,F
INIT
Figure 3.6: Destruction
case P1 is the probability to successfully perform the “source action”. State A0
expresses the ability of eavesdropping messages while states A1,S/F . . .An,S/F ,
represent the success/failure eavesdropping of messages in different modalities
depending on the needs of the analysis. It could be for example that A1,S/F
represent the eavesdropping of a single transmission, A2,S/F the eavesdropping
of two consecutive transmissions etc. This kind of modelling is needed when
the attacker needs to eavesdrop specific transmissions and not just a random
one. Furthermore the overall probabilities of intercepting messages depend very
much on the parameters of the system, e.g. whether the attacker/sources are
mobile or not, and how they move in the space. In order to correctly compute
such probabilities, devices and attacker movements need to be modelled as well.
This issue will be thoroughly explained in Chapter 4.
Data Knowledge
As Data Knowledge expresses the fact that the attacker knows part or the whole
content of the memory of a device, knowing where the device is (i.e. localising
it) is a non-optional feature that the attacker needs to have. As shown in
Figure 3.8, P1 and A0 are analogous to P1 and A0,1 for the Destruction IM in
Figure 3.6.
A device usually relates to the surrounding environment to perform its actions,
therefore memory is related to the environment as well. State A1,S expresses the
successful knowledge of a value in the memory of a device, by learning it from
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Figure 3.7: Eavesdropping
the surrounding environment, when this value depends on it (e.g. the device is
an environmental sensor).
In the case where the attacker tries a more intrusive approach, A2,S represent
successful access to the device, A3,S successful readout of the memory and A4,S
the attacker knowledge of the value she is interested in. Note that there is a
transition A2,F → A2,S , which expresses the fact that the attacker may try to
gain access to a device in an iterative fashion. If the device is tamper proof the
transition probability of A2,F → A2,S is set to 0.
Disturb/Partial Data Modification
The state diagram is shown in Figure 3.9. P1, which results in A0,1, expresses
again the probability of successfully localising the target device. A1,S expresses
the fact that the attacker successfully changes the environment to feed a value
into the device (e.g. in the case of a temperature sensor, the successful alteration
of the local temperature) whileA2,S expresses the fact that the value has actually
been fed into the device memory. In fact altering the environment values does
not imply directly that the value has been accepted into the device, hence the
need for A1,S and A2,S .
On the other branch P2 and A0,2 express the probability and capability of
feeding the device with false data by injecting fake traffic into the network. A3,S
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Figure 3.8: Data Knowledge
expresses the successful alteration of the target device memory. This branch of
the state diagram has a broader and different scope than the previous one:
values changed into the device memory can also relate to routing information or
other parameters possibly related to security and communications throughout
the whole network.
A0,1
A0,2
P1
P2
A
1,S
A
1,F
A
3,S
A
3,F
A
2,S
A
2,F
INIT
Figure 3.9: Disturb/Partial Data Modification
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Full Data Modification
In contrast to the previous case, with Full Data Modification the attacker mod-
ifies the memory of a device by direct access to it, hence device-location is
mandatory. Figure 3.10 shows the state diagram where P1 and state A0 as
usual express localisation of the device. At A1,S the attacker gather access to
the device memory, A2,S and A3,S represent respectively read access and write
only access5, while A4,S express read/write access. States A5,S and A6,S repre-
sent successful modification of the whole memory or a desired part of it, with the
important difference that in A6,S is possible to verify that modification actually
happened, since here the attacker has read access.
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Figure 3.10: Full Data Modification
Transitions going fromAx,F toAx,S states express the possibility for the attacker
to try again. As in Data Knowledge, if the device is tamper proof or there are
other countermeasures in place to block an action, some or all the probabilities
of these transition could be set to 0.
Reprogramming
Is one of the most intrusive and dangerous interventions. P1 and state A0,1 (Fig-
ure 3.11) have the usual meaning of device location. A1,S represents successful
access to the program memory of the device, and A2,S a successful reprogram-
ming.
5There are cases when the attacker may have the possibility to write a value e.g. in a
register, but not being able to read it.
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Figure 3.11: Reprogramming
P2 and A0,2 instead express the probability and the ability to reprogram a
device remotely (e.g. through illegitimate actions like malware, or through
legitimate ones like firmware upgrades). From there A3,S represent successful
injection of a malware or remote access to the target device, andA4,S a successful
reprogramming of it. Here transitions between Ax,F and Ax,S states have the
same meaning as for the other interventions.
Device Injection
This intervention is rather simple to represent, since it depends strongly on the
system, specifically on the policies for new devices and how are they accepted
and correctly added to the system. The state diagram is shown in Figure 3.12,
here P1 and A0 represent the probability and the ability of injecting new nodes
and state A1,S a successful injection.
Energy Reduction
This is one of the two interventions that exploit the energy level of a device.
Energy Reduction refers to the reduction of part or all the energy of a device.
Figure 3.13 shows the state diagram for this intervention. P1 and A0,1 express
the ability of tampering with a device while P2 and A0,2 express the opposite (i.e.
no tamper capabilities). This is a non-deterministic choice as having tampering
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Figure 3.12: Device Injection
abilities is independent from being able to reduce energy without tampering, an
attacker may very well possess both these abilities. A1,S/F represents success/-
failure in locating the target device. From A1,S we go to A3,S which expresses
the successful reduction of the energy of the target device by tampering with it
(e.g. producing a power leak or simply taking out the battery), while, on the
second branch, A4,S expresses the reduction of the energy by other means that
do not involve tampering but need the device to be located, like forcing the de-
vice to transmit data but in a more surgical and local manner (e.g. continuously
triggering of sensor measurements). If the device is not located (state A1,F ) then
A2,S expresses the success in reducing the energy by other means (e.g. forcing
the device to continuously transmit data by producing traffic elsewhere in the
system).
Energy Control
For more complex systems which have a variable level of energy, Energy Control
expresses the ability to control the energy level of the target. The energy of the
device can also increase. It is the case for example of Energy Harvesting WSN.
The state diagram shown in Figure 3.14 begins like the one above, with A0,1 and
A0,2 corresponding respectively to tamper/no-tamper capability, and A1,S/F
success/failure in locating the target device. Then it goes on with A2,S which
expresses success in controlling the energy by direct tampering, and A3,S where
the attacker is able to exert this control with precision. A4,S has the same
meaning as A3,S with the exception that this control is applied without tamper-
ing. This is for example the case of Energy Harvesting WSN where the attacker
could stop or inhibit the energy harvesting by operating directly on the energy
source.
3.3 Model Implementation 55
The interventions that we have shown in this section are the basic modules for
the whole attacker model. They can of course be composed according to the
relationships they have (see Section 2.2.3).
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Figure 3.13: Energy Reduction
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Figure 3.14: Energy Control
56 Quantitative Modelling
3.3.2 Time and Presence
Interventions are directly modelled into PRISM language by MDPs, but how is
it possible to model time and presence in relation with interventions? As shown
in Chapter 2, these two dimensions are strongly dependent on the attacker
strength. Time and presence are needed to ultimately understand how long
does the attacker take to successfully execute an attack and what is the extent
of it.
We have already seen in Section 3.2 that PRISM inherently represents time
as the real-time spent in a state if it is continuous, or when it is discrete as
the number of transitions occurred from the initialisation of the system. This
representation is useful when the time dimension can be directly related to the
PRISM representation of time (Chapter 4 shows a case where this happens for
the Eavesdropping intervention). When that is not the case, time is modelled
through the use of a proper reward structure. It can be simple, i.e. express time
through a unique coefficient, or more complex with several time coefficients
depending on the attacker strength. Furthermore when defining the rewards
structures, the transition probabilities have to be taken into account, as the
time assigned to a transition depends on the probability and the strength of the
attacker. This relationship can be written as a function:
timek,strength = f(P [transitionk], strength) (3.3)
where P [transitionk] is the probability assigned to transition k and strength is
the attacker strength. Assuming for example that the stronger the attacker is
the less the time she takes perform an action, Figure 3.15 shows an example
of time values for the same probability in correspondence with different level of
the attacker strength.
Listing 3.4 shows the reward structure for the example above. Specifically the
coefficients for [transition_K] refers to the values shown in Figure 3.15; whilst
[transition_N] represents another transition different from K.
Differently from Time, Presence is modelled implicitly through the transition
probabilities: depending on the assumptions about the attacker strength with
respect to presence, different transition probabilities are assigned to the model.
Therefore, to perform an analysis under different attacker presence values, one
needs to change the relevant probabilities. For example in the case of eaves-
dropping, the probability of successfully eavesdropping packets changes with the
presence of the attacker and of the underlined model used to compute eaves-
dropping probabilities. This will be explained thoroughly in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.15: Cumulative Density Functions of a Transition Against Time with
Different Attacker Strengths
Similarly to Formula 3.3, with respect to presence the transition probability can
be expressed in terms of the attacker presence:
P [transition] = f(presence) (3.4)
Therefore, considering Formulas 3.4 and 3.3 together, presence should be the
first dimension that needs to be taken into account, then time and finally inter-
ventions.
3.4 Summary
This chapter proposes a quantitative implementation of the model defined in
the previous chapter. The author first introduces the problem of choosing a
suitable model language, Markov models are defined at this point. Then the
PRISM language is presented, it is a state-based language augmented with re-
ward structures. The modelling of the interventions, presence and time is then
explained.
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1
2 //Time Weak Attacker
3 rewards "TimeStrength_1"
4 [transition_K] true : 4.1;
5 ...
6 [transition_N] true : 6
7 endrewards
8
9 //Time Medium Attacker
10 rewards "TimeStrength_2"
11 [transition_K] true : 2.9;
12 ...
13 [transition_N] true : 5.5;
14 endrewards
15
16 //Time Strong Attacker
17 rewards "TimeStrength_3"
18 [transition_K] true : 1.8;
19 ...
20 [transition_N] true : 3;
21 endrewards}
Listing 3.4: Time Rewards for Different Attacker Strengths
Chapter 4
Probability Extraction
This chapter discusses the problem of computing transition probabilities for the
quantitative model described in Chapter 3: this problem is called “Probabil-
ity Extraction”. In the first part of the chapter the problem is introduced and
described. The second part presents a way to extract probabilities for eaves-
dropping. Finally probability extraction for all other interventions is discussed.
Probability extraction is a crucial step in the analysis of a system, since the
model defined in Chapter 3 is a quantitative model. After reading this chapter
the reader is expected to understand what is the process behind the assignment
of a probability or a reward time coefficient, within the PRISM model defined
earlier, and what are the challenges the analyst has to engage in order to carry
out the probability extraction.
4.1 The Problem of “Probability Extraction”
As the model presented in Chapter 3 is a quantitative model, in order to use
it for the analysis of a particular system, the parameters specific to the model
class (either transition probabilities or rates) have to be specified. Furthermore,
whenever the analysis requires it, rewards coefficients have to be defined as well
(see Section 3.3.2).
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It is important to note that an analysis can be performed even though not all
probabilities or rates are known. This can be done by setting unknown proba-
bilities to one, in this way the final result will not be affected by the unknown
probability; this is because the overall probability of a state is computed by mul-
tiplying one by one the probabilities of each transition belonging to the path
that brings from the init state to the state itself. As for rates, it is slightly more
complex since they define the overall time spent in the system, therefore there
are two possible solutions:
1. Set the rate to an arbitrary high value so that the time spent in the state
is relatively short.
2. Set the rate to an average value and take into account that the overall
time in the system as a confidence interval dependent on the value input.
The first solution cannot be applied if there are multiple transitions coming out
from the state since the transition with an higher rate is more likely to be chosen
(cf. Formula 3.2), this would invalidate the model analysis for specific paths.
When this happens, the analyst has to solve the problem case by case.
Extracting a probability is different between interventions and possibly even
between transitions belonging to the same intervention. Therefore there is not
a method that is general to do it for all interventions, quite the opposite. In the
remainder of this chapter a method for extracting probabilities for Eavesdrop-
ping is explained; afterwards follows a discussion about probability extraction
for other interventions. Eavesdropping was chosen, as most of the interventions
needs localisation, which is based on eavesdropping. Furthermore eavesdrop-
ping is the most fundamental action for an attacker that wants to target an
ubiquitous system, therefore its modelling is of primary importance.
4.2 Extracting Probabilities for Eavesdropping
In Ubiquitous Computing, mobility and ubiquity belong to each element of the
system, therefore every model has to take into account these aspects and treat
them accordingly. Eavesdropping is perhaps one of the most critical interven-
tions with respect to mobility since here the spatial relation between attacker
(i.e. listener) and source (i.e. device) has a huge influence determining whether
or not eavesdropping is possible and to which extent. It is like when you want to
eavesdrop a conversation between two people: if they are holding a position in a
calm and quiet room, one can easily follow the conversation; on the other hand
if they are walking throughout an open environment, filled with other sounds,
even distinguishing words becomes difficult if not impossible. The literature is
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full of mobility models which could be used for probability extraction, unfor-
tunately all these models focus on asymptotic properties such as the expected
length of a movement or the average speed of a device. For a survey on mobility
models the reader can refer to [6].
These models are very useful when designing communication systems or drafting
technology standards that have very stringent requirements in terms of Quality
of Service (QoS) or throughput; on the other hand when it comes to compute
values which concerns with the expected time to eavesdrop the first packet
or the probability of eavesdropping two consecutive packets (this is of most
importance e.g. for some localisation algorithms that rely on Round Trip Time),
it is essential to know how the system behaves during a specific time window
by modelling the evolution of a system step by step through time.
For this purpose a parametric model was developed in MATLAB [45]. MAT-
LAB is a framework for numerical computation and visualisation which makes
use of extended libraries, among which are libraries for mathematics and statis-
tics. It has a programming language which resembles C/C++ in its structure
although it is substantially different: it is interpreted by the MATLAB frame-
work which deals with memory management, type assignments and similar so
that the programmer can focus only on the algorithm, leaving typical problems,
such as segmentation faults or exception handling, to the framework.
For the purposes of this work, MATLAB is used as a model generator for PRISM:
all the parameters are inputted into MATLAB which at the end generates a
PRISM model that can be then analysed with the PRISM tool (for details
about the model generator please refer to Appendix B). This is very convenient
as a PRISM model can easily reach 1500 lines of code for the mobility model
alone. The model is a DTMC. Station mobility and transmission are modelled
as independent concurrent modules; this means that station movements and
transmission are independent. The model is defined by the following parameters:
• A 2D space whose dimensions are defined by x, y.
• n mobile/static sources.
• k mobile/static attackers.
• stepx and stepy defining the maximum distance a device can cover in one
step.
• A vector which defines the eavesdropping probabilities at different dis-
tances.
• A data structure which defines how the device moves for every point in
the space, according to a chosen probability distribution.
• P (tn = Tx|tn−1 = NoTx) the probability of transmission given that the
source was not transmitting the moment before, it can be different for
each source (from now on referred to as P (Tx|NoTx)).
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• P (tn = Tx|tn−1 = Tx) the probability of retransmission, it can be differ-
ent for each source (from now on referred to as P (Tx|Tx)).
The mobility can be either defined by [start, end] points, or the movement can
keep ongoing without solution; furthermore movements can either follow a spe-
cific path or be defined by a probabilistic distribution, specifically in the latter
case the probabilistic distribution can be either independent on the position or
biased towards a specific point in the whole space.
After the model has been built, we can check properties like: “What is the
probability that attacker k eavesdropped on source n between time t1 and t2?”,
“In a [start, end] walk what is the overall number/percentage of eavesdropped
messages?”. Questions like this are very important as we will see for the Insulin
Pump case study.
The model is very versatile with respect to space, time and speed of the mobile
stations. In choosing the value of these three variables the analyst has to apply
to the following:
• The distance unit is not fixed, therefore depending on the model it can be
interpreted as meters, tens of meters hundreds of meters and so on.
• The same goes with the time unit: it can be interpreted as seconds, min-
utes, hours etc.
• Space, time and speed of the devices are dependent on one another: for
given two, the third is decided as speed = distance/time. Hence if you
set for example the distance unit to 6m and you assume that the station
moves at least at 2m/s, then the time unit assumes the value if 3s, which
is the time needed by the station to cover 6m.
• Mobile stations can have several speed values which are multiple of the
stepx, stepy value.
Furthermore the analyst should choose the distance unit according to the eaves-
dropping probabilities. In fact, to keep the number of transitions low, it is
recommended for the distance probability vector to have a short length, hence
if the maximum eavesdropping distance is 10m for example a good value for
the distance unit should be 5m so that the eavesdropping probability vector
contains only three values: those for eavesdropping probability at 0m, 5m and
10m. It is not always possible to do that as there are technologies whose trans-
missions are long range, nevertheless for short range transmissions this could be
possible most of the time.
But how big a space and how many stations or eavesdroppers can be modelled?
Table 4.1 shows the size of the mobility model in terms of states and transitions
(cf. Section 3.2) for different parameters. The movement modelled in this case
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is a random walk.
The columns are divided into four sets which differ with respect to one variable
only:
1. Columns I to III differ for the number of static devices,
2. Columns I and IV to VII differ for the space dimension,
3. Columns VII to IX differ for the step size,
4. Columns X to XII differ for the number of mobile stations.
I II III IV V VI VII
Static/Mobile 1/1 2/1 3/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
Step Size 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Space dim x;y 10;10 10;10 10;10 20;10 20;20 30;10 30;30
#States 298 372 484 498 898 698 1 898
#Transitions 3 684 4 056 4 712 7 040 13 974 10 396 31 476
VIII IX X XI XII
Static/Mobile 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/2 1/3
Step Size 2 3 1 1 1
Space dim x;y 30;30 30;30 5;5 5;5 5;5
#States 1 962 2 020 74 5 476 405 224
#Transitions 83 942 157 710 780 575 088 432 475 488
Table 4.1: Size of Mobility Model for a Random Walk
From this it is possible to draw some considerations:
1. The number of states and transitions increases linearly with the number
of static devices by a small factor.
2. The number of states and transitions increases linearly with the product
of x by y (i.e. the number of points in the space).
3. The number transitions increases linearly with the step size by a significant
factor while the number of states grows by a very small factor.
4. The number of states and transitions grows exponentially with the number
of mobile station.
The fourth consideration is very serious since it means that increasing the num-
ber of mobile stations makes the model impossible to check. On the other hand
here the model considered is a random walk, where the mobility of a station is
not limited in any way. As we will see for the case of the insulin pump, when
the mobility of a station is specified along a specific path or it is constrained in
a limited area, the model size is still small enough to be checked.
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4.2.1 Eavesdropping the Insulin Pump: The Model
In Chapter 2, Section 2.3, we have introduced and described the Insulin Pump
System according to the specifications given in [43]. The authors of the paper
perform an attack on the system by capturing a single packet from the system.
In order to investigate how real this threat is (i.e. what is the average time
needed by an attacker to eavesdrop a packet) a mobility model which applies to
a realistic scenario has been developed. The scenario taken into consideration
is the following one:
“A patient with an Insulin Pump System is at the hospital. An
attacker, who wants to eavesdrop a packet from the patient’s system,
performs a survey moving either outside along the hospital perimeter
or inside the hospital within the corridors.”
The hospital modelled is the “RigsHospitalet” in Copenhagen, Denmark, one
of the biggest hospitals in Denmark. Figure 4.1 shows a satellite picture of the
hospital, along with its 2D geometry and dimensions.
The parameters of the model are set as follows:
• x = 1 : 53, y = 1 : 25, the unit space is 5m.
• One mobile source, the patient.
• One mobile eavesdropper, the attacker.
• stepx and stepy are both set to 1, there is no reason to give the patient or
the attacker the possibility of covering 10m with a step.
• The eavesdropping probabilities are set to [0.95, 0.85, 0.1]1.
• A data structure which defines the mobility of a device for each point in
the space, according to a chosen probability distribution.
• Regarding P (Tx|NoTx) and P (Tx|Tx) these are kept as variables, since
the scope of the analysis is to assess how different values influence the
overall result.
About eavesdropping probabilities, radio transmissions degrade as the distance
between transmitter and receiver increases. A digital transmission is composed
1See page 65
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Figure 4.1: RigsHospitalet Geometry
of bits; a digital transmitter is able to decode a bit as long as the transmission
is not too much degraded, thus a digital transmission is either received in its
whole or it is not. Figure 4.2 shows the rate of successful decoding of a received
packet against the power of the received signal, data are taken from [50]. As
the quality of digital transmissions has a step shaped behaviour, three ranges
were defined for the eavesdropping probabilities:
1. The attacker is in the very vicinities of the patient.
2. The attacker is within the transmission range of the patient.
3. The attacker is at the far edge of the transmission range of the patient.
In [43] it is said that a transmission from the insulin pump can be decoded
up to 7 meters, therefore it is highly unlikely for an attacker to eavesdrop a
packet from a bigger distance. Hence the eavesdropping probabilities were set
to 0.95 for distances d < 2.5m (i.e. half of the distance unit), 0.85 for distances
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Figure 4.2: Success Decoding Against Signal Strength
2.5m < d < 7.5m and 0.1 for 7.5m < d < 12.5m, as a remark this is also the
reason why the distance unit was chosen to be 5m.
The simulations performed consider the following scenarios for the attacker and
patient mobility:
• The patient:
– is in a room of the hospital,
– is waiting at the main entrance.
• The attacker:
– is outside along the hospital perimeter,
– is inside the hospital in public corridors.
Attacker and patient move according to different behaviours:
• The attacker pattern is shown in Figure 4.4; she performs two kind of
movements: 1) outside performing a survey around the hospital 2) inside
following a path within the corridors.
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• Differently the patient moves accordingly to a 2D normal distribution
biased towards a focal point, this is the point where the patient is more
likely to be. Figure 4.3 shows the patient mobility in a part of the hospital.
The PRISM model is shown in Listing 4.1. The listing samples the main parts
of the model, specifically the PRISM modules, constants, formulas and reward
structures. The listing contains also a short description of what each module
does in the form of comments, these are introduced by //.
1 dtmc
2
3 const double p_tx_notx;
4 const double p_notx_notx = 1-p_tx_notx;
5 const double p_tx_tx;
6 const double p_notx_tx = 1-p_tx_tx;
7 const double p_eaves_0 = 0.95;
8 const double p_eaves_1 = 0.85;
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9 const double p_eaves_2 = 0.1;
10
11 // Module that describes the movement of the Patient
12 module src1_movement
13 x_src1 :[1..53] init ...;
14 y_src1 :[1..25] init ...;
15 ...
16 [tick] x_src1 = 4 & y_src1 = 21 ->
0.023:( x_src1 ’=3) & (y_src1 ’=20) +
0.036:( x_src1 ’=3) & (y_src1 ’=21) +...;
17 ...
18 endmodule
19
20 // Module that models the communication of the
Insulin Pump
21 module src1_comm
22 tx_src1:bool init false;
23 [tick] tx_src1 = false -> p_tx_notx :(tx_src1 ’ =
true) + p_notx_notx :(tx_src1 ’ = false);
24 [tick] tx_src1 = true -> p_notx_tx :(tx_src1 ’ =
false) + p_tx_tx :(tx_src1 ’ = true);
25 endmodule
26
27 // Module that describes the movement of the Attacker
28 module eave1_movement
29 x_eave1 :[1..53] init ...;
30 y_eave1 :[1..25] init ...;
31 ...
32 [tick] x_eave1 =10 & y_eave1 =21 ->
1:( x_eave1 ’=11) & (y_eave1 ’=21);
33 ...
34 endmodule
35
36 // Module that model the eavesdropping of a
transmission
37 module eave1_intercept_1
38 src1_coughtby_1:bool init false;
39 [tick] tx_src1 = true & src1_coughtby_1=false &
src1in_range_of1 =2 ->
p_eaves_2 :( src1_coughtby_1 ’ = true) +
1-p_eaves_2 :( src1_coughtby_1 ’ = false);
40 [tick] tx_src1 = true & src1_coughtby_1=false &
src1in_range_of1 =1 ->
p_eaves_1 :( src1_coughtby_1 ’ = true) +
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1-p_eaves_1 :( src1_coughtby_1 ’ = false);
41 [tick] tx_src1 = true & src1_coughtby_1=false &
src1in_range_of1 =0 ->
p_eaves_0 :( src1_coughtby_1 ’ = true) +
1-p_eaves_0 :( src1_coughtby_1 ’ = false);
42 [tick] src1_coughtby_1 = false &
src1in_range_of1 >2 -> 1:true;
43 [tick] tx_src1 = false & src1_coughtby_1 = false
& src1in_range_of1 <3 -> 1:true;
44 [cought11] src1_coughtby_1=true ->
1:( src1_coughtby_1 ’ = false);
45 endmodule
46
47 // Formula that computes the distance Between attacker
and Patient
48 formula src1in_range_of1 = max((x_eave1 -x_src1 >0
?x_eave1 -x_src1:x_src1 -x_eave1) ,
(y_eave1 -y_src1 >0 ?y_eave1 -y_src1:y_src1 -y_eave1));
49
50 rewards "time"
51 [tick] true : 1 ;
52 endrewards
53
54 rewards "e1_eavesdropped_s1"
55 [cought11] src1_coughtby_1=true : 1 ;
56 endrewards
Listing 4.1: The Insulin Pump Eavesdropping PRISM Model
There are some remarks that should be made about the model listing:
• Constants are left undeclared, in this way the model can be checked against
several values of the same constant.
• Most commands are labelled [tick]: this synchronises the commands so
that transmitting and eavesdropping happen together with movements.
• Time is counted by a proper reward which counts the [tick] transitions.
• rewards ‘‘e1_eavesdropped_s1’’ counts the eavesdropped packets.
• Formula at Line 48 computes the distance between the eavesdropper (i.e.
the attacker) and the source (i.e. the insulin pump).
The sizes of the model are shown in Table 4.2.
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Perimeter Corridor
Space dim x;y 53;25 53;25
#States 32 220 29 184
#Transitions 476 968 426 432
Table 4.2: Size of Mobility Model for the Insulin Pump Case
4.2.2 Eavesdropping the Insulin Pump: Model Checking
Given the model, any kind of properties can be checked against it, these can be
properties regarding the number of consecutive eavesdropped packets or on the
expected time to intercept one. As the security threat underlined by [43] needs
just one eavesdropped packet for the attacker to be able to decode the PIN of
the device hence enabling him to hijack it, the model was checked against the
property shown in Listing 4.2, which computed the expected time to eavesdrop
the first packet.
R{"time "}=? [ F src1_coughtby_1=true ]
Listing 4.2: Property: Time to Eavesdrop First Packet
Before showing the results and commenting on them, it is only natural to pre-
dict what the result should be. The probability of eavesdropping is closely
linked with the probability that the source is transmitting. Figure 4.5 shows
the DTMC which models the transmission of the Insulin Pump. The proba-
bility of transmitting (i.e. being in state “Tx”) depends both on the values of
P (Tx|NoTx) and P (NoTx|Tx), which is equal to 1− P (Tx|Tx).
NoTx Tx1-P1
P1 =P(Tx | NoTx)
P2 =P(NoTx | Tx)
1-P2
Figure 4.5: Transmission Module DTMC
The probability of being in state “Tx”, piTx, can be computed by solving the
equation system:
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{
piTxP (NoTx|Tx) = piNoTxP (Tx|NoTx)
piTx + piNoTx = 1
which results in:
piTx =
P (Tx|NoTx)
P (Tx|NoTx) + P (NoTx|Tx) (4.1)
Figure 4.6 shows the values of piTx as a function of P (Tx|NoTx) and P (Tx|Tx).
The overall probability of transmission grows with P (Tx|NoTx) as2 1 − e−kx
with 1 ≤ k ≤ 4, and exponentially with P (Tx|Tx) as2 ex−k with 1 ≤ k ≤ 4.
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 shows the evaluation of the property shown in Listing 4.2 for
values of P (Tx|NoTx) and P (Tx|Tx) going from 0 to 1. Specifically Figures 4.7
shows the case where the attacker is performing a survey along the perimeter
while Figures 4.8 the one where she is walking through the hospital corridors.
Figures labelled as (a) refer to the case where the patient is near the window
while the ones labelled as (b) to the case where he is in the middle of the room.
From the figures it is possible to see that when the patient is near the window,
the expected time to get the first packet is less than when the patient is far from
the window, this in the perimeter case. The corridor case present is the opposite
behaviour the expected time is greater when the patient is near the window. This
of course has to be expected, nevertheless there is a very noticeable result worth
mentioning: the time to first eavesdrop strongly depends on P (Tx|NoTx), that
is when the device transmits the first packet of a transmission. This is some-
how counter intuitive if you look at the transmission probability of Figure 4.6.
Furthermore if P (Tx|NoTx) & 0.4, the value of P (Tx|Tx) more or less has
no influence on the result. Hence, as an immediate result, if the constructor
wishes to inhibit the hijack of the insulin pump he should choose some appro-
priate values for the transmission probabilities, focusing on the P (Tx|NoTx)
parameter.
In order to study how the probabilities of eavesdropping a packet within a given
time grows with respect to P (Tx|NoTx) and P (Tx|Tx) separately, the model
was checked against the following property:
2The equation is an approximate fit.
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Figure 4.6: Transmission Probability of Insulin Pump
4.2 Extracting Probabilities for Eavesdropping 73
(a)
(b)
Figure 4.7: Perimeter Case: Time to Eavesdrop the First Packet
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.8: Corridor Case: Time to Eavesdrop the First Packet
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P=? [ F<=T src1_coughtby_1=true ]
Listing 4.3: Property: Probability of Eavesdropping a packet within the next T
seconds
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Results are shown in Figures 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12: P (Eavesdropped) is the
probability of eavesdropping a packet, T is the time within which the probability
is computed, it can assume values of (205, 505, 1003). Specifically:
• Figure 4.9 reports the case where the patient is near the window and the
attacker is going along the perimeter.
• Figure 4.10 reports the case where the patient is far from the window and
the attacker is going along the perimeter.
• Figure 4.11 reports the case where the patient is near the window and the
attacker is walking within the hospital corridors.
• Figure 4.12 reports the case where the patient is far from the window and
the attacker is walking within the hospital corridors.
The following can be observed:
1. The probability of eavesdropping a packet grows with P (Tx|Tx) exponen-
tially as ekx, with k < 1; this growth was expected but not with a so small
value of k.
2. The probability of eavesdropping a packet grows with P (Tx|NoTx) as
1− e−kx with k > 5, this growth as well was expected but with a smaller
k.
3. Values of P (Tx|Tx) < 0.4 do not influence P (Eavesdropped) that much
(see the graphs in the first row of each figure).
4. The higher T the higher the P (Eavesdropped), this is obvious, the more
time the attacker has to eavesdrop the more likely the insulin pump trans-
mits a message.
5. For given P (Tx|NoTx), P (Tx|Tx) does not have any significant impact
on P (Eavesdropped). This is the most interesting result as it gives an
indication on how to modify the design of the system (e.g. by tuning
transmission probabilities) to make it more secure to some extent.
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4.2.3 Following the Target Device
In the previous part of this chapter we have investigated the eavesdropping of
the first packet of the insulin pump, the main problem for the attacker was
to find a target whose location was approximately known; from the results we
have found out that it takes time for the attacker to find the insulin pump,
mainly because its transmission range is very limited. But what happens after
the attacker has found the patient? Clearly she would not continue to wander
around but she would try to follow the patient, so the question arises: how does
the model change in this case?
In order to investigate this scenario a new model has been created and imple-
mented. This model is simpler: one of the two (the attacker) is kept fixed while
the other (the patient) can freely move. The main difference is that the attacker
is following the patient so that this one is always in range of the attacker. Hence
the model is defined by the following parameters:
• x = 1 : 5, y = 1 : 5, the maximum distance between the patient and the
attacker is 2 since the attacker is fixed in the middle the unit space is still
5m.
• One mobile source, the patient.
• One static eavesdropper, the attacker, positioned in the middle of the
space.
• stepx and stepy are both set to 1.
• The eavesdropping probabilities are set to [0.95, 0.85, 0.1].
• P (Tx|NoTx) and P (Tx|Tx) are kept as variables.
The size of the model is only 100 states and 1064 transitions. Results shows
that the time to eavesdrop packets still strongly depends on P (Tx|NoTx). Fig-
ures 4.13 and 4.14 shows the probability of eavesdropping a packet with respect
to time. It is possible to notice that when P (Tx|NoTx) grows and P (Tx|Tx) is
fixed, the probability of eavesdropping grows as well noticeably, while when the
opposite applies, still the probability grows with P (Tx|Tx) but less noticeably.
Simulation Time
In this small section some figures about the simulation time are reported. The
time needed to perform a simulation depends on the size of the model and on
the type of property checked. Furthermore the simulations were parametrised
on several values of transmission and retransmission probability, thus increasing
the time.
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Figure 4.13: Probability of Eavesdropping a Packet with Respect to Time,
P(Tx|Tx) Fixed
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Figure 4.14: Probability of Eavesdropping a Packet with Respect to Time,
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Simulation Minimal Time Maximum Time
Property in Listing 4.2
Section 4.2.2
5 hours 30 hours
Property in Listing 4.3
Section 4.2.2
8 hours 50 hours
Following Target
Section 4.2.3
5 minutes 20 minutes
Table 4.3: Simulation Time for Eavesdropping Mobility Model
Table 4.3 shows the simulation time for the eavesdropping mobility model pre-
sented in this section. The first two rows refer to the results in Section 4.2.2
while the third to the ones in Section 4.2.3.
4.3 Probability Extraction for Other Interven-
tions
In the previous section we have seen how to extract probabilities for Eavesdrop-
ping. But how do we do that for other interventions, furthermore is it always
the case where a general model can be defined and then tailored to the speci-
fications of the system? The author will try to answer these questions in this
section, unfortunately the answer is that it is not always possible to apply a
general model, nevertheless it could very well be the case where the analyst
chooses reasonable probabilities simply by appealing to his experience.
Most of the interventions defined in Chapter 3 are composed of atomic actions; as
we already know probability extraction is the process of finding the probabilities
of these actions being performed by the attacker. Interventions share several
of these actions: as an example localisation is one of the first steps for most
interventions. This makes the whole process of extracting probabilities shorter
as once the probability of an action is extracted this can indeed be used in all
interventions. The writer will now list all the actions within the interventions
modules as defined in Chapter 3 and point out a way to extract the relative
probabilities. Sometimes extracting a probability can be defined to some extent
regardless the technology, as the process can be generalised from system to
system, other times a line of action can be pointed out, but is the analyst that
ultimately has to define its own way to extract the probability.
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Device Location - This action is is part of all interventions but Eavesdrop-
ping and Device Injection. The probability of locating a device can be computed
using the eavesdropping model defined above. Depending on the system, locali-
sation can be done for example by triangulating the signal; to do this the attacker
needs to eavesdrop three packets, and this probability can be easily computed
with the mobility model above. Other ways of locating a device can be devised,
most of them would probably rely on eavesdropping, hence the mobility model
can still be used.
Device Crashing - This action is part of Destruction, specifically A0,1 →
A1,S (cf. Figure 3.6). The probability should be computed by the analyst
depending on the underling technology (e.g. . In the case where the device does
not have any specific design to prevent destruction, this probability can be set
to one.
Remote Destruction - This action completes Destruction on the second
branch of the intervention (cf. Figure 3.6, A0,1 → A2,S , A3,S). With this the
attacker is able to remotely destroy a device without localisation and it really
depends on the system and on the vulnerabilities it has with respect to remote
destruction (e.g. electromagnetic pulses), hence the analyst has to compute it.
Infer Data from Environment - This action is on the first branch of Data
Knowledge (cf. Figure 3.8, A0,1 → A1,S). With this the attacker knows data on
the memory of a device by inferring it from the environment (e.g. a temperature
sensor). Performing this action should not be that difficult (e.g. measure the
temperature of a place), but it is up to the analyst to choose that. Other memory
values the attacker could be interested in are logic values such as routing tables,
number of nearby devices etc. This kind of information can be obtained from
the attacker by eavesdropping incoming transmissions, hence the eavesdropping
model can be used in this case.
Device Physical Access - This action is part of Data Knowledge, Full Data
Modification, Reprogramming, Energy Reduction and Energy Control. It repre-
sents the physical access to a device, it really depends on the device whether
it has tamper proof mechanisms or not. If that is the case it is possible to
extract the probabilities by looking at the specifications of the tamper proof
mechanism, specifically on the statistics of tests performed by the constructor,
if these are available. If the device is not tamper proof then the probability can
be reasonably set to one, this is however up to the analyst.
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Memory Read Access - This action is part of Data Knowledge and Full Data
Modification, it is the physical access to the memory of a device. Similarly to the
previous action, this could be inhibited or blocked by tamper proof mechanisms.
Furthermore it could be the case where the access to the memory is secured with
a password or a key (e.g. the Atmel CryptoMemory [1]). Such devices are hard
to break in but a skillful attacker could hack it (e.g. see the DPA to Atmel
CryptoMemory in [7]). Extracting probabilities for this action requires the
analyst to rely on his experience, again if there are no tamper proof mechanisms
this probability could be set to one.
Feed Value Physically - This action is part of Disturb/Partial Data Modifi-
cation (cf. Figure 3.9, A0,1 → A1,S), it is the modification of a value by forging
it physically (e.g. a sensor reading). For this action there is no general way to
extract the probability hence the analyst needs to assess it case by case. Nev-
ertheless in principle, when is the case of forging sensor data, the analyst could
use the data-sheet of the device, to assess the timing responses of the sensor
and its precision. Once this probability is computed, the successful feeding (see
Figure 3.9, A2,S) probability could be set to one or to other values depending on
the system implementation (e.g. choose a value by majority voting with three
consecutive readings).
Fake Traffic Injection - This action can be seen as complementary to eaves-
dropping: the creation and transmission of arbitrary data over the network.
Indeed it requires the knowledge of data formats and how the system works. It
is part of Disturb/Partial Data Modification and Energy Reduction. The ana-
lyst can compute it by taking into account the sensitivity of the target receiver,
the distance between transceiver and receiver and the maximum transmission
power. It is exactly as eavesdropping, but it does not need a complex model
such as the mobility model presented above, since we can assume that the at-
tacker already knows that a device is out there listening, however the mobility
model can be used by the analyst if needed; in this case the probability of
eavesdropping, P (Eavesdropping) becomes the probability of successful injec-
tion, P (Injection), the overall probability of transmission can be set to one
(i.e. the attacker tries to inject packet continuously). Once the probability of
this action is computed, the analyst has to assign a probability to A0,2 → A3,S
(i.e. the device accepts the fake data, cf. Figure 3.9). Similarly to “Feed Value
Physically”, this probability could be set to one or to other values depending
on the system implementation.
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Memory Write Access - This action is part of Reprogramming and Full
Data Modification, for which is a key action as it is impossible to modify data
on a device without it (cf. Figure 3.9, A1,S → A3,S A2,S → A4,S). It is
complementary to “Memory Read Access” as it gives the attacker the power
to modify the contents of a device memory. There are two different type of
memories: data and program. Accessing one could be easier than accessing
the other. Both memories could be protected with tamper proof mechanisms
or by cryptography and crypto chip. Furthermore some parts of the memory
could be hard-coded into the device (e.g. by hardware design), hence impossible
to change. About the program memory, some devices have special interfaces
that permit complete access to the program memory (e.g. JTAG interface [2]),
therefore sometimes access to program memory could be easier than accessing
Data memory. The remarks for the analyst are similar to the case of “Memory
Read Access”: the analyst has to rely on his experience, if there are no tamper
proof mechanisms or if some special interface is present on the device, this
probability could be set to one.
Remote Reprogramming - This action belongs to the second branch of
Reprogramming (cf. Figure 3.11). It is the remote reprogramming of a device,
this could be done by malware spreading or by exploiting legitimate mechanisms
such as remote firmware upgrades (see [58]). This probability has to be assessed
case by case as it is closely tied up with the underlying technology. What the
analyst could do is simply to put this probability either to zero or one depending
on the attacker strength he is considering for the analysis.
Inject Device - This is the only and fundamental action for Device Injection.
the success of this action depends uniquely on the technology used and on
the system policies. The intervention, Device Injection, could be supported by
Destruction, (cf. Table 2.1), hence the analyst could take this into account when
computing the corresponding probability: the destruction of a device could ease
greatly the injection of a new device in the system.
Remote Energy Reduction - This is part of Energy Reduction (cf. Fig-
ure 3.13,A2,S). It is the action of reducing the energy of a device without
having access to the device. Basically this can happen by inducing the device to
consume its energy by making him respond to network traffic for example. This
action needs the attacker to be able to inject some traffic that the device reacts
upon. In the extraction of this probability the analyst could simply compute
it as with “Fake Traffic Injection” combining it with the energy control mecha-
nisms that a device might have which might be transmit low rate data to save
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energy. Clearly this action has to be assessed case by case.
Physically Force Data Transmission - This action is part of Energy Reduc-
tion (cf. Figure 3.13,A4,S). It stimulates the transmission of data by exploiting
the device nature without tampering with it (e.g. changing the temperature or
moving the sensor). Clearly it can be performed only if the device is located.
In extracting this probability the analyst should take into account the device
specifications, specifically the time the sensor needs to respond to the action (a
sensor reading could occur every fixed period of time), how is it designed to re-
act to the stimuli the attacker might perform and other possibly more complex
behaviours.
Energy Reduction by Tampering - This action is part of Energy Reduc-
tion (cf. Figure 3.13, A3,S). It needs the attacker to locate the device and to
be able to tamper with the device. As with all other actions that deals with
tampering, tamper proof mechanisms have to be taken into account by the an-
alyst when extracting probabilities for this action. The actions depends also
on the type of energy source the device has, whether is a battery or something
else, and on the power control unit. Performing this action on energy harvest-
ing devices should be more complex, as the power control unit is designed to
control multiple power sources hence follows some algorithms which prevents
energy depletion in general.
Energy Control by Tampering - This action is part of Energy Reduc-
tion (cf. Figure 3.14, A2,S and A3,S). It is very much similar to the previous
apart from the fact that the energy can be also risen by the attacker and not
only depleted. This could be done by taking in and out the battery at specific
points in time, or by exerting some specific kind of control over the power con-
trol unit of the device. It is very specific to the system so the analyst ultimately
has to deal with the problem of computing the transition probabilities.
Control Energy Source - The second branch of Energy Control (cf. Fig-
ure 3.14) define a state where the attacker controls the energy level of a device
without tampering with it (i.e. without physically accessing the device). This
can be done with energy harvesting units by controlling the energy source that
the device harvests. It is indeed very specific to the kind of energy source and
on how this energy is harvested. A general method to extract probabilities for
each harvesting method could be indeed developed, but doing it within this
thesis would not make much sense since it is very expensive in terms of time
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and secondly because technologies change rapidly, and such an analysis would
easily need a major reassessment in a few years. Still, when the analyst extract
the probabilities for a specific energy harvesting method, he can then reuse it
in the future without the need of computing them again.
This completes the list of actions for the interventions. Within each action the
analyst, together with probabilities, has to account also for the time each action
takes, so that he can input it in the model as a reward coefficient (remember
the example in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2, Figure 3.15).
Analyst
Experience
General
Model
Tech
Specific
Device Location x
Device Crashing x
Remote Destruction x
Infer Data from Environment x x
Device Physical Access x
Memory Read Access x x
Feed Value Physically x
Fake Traffic Injection x x
Memory Write Access x
Remote Reprogramming x x
Inject Device x
Remote Energy Reduction x
Physically Force Data Transmission x
Energy Reduction by Tampering x
Control Energy Source x x
Table 4.4: Actions and Probability Extraction Process
Table 4.4 shows the probability extraction method for each action defined above.
The extraction can be based on a general model (e.g. device location), the
analyst experience (e.g. memory read access) or be technology specific (like
for example the energy source control). It is clear that most of them are all
dependent on the technology, whether it is some tamper proof mechanism or a
energy harvesting technology or a cryptographic chip.
In this chapter we have defined the process of probability extraction, built a
model to compute eavesdropping probabilities for mobile and static station and
pointed out a way to extract probabilities for every intervention. It should
be clear to the reader that the analyst can disregard the computation of some
probabilities, setting them to a neutral value (i.e. 1) or to a null one (i.e. 0).
The analyst should do this when:
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• For a professional or analytical reason, he is not interested in exploring
specific states of the model: null value;
• The system under analysis does not have any implementation or behaviour
or physical part which allow for some branches of the model (e.g. a device
that cannot be reprogrammed remotely): all the transitions belonging to
those branches assume a null value;
• He is not interested for professional or analytical reasons in the effect of a
specific transition probability: the corresponding value is set to 1 (neutral
value) so that in a path its contribution is neglected (i.e. multiplication
by 1);
• He is not able to extract a probability for an action either because he
does not have time or because he does not have the necessary data or
documentation: neutral value.
From this remarks it is important to note that it is not mandatory to extract
probabilities to perform an analysis. Even getting only the results about the
eavesdropping probabilities with the mobility model can be of interest depending
on the case.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter the author defined and explained the process of Probability Ex-
traction. This is a critical process as it supplies the model with the quantitative
values it needs. It is also a most complex process as the technologies that com-
pose ubiquitous systems are various and of different natures; furthermore it is
not always the case where the analyst has access to detailed system specifica-
tions. In the last part the author makes a classification of the possible ways
for the analyst to extract probabilities. The chapter describes in details the
process of extracting probabilities for eavesdropping: this is done by the devel-
opment of a model which takes into account the movements of the target and
the eavesdropper, along with the range the transmissions can be eavesdropped
at.
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Chapter 5
Analysis of two Systems
This chapter proposes the analysis of two systems, namely the Insulin Pump
System, described in [43], and the FleGSens system, an area monitoring WSN,
defined in [52]. The analysis is performed using the PRISM model checker and
the model defined in the previous chapters.
In order to analyse a system the analyst has to perform three steps, these are:
Interventions
Construction
Probability 
Extraction
Analysis
Figure 5.1: Analysis Process Flow Diagram
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1. The construction of the interventions against each system, i.e. what are
the active states or whether an intervention exists for the specific system.
2. Probability extraction, what are the probabilities assigned to each transi-
tion.
3. The analysis of the model using PRISM.
Figure 5.1 shows a flow diagram of the process.
The analyses proposed in this chapter are divided into four parts, one for each
step plus a final discussion. As probability extraction has been thoroughly ex-
plained in Chapter 4,This chapter will focus on what numbers are used as input
in the model and how they were chosen (remember Table 4.4 in Section 4.3).
5.1 The Insulin Pump System
The system has been already introduced in Chapter 2. It consists of five wire-
lessly interconnected devices (see Figure 5.2): an insulin pump, a remote control,
a PDA, used for collecting data and reporting them to the patient or the doctor
and to program some parameters of the system, a continuous glucose sensor,
attached to the body, and a user glucose meter that can be used by the patient
or the doctor to perform a measure of the glucose present in the blood stream,
whenever needed.
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Fig. 1. (a) Insulin delivery system, (b) security attacks, and (c) experimental setup used in the attacks
proposed zero-power defenses. This work was the first to
practically demonstrate a security attack on a medical appli-
ance. Although similar in overall objectives, our work differs
significantly in our attack methodology and proposed defenses.
As the authors stated in [14], they did not perform packet
analysis or reassembly, “only simple waveform manipulation
and repetition.” We, however, fully reverse-engineered the
radio protocol of the insulin delivery system so that adversaries
can reassemble the packets and emulate the full functions of
a remote control: wake up the insulin pump, stop/resume the
insulin injection, or immediately inject a bolus dose of insulin
into the human body. The defenses that we propose are also
different from those presented in [14].
Proximity-based access control has been proposed as a
technique for implantable medical devices to verify the dis-
tance of the communicating peer before initiating wireless
communication, thereby limiting attackers to a certain physical
range [15]. Our proposal for using BCC is different in that
we replace the traditional wireless channel, and not add an
additional channel.
In the area of BCC, initial research tried to model the
body-coupled channel [16], [17]. Another work was based
on an experimental study and discussed the characterization
of the human body as a signal transmission medium [18],
[19], [20]. A third group of studies dealt with the design and
implementation of the transceiver for BCC [21], [22], [23].
III. PASSIVE AND ACTIVE ATTACKS ON WIRELESS LINKS
OF AN INSULIN DELIVERY SYSTEM
We next discuss successful passive and active attacks on
a commercially available insulin delivery system. Our exper-
imental setup included a glucose meter, an insulin pump, a
remote control, and a Universal Software Radio Peripheral
(USRP) [24]. We choose not to fully disclose the model
information (brand, type and model no.) here.
USRP is an off-the-shelf software radio board that costs
about $700. With free software (GNU radio [25]) and appro-
priate daughter boards, the USRP can intercept radio com-
munications within a frequency band, and generate wireless
signals with different configurations of data, frequency, mod-
ulation, and power.
As shown in Fig. 1(b), we focused on the wireless link
from the remote control to the insulin pump and intercepted
the communication. We then fully reverse-engineered the
communication protocol and were able to successfully launch
active attacks that remotely control the insulin pump. We show
the experimental setup in Fig. 1(c).
A. Frequency
The operating frequency of the wireless link needs to be
determined first. The frequency of any wireless device is
publicly available online and easily obtained through its FCC
ID. In our example system, the communication between the
remote control and insulin pump uses 915 MHz. A 915 MHz
daughter board and antenna are attached to the USRP board
to receive and generate the signal in the 915 MHz frequency
band.
B. Modulation type
We intercepted the wireless signal around 915 MHz and
down-converted it to near the baseband, as shown in Fig. 2.
After analysis, we found that on-off keying was used in the
communication. This modulation scheme uses the presence of
a carrier wave to indicate a binary 1 and its absence to indicate
a binary 0.
Fig. 2. Signal intercepted by USRP
C. Packet format
For both the glucose meter and remote control, in order to
make the insulin pump receive the data or control command,
a code of six hexadecimal digits needs to be entered manually
by the users into the insulin pump. The digits are printed on
the back of a glucose meter or remote control as a “PIN.” We
152
Figure 5.2: Insulin Pump System - Source [43]
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The insulin pump is the main device, it communicates with all other devices
and is the one which directly injects the insulin into the patient. The glucose
sensor monitors the glucose level of the patient and the whole system relies on its
readings. It sample the glucose level of the patient with a sampling frequency
that can be defined by the doctor (in this thesis we assume that it gather a
sample every 30 seconds). The remote control can be used to tell the insulin
pump to inject a dose of insulin in the patient’s body. It can be used by the
patient to adjust his insulin dose whenever he feels like he needs it1. Figure 5.2
shows the communication existing between the devices.
5.1.1 Construction of Interventions
As the interventions defined in Chapter 3 are general for Ubiquitous Systems,
they have to be constructed against the insulin pump system. Since the Insulin
Pump is a highly localised device (i.e. the human body), and its range does not
spread over 7-10 meters, the interventions’ branches that relies on purely remote
actions can be generally discarded. The interventions are therefore constructed
as follows:
Destruction: The intervention only involves the first branch states: physical
location A0,1, and crashing A1,S/F .
Eavesdropping: This intervention has several statesA1,S/F . . . An,S/F depend-
ing on how many time/probabilities combinations the analyst wants to
explore. This was already taken into account in the mobility model in
Chapter 4. Section 5.1.2 explains how values are chosen from the model.
Data Knowledge: All states are active. The attacker could get knowledge of
the values of the continuous glucose sensor for example by eavesdropping
its transmissions, or she could get hold of a device and access its memory.
Disturb/Partial Data Modification: The intervention involves all states.
The first branch expresses the fact that the attacker feeds the device with
a false reading, in this case it could be that she feeds the glucose meter
with a false sample. With respect to the second branch the attacker could
forge legitimate command packets hence forcing the insulin pump into
injecting an irregular dose (as the attack in [43]).
Full Data Modification: All states are active as the attacker could get hold
of a device hence try to access its memory and modify it (remember this
intervention needs physical access to the device, cf. Section 3.3).
1Diabetic patients are usually trained in self administration of insulin doses.
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Reprogramming: As in the previous interventions all states are active as the
attacker could access one of the devices (e.g. the PDA) and reprogram it
both remotely, through malware or system update, and locally by repro-
gramming one of the devices such as for example the glucose meter or the
remote control.
Device Injection: This intervention is active as well, as the attacker could
substitute the remote control of a system with one programmed by herself,
or she could also destroy the continuous glucose sensor and inject a new
one programmed by herself.
Energy Reduction and Control: It does not make sense to talk about these
last two interventions since energy management is not critical for the In-
sulin Pump System.
The model describes all the possible actions the attacker can take, even if these
are very unlikely, complex or too risky to be carried out. The attacker for
example could prefer to eavesdrop and inject packets from a certain distance
instead of trying to steal a device and being caught in the process, hence the
analyst might want to explore only the most likely threats instead of all of them.
5.1.2 Probability Extraction
This section discusses and defines, for the relevant actions, the values for the
probabilities and the time rewards which are used for the analysis of the model
in Section 5.1.3.
Device Localization - As device localization is the basic action it is only
logical that it is the first probability to be extracted. To do this the mobility
scenario defined in Chapter 4 is used. If we consider the average walking speed
for a human as 4.5km/h = 1.25m/s and that the unit space is 5m, then the
time unit is ∆T =
5m
1.25m/s
= 4sec. The transmission of the Insulin Pump can
be modelled as a Poisson process. In a Poisson process the probability of having
k events in a time ∆T is given by:
P (N(∆T ) = k) =
(λ∆T )ke−λ∆T
k!
(5.1)
where λ is the transmission rate. The most active device in the insulin pump
system is the continuous glucose sensor which transmits two measurements every
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minute. As the mobility model is time discrete, the transmission probability has
to be computed with respect to the time unit. Hence the probability of having
at least one transmission in a time unit is:
P (N(∆T ) > 0) = 1− P (N(∆T ) = 0) = 1− (λ4)0e−λ4 u 0.125
with λ = 2/60 and ∆T = 4s.
By looking at the eavesdropping probabilities curves in Figures 4.9, 4.10, 4.11
and 4.12, for values of P (Tx|NoTx) = 0.125 the corresponding P (Eavesdropped)
values are:
• 0.04 to 0.4 for T = 205, approximately 14 minutes.
• 0.12 to 0.58 for T = 505, approximately 34 minutes.
• 0.2 to 0.85 for T = 1003, approximately 67 minutes.
These are the probabilities of eavesdropping the first packet. When the attacker
does it, she knows she is within 7 meters from the victim, hence she just needs
to eavesdrop few more packets (roughly a minute) to refine the location of the
target.
These values apply for an attacker that follows the mobility model in Chapter 4,
which models one mobile eavesdropper and one mobile station. Indeed it is
possible to stage a stronger attacker in the model, for example an attacker
that is able to place multiple eavesdropping devices in the environment, thus
increasing the eavesdropping probability and decreasing the time to eavesdrop
accordingly. The strongest attacker eavesdrops a packet after 30 seconds with
probability 1.
Device Crashing - As for device crashing, it is up to the analyst to assess
the probability and the time for the attacker to crash a device. In the case of
the insulin pump it depends very much on which of the five devices she wants to
crash, getting hold of the remote control it would probably be easier than the
continuous glucose monitor or the insulin pump which are attached to the body,
and the attacker might exploit the fact that in a hospital it is normal for patients
to take off their insulin pump systems for reprogramming or maintenance. It
is also a question of how much risk the attacker wants to take to carry out her
action. In this analysis we will assume that the attacker wants to destroy the
continuous glucose sensor since it is the most likely device to be targeted as it
is the most active one. Furthermore if the attacker wants to send false glucose
measurements, the continuous glucose sensor has to be taken off, otherwise the
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insulin pump could discard the fake measurement in favour of the real one. Here
we set the probability of destroying the device to 1 with a relatively long time,
10 minutes (this value is empirical but reasonably realistic). The attacker might
also like to destroy the insulin pump, but here we discard this case since the
aim of this analysis is to evaluate the security and integrity of the insulin pump
itself with respect to the surrounding threats, moreover as the insulin pump is
the core of the system, it must be physically well protected, hence crashing it
very unlikely.
Inject Device - Crashing the continuous glucose sensor can be used to sup-
port device injection; this can be modelled as a non-deterministic choice in
modelling Device Injection. This can be done simply by duplicating the PRISM
module and assigning different probabilities and time for execution to P1 (cf.
Figure 3.12). In the case of injection being supported by destruction, we set
the probability to 1 with a value for the time reward comparable with the in-
terval between measurements (i.e. 30 seconds). In the opposite case (injection
not supported), the overall time is shorter (i.e. the attacker does not have to
destroy a device), but the probability of success is lower. In this work it is set
to 0.5 (it is assumed here that the insulin pump decides either for the legitimate
sensor or the fake one). Unfortunately the technical specifications of the insulin
pump could not be retrieved the only data at disposal are the ones in [43]. With
them a more precise probability for device injection could be computed.
Infer Data from Environment - The only data that the insulin pump uses
are glucose samples. The attacker can get hold of this data by eavesdropping
transmissions from the continuous glucose sensor. As the packets are not en-
crypted, all the attacker needs is just to catch a transmission. To compute
this probability, given that the device is located, the eavesdropping mobility
model can be used: this is the case where the device is followed by the at-
tacker (cf. Section 4.2.3). Specifically the analyst can use the data in Fig-
ure 4.13: for P (Tx|NoTx) u 0.125 the average time to eavesdrop a packet is
T = 50TimeUnits, approximately 3-4 minutes, with a probability of u 0.9.
Memory Read Access - Data about the glucose samples can be acquired
by the attacker also by accessing the memory of a device. In the insulin pump
system the PDA is the only device that stores data. Unfortunately specific
details about PDA (e.g. operating system, storage method) are not available;
anyway it is very likely for this data to be unprotected, as the transmission is
unprotected as well. For this reason in this analysis we assume that for the
attacker it should not be a problem to extract the data from the PDA once she
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has it in her hands. Moreover if data are stored on an external memory card,
accessing them could even be easier.
Device Physical Access - As there are no technical specifications it is not
possible to assess this probability, hence we will disregard it (i.e. set it to 1).
Nevertheless it is possible to make some observations: the attacker might want
to access the insulin pump itself to reprogram it for a specific purpose or decide
instead for the continuous glucose sensor to tamper with its detection mech-
anisms. The remote control could also be sabotaged by the attacker. Device
physical access concerns with the PDA as well, as there could be mechanisms in
place to inhibit access to the device (such as secure data wipe if password is not
correct and similar). All these actions indeed need the attacker first to get hold
of the device (as in device crashing), this can be taken into consideration when
inputting the probability and the time reward. In this analysis Device Physical
Access comprises getting hold of the device and accessing it.
Fake Traffic Injection - Computing this probability is similar to eavesdrop-
ping and it is as much as important, since the attacker may forge a transmission
to force the insulin pump to inject an irregular dose of insulin. The range for
injecting a packet is 20m with a 200mW (23dBm) transmitter (as [43] states).
Hence depending on the scenario a model similar to eavesdropping could be
produced. It is also possible to assume that the attacker is able to get within
the range of the insulin pump once she has identified the target. As there is
always a small possibility of failing even if the insulin pump is well within range,
the probability here is set to 0.97 (this is an average value chosen considering
data in Figure 4.2). The time needed is simply the time for the transmission
(i.e. the time unit).
Reprogramming - Reprogramming could be performed on every device. The
glucose meter, the sensor, the insulin pump and the remote control need specific
knowledge about the hardware hence also specific skills from the attacker. As
for Device Physical Access, we do not have any technical specification therefore
it is not possible to assess whether reprogramming is possible and how much
time it takes. The PDA could also be targeted from the attacker, and since it
has a general purpose OS, even a weak attacker should have the necessary skills
to reprogram it for example through a malware remotely or locally by installing
a malicious application directly on the device. As we do not have any specific
technical specification we disregard this intervention here.
The process of probability extraction for the insulin pump ends here. This
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could be improved if a specific technical documentation could be produced.
Unfortunately this is not available mostly for security reasons: the authors of
[43] did not provide the producer nor the model of the insulin pump as they
would have clearly given evil people the instruction to attack the system, hence
endangering actual patients lives.
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Figure 5.3: Insulin Pump Interventions Diagram
5.1.3 Analysis of the Model
Now that the probabilities have been decided, along with the time needed to
perform the corresponding action, the analysis of the model with PRISM can
be carried out. In Section 5.1.1 the author constructed the interventions for the
insulin pump. Specifically, with respect to interventions defined in Chapter 3,
some interventions have been discarded, others have been limited by making
some states inactive. Remember that a state can be defined inactive for three
reasons:
• The system under analysis does not express the behaviour the state rep-
resents.
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• The analyst (which in this case is played by the writer) does not think it
was worth investigating these states.
• The lack of technical specifications does not allow for probability extrac-
tion for the transitions bringing to those states.
The interventions modelled here are Destruction (cf. Figure 5.4), Data Knowl-
edge (cf. Figure 5.6), Disturb/Partial Data Modification (cf. Figure 5.8), Full
Data Modification (cf. Figure 5.10) and Device Injection (cf. Figure 5.12); inac-
tive states are greyed out. Eavesdropping was largely discussed earlier, proba-
bilities extracted from it are widely used throughout all interventions2 together
with the corresponding time rewards.
Figure 5.3 shows to which device each intervention can be applied to. Specif-
ically Eavesdropping can be applied wherever a transmission occurs, hence at
the glucose sensor, meter and the remote controller. In this analysis Destruc-
tion is applied only to the glucose sensor since is the device responsible for
monitoring the patient glucose level and its destruction can support Device In-
jection. Data Knowledge can be applied to the insulin pump or to the PDA.
With Disturb/Partial Data Modification the attacker forges a fake transmission
from the glucose sensor hence targeting the receivers of such transmission: the
insulin pump and the PDA. Finally Full Data Modification targets the PDA
while Device Injection the glucose sensor.
Destruction - From the process of probability extraction, the transition prob-
ability INIT→A0,1 is set to 0.58 with a time reward of 505 time units. This
is taken from the probability extraction of device location on page 95. The
transition probability was chosen to be the worst value of the second line (“0.12
to 0.58 for T = 505, approximately 34 minutes.”). This does not rule out the
other values as there is a most important feature of this model (which often
occurs in Markov chains models). We demonstrate this feature by showing it:
when the model is in state INIT there is a probability of 0.58 to go to A0,1 (cf.
Figure 5.4), or 0.42 to stay in INIT. When you stay in INIT at the next step
the model has the same choice again.
Going on, the probability of be in state A0,1 (i.e. the attacker locates the
device) is P = 0.58 at T = 505, P = 0.58 + (0.42 × 0.58) at T = 1010, P =
0.58+(0.42×0.58)+(0.42×0.42×0.58) at T = 1515 . . . The results are consistent
with those at page 95: for example 0.58+0.42×0.58 u 0.83 for T = 1010 which
is approximately 0.85 for T = 1003. PRISM obviously takes this into account
while checking the model.
2Remember that localisation which makes use of eavesdropping is largely used in other
interventions.
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A
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P1=0.58
T=505
P=1
T=150
Figure 5.4: Insulin Pump: Destruction Intervention
In this analysis we are interested in the average time needed to achieve the
intervention and on the relative probability. The reward structure that keeps
track of the time is shown in Listing 5.1.
1 rewards "time"
2 [locating] true :505;
3 [crashing] true :150;
4 endrewards
5
6
7 // Property for model checking
8
9 Rmax=? [F A_d =2]
10 // A_d=2 corresponds to the
11 // successful destruction of the device
Listing 5.1: Insulin Pump: Time Rewards for Destruction
The expected time to destroy a device, which is the time needed to locate the
device and destroy it, is 1020.70TU u 68min. Figure 5.5 shows the probability
of destroying the device as a function of time T (expressed in Time Units). As
expected this probability grows with time, this because the more time passes
the more likely it is for the attacker to achieve its goal.
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Figure 5.5: Insulin Pump: Success Probability for Device Destruction
Data Knowledge This intervention, differently from the one above, has two
active branches which originate from state A0 (cf. Figure 5.6). The correspond-
ing reward structure is shown in Listing 5.2.
A0
P1=0.58
T=505
A
1,S
A
1,F
A
2,S
A
3,S
A
4,S
INIT
P=0.9
T=50
P=0.9
T=50
P=1
T=150
P=1
T=1
P=1
T=1
Figure 5.6: Insulin Pump: Data Knowledge Intervention
Specifically there is only one reward structure which keeps track of the time for
all branches. Depending on the property the analyst checks, the PRISM model
checker computes the time related to the branch the property refers to.
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1 rewards "time"
2 [localize] true: 505;
3 [environment_read] true: 50;
4 [access] true: 150;
5 [readout] true: 1;
6 [success] true: 1;
7 endrewards
8
9 // Property for time to reach state A1 ,S (A_dk =2)
10 Rmax=? [F A_dk =2]
11
12 // Property for time to reach state A4 ,S (A_dk =8)
13 Rmax=? [F A_dk =8]
Listing 5.2: Insulin Pump: Time Rewards for Data Knowledge
The expected time, computed by PRISM, to eavesdrop a packet and gather a
reading from the glucose sensor (i.e. time to reach state A1,S) is 926.24TU u
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Figure 5.7: Insulin Pump: Success Probability for Data Knowledge
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62min, while the time to physically get access to the memory of a device (e.g.
by getting hold of the PDA) is 1022.69TU u 68min.
Figure 5.7 shows the probability as a function of time T (expressed in Time
Units) of achieving data knowledge by reaching states A1,S (eavesdropping of the
value) and A4,S (accessing the device memory). The two curves are comparable,
this is because locating the device is the most time consuming action. Since
the expected time is similar, the attacker can choose the action that carries
the smallest risk (i.e. eavesdrop the packet). Indeed getting access to the
device memory gives more information, hence it depends ultimately on which
are the attacker’s goals. An important observation is that the two actions are
comparable as the transmission is given in clear (i.e. is not encrypted). If
confidentiality were implemented, then the transition probabilities and the time
rewards would change greatly, and accessing the device would most likely be the
easiest way to achieve Data Knowledge,even though it is more risky.
Disturb/Partial Data Modification This intervention has five inactive
states. These are the ones that express the behaviour of feeding a false value
through the environment. As stated before this does not make much sense
within the insulin pump system as modifying the glucose value detected from
the sensor would mean to intervene on the patient and, whereas this is indeed
possible, it is not possible to extract a general probability for this event.
A0,2
A
3,S
A
3,F
INIT
P2=0.58
T=505
P=0.97
T=1
Figure 5.8: Insulin Pump Disturb/Partial Data Modification Intervention
To carry out this intervention the attacker has to forge a false transmission
containing a false reading. This behaviour is expressed by the second branch (see
Figure 5.8). As the insulin pump is a highly localised system the attacker has
104 Analysis of two Systems
first to locate it, the transition probability and the reward time of INIT→ A0,1
are set at 0.58 and 505 TU . Then for A0,2 → A2,S , this is set to 1 (the time to
send the transmission) and the probability to 0.97 (cf. “Fake Traffic Injection”
page 97). It is important to note that in this case there is no “retry” transition
A2,F 9 A2,S since there is no way for the attacker to know whether the injected
packet was accepted by the system.
1 rewards "time"
2 [localize] true :505;
3 [inject] true :1;
4 endrewards
5
6
7 // Property for model checking
8
9 Rmax=? [F A_dist =7]
10 // A_dist =7 corresponds to the
11 // successful injection of the forced transmission
Listing 5.3: Insulin Pump: Time Rewards for Disturb/Partial Data Modification
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Figure 5.9: Insulin Pump: Success Probability for Disturb/Partial Data Modi-
fication
Listing 5.3 shows the reward structure for the time needed to accomplish the
intervention. Figure 5.9 shows the probability for successfully injecting a false
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transmission as a function of time T (expressed in Time Units). As with all other
interventions whose branches are based on localisation, the success probability
grows with time. Unlike other interventions the probability goes asymptoti-
cally to 0.97; this is the maximum probability for achieving the intervention as
P (A0,2 → A3,S) = 0.97 and A3,S is an absorbing state (i.e. there is no retry
transition from the corresponding fail state).
Full Data Modification With this intervention we consider the fact that the
attacker wants to get hold of the PDA and to modify its memory. The PDA is
the only device in the system that stores data about the glucose readings and
the system status hence it is the only device this intervention applies to. Full
Data Modification is divided into two branches, one that enables the attacker
with read/write access to the device, the other which enables write access only.
The two branches originates from state A1,S (cf. Figure 5.10) that represents the
fact that the attacker has located the device and has gathered physical access
to it. In this case the branch with write access only is inactive as accessing a
common PDA memory usually means that it can be both read and written at
the same time, and there are no indications that mechanisms to prevent this are
in place. As a marginal note, the write only branch would apply only to cases
where the memory can only be written (e.g. a hardware register).
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Figure 5.10: Insulin Pump: Full Data Modification Intervention
The corresponding reward structure is shown in Listing 5.4. The time to access
the device is set at 150TU u 10min which is the same as the time for device
crashing (cf. page 96). The probability is set to an arbitrary high value 0.98
(and not to 1) to express the possibility for the attacker to fail in getting physical
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1 rewards "time"
2 [locating] true :505;
3 [access] true :150;
4 [read_access] true :5;
5 [write_access] true :10;
6 [success] true :5;
7 endrewards
8
9 // Property for model checking
10
11 Rmax=? [F A_fdm =8]
12 // A_fdm=8 corresponds to the
13 // successful injection of the forced transmission
Listing 5.4: Insulin Pump: Time Rewards for Full Data Modification
access to the device (i.e. fail in stealing it from the patient or the doctor). The
attacker may try again to get the device hence the transition A1,F → A1,S is
active with the same time reward and probability as A0 → A1,S .
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Figure 5.11: Insulin Pump: Success Probability for Full Data Modification
Figure 5.11 shows the probability of achieving Full Data Modification as a func-
tion of time T (expressed in Time Units). The values are comparable with the
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previous interventions. This is of course expected as this intervention is based
on localisation as well as the previous ones.
Device Injection With Device Injection in the case of the insulin pump sys-
tem, we consider the case where the attacker wants to inject a continuous glucose
sensor into the system. This device is a malicious device programmed by the
attacker to send to the Insulin Pump a glucose value defined by the attacker
herself.
A0
A1,S
A1,F
INIT
Not SupportedSupported
P1=0.58, T1=505
P2=0.5, T2=8
P1=0.58, T1=655
P2=1, T2=8
P1, T1
P2, T2
Figure 5.12: Insulin Pump: Device Injection Intervention
The injection of a malicious device can be supported by the destruction of the
old one. This is modelled by assigning two different values to the transitions
going from INIT to A0 and from A0 to A1,S (cf. Figure 5.12):
Supported: when the intervention is supported by Destruction the probabil-
ities and the time rewards values are set accordingly to the results in
Figure 5.5. Specifically: P (INIT → A0) = 0.58, T = 655TU u 44min
for INIT→ A0, and P (A0 → A1,S) = 1, T = 8TU u 30 sec for A0 → A1,S .
Not Supported: when device injection it is not supported, P (INIT → A0) =
1, T = 505TU u 33min for INIT→ A0, and P (A0 → A1,S) = 0.5,
T = 8TU u 30 sec for A0 → A1,S .
The probability and the time reward for A0 → A1,S is taken from the data
regarding the probability extraction process at page 96.
Listing 5.5 shows the reward structure used to compute the time needed for
the intervention while Figure 5.13 shows the probability to successfully inject a
device as a function of time T (expressed in Time Units).
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1 rewards "time"
2 [supported] true: 655;
3 [not_supported] true: 1;
4 [injected] true :8;
5 endrewards
6
7 // Property for model checking
8
9 Rmax=? [F A_inj =2]
10 // A_inj=2 corresponds to the
11 // successful injection of a new device
Listing 5.5: Insulin Pump: Time Rewards for Device Injection
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Figure 5.13: Insulin Pump: Success Probability for Device Injection
The results confirms that whenever injection is supported by destruction the
overall probability of success is higher. Furthermore when the intervention is
not supported, the success probability goes asymptotically to 0.5. As a minor
remark, injecting a device in the supported case takes more time (150TU u
10min). This is in fact the time needed to destroy the device.
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5.1.4 Discussion
This concludes the analysis of the insulin pump system with PRISM. There are
some observations to be made regarding the analysis:
• The results throughout all interventions show the same behaviour. This
is due to the fact that the insulin pump is a highly localised system (as
BAN usually are), therefore localisation is a key action in all interventions,
hence its influence is present in all data. Furthermore since the system is
not protected with any other mean (e.g. encryption), localisation is the
only “countermeasure3” that keeps the attacker away from attacking the
system. If this were not the case the interventions that have to deal with
encryption, such as Data Knowledge, would show a different behaviour
globally.
• Interventions can be combined whenever they share a common action (e.g.
device location) so that the attacker has to locate the device only once thus
perform multiple interventions in less time.
• The model was analysed against a specific attacker: an attacker with a
single eavesdropping device. This was done because analysing the system
with a stronger attacker it is not that much interesting as it does not leave
any margin to “counteract” the attacker. A stronger attacker would only
lower the time to locate the device while increasing the probability. In this
case the behaviour of the interventions (namely the curves in the figures)
would be the same, only with higher probabilities and lower time.
As the reader has probably noticed, the model here has been used to explore
specific cases for the system, the cases the analyst considered interesting and
most important. From this analysis the application of the model to real scenarios
should be clearer: it is not a kind of oracle that can be queried by the analyst
to know whether a system is secure or not, quite the opposite it is a fine grained
tool that helps in understanding what are the weaknesses of a system, given
certain assumption made by the analyst himself, and more importantly where
it is possible to modify the system in order to strengthen it.
3Here the term is clearly used improperly, as a passive action cannot mimic an active action
such as the one that the concept of countermeasure recalls.
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5.2 FleGSens: a WSN System for Area Moni-
toring
As specified earlier in Chapter 2, the FleGSens system [52] is a WSN for monitor-
ing trespasses in an area under surveillance. It uses the iSense nodes, described
in [19]. It is composed of two main kinds of devices: gateways and sensors.
Gateways receive the transmissions from the sensors, organise data and relay
them to the control centre. Sensors are equipped with an infrared sensor which
detects movements at a range of 10 meters within a view angle of 110 ◦ (denoted
“F” in Figure 5.14).
The FleGSens WSN basically consists of two different kinds
of nodes: there are one or several gateways in the network
as well as ordinary sensor nodes. The node types differ only
by the fact that gateways possess a secure and permanent
connection to a base station as well as a permanent power
supply. Gateways make up 1% of the overall node population.
Protocols in the context of the FleGSens scenario must be
able to deal with up to 5% of the nodes to be compromised.
Compromised nodes are assumed to be approximately uni-
formly distributed in the network, the only exception being
that gateways and the base station to which they are connected
cannot be compromised. Furthermore, it is assumed that up to
10% of the nodes can be permanently down e.g. due to power
exhaustion or damage. Table I summarises the conditions
under which the FleGSens system must be able to function.
Parameter Value
Compromised nodes 5%
Permanently failed nodes 10%
Gateways 1%
TABLE I
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS OF THE FLEGSENS SCENARIO
B. Application-specific Objectives
With the boundary conditions for both the FleGSens system
and the attacker strength thus defined, the following applica-
tion specific goals of the attacker can be identified:
a) Preventing the network from reporting trespassers:
If a trespasser crosses the area monitored by the WSN, the
network has to communicate and process the sensor events
triggered by the trespasser and raise an alarm when indicated.
The attacker therefore might want to hinder the communica-
tion or processing of sensor events. Given the attacker has
compromised a sufficient amount of nodes in the network,
they can achieve this by not relaying messages concerning the
detection of the trespasser at critical points. This attack will
be referred to as Silence Attack in the following. Redundant
sensor coverage of the area and redundant routing paths
through the network complicate this attack. Another venue
the attacker might choose consists in destroying the nodes on
the trespasser’s path. This also motivates the deployment of a
node failure monitoring protocol to ensure that missing nodes
are reported to the gateway.
b) Delaying the report of trespassers: Instead of alarm
prevention, the attacker may want to delay the report of
trespassers, enabling them to cross the monitored area suf-
ficiently long before the network maintainer arrives on site.
This could be achieved by a typical Jamming Attack blocking
the frequency used for communication and therefore forcing
the network to establish alternative paths to a gateway. The
use of redundant routing paths and several gateways reduces
the risk of falling victim to this kind of attack.
c) Manipulating the information reported about a tres-
passer: If an alarm is raised, the network should simultane-
ously provide information as to the last known locations of the
trespasser, e.g. as identified by the network addresses of nodes
that register the trespasser via their sensors. If the attacker
is able to manipulate the information sent in the according
messages, it will be difficult up to impossible to locate the
trespasser in a reasonable amount of time, resulting in their
unhindered passage of the monitored area. If communication
is authentic and information integrity is granted e.g. by using
MACs at application layer, an outside attacker cannot manip-
ulate the messages without being detected – inside attackers,
e.g. in the form of compromised nodes may still launch the
Manipulation Attack described here, as far as they are privy
to the cryptographic keys needed.
d) Covering up node failures: If an attacker can cover
up node failures a trespasser could choose their path across
the monitored area according to where the failed nodes are
and thus be able to cross over undetected. Covering up node
failures could be achieved by replaying old messages of the
failed nodes, thus suggesting that the nodes in question are
still up and running. It is the objective of a secure node failure
detection protocol to protect against this kind of Replay Attack.
IV. PROTOCOL DESIGN
This section of the paper describes in depth the design of the
protocols running within the basic FleGSens system. As men-
tioned in section I, the basic system consists of two protocols
at application layer: one for trespass detection and node failure
detectio respectively. First, the trespass detection protocol
as the core of the application is introduced in Section IV-A.
Where applicable according to the attacker objectives specified
in Section III-B, the need for security mechanisms is pointed
out. In Section IV-B the secure node failure detection protocol
is described.
Beneath the application layer, the FleGSens protocol archi-
tecture uses a hop based routing network layer and an IEEE
802.15.4 link layer. The network itself follows a grid topology
as illustrated by figure 1, where a and b denote length and
width of the monitored area, n identifies the number of nodes
and F illustrates the sensor range.
a
b
n
F
Fig. 1. Grid topology of the FleGSens scenario
A. Trespass Detection Protocol
A trespasser that moves within the range of a PIR sensor
will create a so-called PIR event – i.e. an interrupt on the node
whose PIR sensor has detected the movement. A PIR event
may be characterised by the timestamp of its registration and
the location or ID of the node that registers it. Note that no
complex sensor information is needed to identify a trespasser.
Figure 5.14: FleGSens Topology - Source [52]
Figure 5.14 shows the topology of the network: the sensors are deployed over
a certain area in a strip fashion. The radio technology used complies with the
IEEE 802.15.4 standard [3], working at a rate of 250Kbit/s with a range of 30
meters; the senso s make use of the AES block cipher as defin d in the IEEE
standard. Eac s nsor stores a preshared key with the gateways which is used
authenticate each message sent by the s nsor. Cryptography is used only for
authentication and n t f Encryption, this m ans tha data are sent in clear
(as for the insulin pump) but they cannot be forge without knowledge of the
key.
Within FleGSens there are two protocols in place that were designed to strength-
en the system both in terms of efficiency and security: the “Trespass Detection
Protocol” and the “Node Failure Detection Protocol”. The first one organises
the network in small clusters which gather collective information about tres-
passes and send it in one transmission only. This is done to prevent one event
triggering traffic flooding, hence overloading the gateways and the overall net-
work in general. Furthermore, to avoid false positives due for example to animals
or similar sporadic events, a sensor recognises a movement as a trespass only if
two movements are detected within a variable time usually set to 10 seconds.
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Therefore if a sensor registers two movements more than 10 seconds apart, it
disregards them. The second protocol is needed to detect node failures, so that
failed nodes can be repaired or replaced. It is important to note that this proto-
col would mark as failed also nodes that have been destroyed or whose battery
has been depleted or taken off.
In this analysis the analyst decided to focus on the sensors only as these are
the ones that perform the movement detection. Furthermore the gateways are
supposed to be deployed well within the network hence not reachable before
raising an alarm.
5.2.1 Definition of Interventions
As we have seen most of the interventions in the case of the insulin pump, we
just focus on three of them for this analysis:
• Destruction.
• Reprogramming.
• Energy Reduction.
Specifically they can be defined as follows:
Destruction: All states are active, the attacker can both destroy the device
physically or remotely by making the sensor deplete its energy.
Reprogramming: As the sensors are implemented over a standard technology,
the attacker may reprogram it. The paper does not specify any kind of
remote reprogramming feature, hence the only way the attacker has to
reprogram it is by physical access. The active states are those on the first
branch.
Energy Reduction: FleGSens is a WSN, its devices have limited lifetime and
energy, hence it is vulnerable to Energy Reduction. All the states are
active as the energy could be reduced by taking out the battery or by
forcing the sensor to deplete its energy by elaborating some data (cf.
remote energy reduction, Chapter 4, Section 4.3). In this analysis the
analyst explores only the second branch of the intervention (i.e. remote
energy reduction) as the first branch (which models the device tampering)
needs an analysis of the effectiveness of the infrared sensor to assess the
successful tampering of the sensor without the attacker being detected.
Furthermore if the attacker found a way to go undetected to the infrared
sensor, it would not make sense for her to deplete the energy of the sensors
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as she would already possess a method to render the detection network
useless.
The other interventions were disregarded for the following reasons:
Eavesdropping: As the network is spread over a specific area (e.g. a national
border) and it is meant to guard it, the attacker most likely knows its
position. If we add the fact that the radio technology is a well known
standard, and that the detection distance is considerable, we can fairly
assume that the attacker is able to eavesdrop packets with a probability
close to 1 every time that a packet is transmitted. Furthermore considering
that this happens every 2 seconds (from the specifications of the network
[52]) then it becomes even more clear that modelling eavesdropping in this
case is not worth.
Data Knowledge: As data is transmitted in clear and given the considera-
tions we just made about eavesdropping, it is not interesting to analyse
this intervention for the purposes of this analysis. It is true that the at-
tacker could get hold of cryptographic material with this intervention. But
she should do this for every node in the network as the key is specific to
each sensor. Furthermore technical specifications about the cryptographic
mechanisms involved are missing: (key generation scheme, random num-
bers generators etc.), hence this intervention is not investigated.
Disturb/Partial Data Modification: as the cryptographic material is not
known it is not possible for the attacker to forge a message. Furthermore
reply attacks are mitigated by the use of authenticated time stamps, hence
the attacker cannot use a legitimate message to Disturb the network.
Full Data Modification: It needs access to the device, the same considera-
tions about Energy Reduction for the tampering branch hold.
Device Injection: A device has a preshared key with the gateways, hence the
attacker would need to know one of this keys to inject a device in the
network.
Energy Control: This does not apply as sensors do not have any energy har-
vesting capability.
In addition, the purpose of this work is to show how the proposed model can
be used to analyse the security of a system, hence going through the same
interventions as the ones already discussed for the insulin pump system would
not have added anything significantly new.
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5.2.2 Probability Extraction
In this section probability extraction for the actions relevant to the analysed
interventions is discussed. These actions are:
• Device Location.
• Device Crashing.
• Memory Write Access.
• Device Physical Access.
• Remote Energy Reduction.
Physically Force Data Transmission is not discussed since the organisation in
clusters inhibits the effectiveness of the action, furthermore the only way to
stimulate a transmission is to trigger the infrared sensor. This would raise a
trespassing alarm, and in this analysis we suppose that the attacker does not
want to do that.
Device Location - As each sensor transmits a short packet every 2 seconds
and the transmission range is considerable, the attacker (even a weak one) would
locate a sensor within tens of seconds. Furthermore the attacker should know
what the area under surveillance is and approximately where the sensors are
placed. In addition sensors are placed 5 to 7 meters apart, finding one should
not be difficult once the area is identified even at the naked eye. Hence the
probability for device location can be set to one with a small time reward.
Device Crashing - Once a sensor has been found it should not be a problem
to crash it. The only problem is to get hold of the sensor without being detected
from the network. For this goal the clustering mechanism of the trespassing
detection protocol could be exploited. Specifically the protocol is designed to
filter out sporadic events, it does this by cancelling events which occur singularly
within a short period (typically 10 seconds, cf. [52]). The attacker could exploit
this by approaching the sensor with slow movements which occurs more than
every 10 seconds. Unfortunately computing the probability for this requires the
specific knowledge of the infrared sensor sensitivity to movements. Since device
crashing was already explored in the analysis of the insulin pump, this action is
discarded here.
Memory Write Access - This action is part of the reprogramming interven-
tion. The iSense sensors can be programmed by direct programming interface,
or, if equipped with a proper module called OTAP (Over-the-Air-Programming),
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they can be programmed wirelessly. The FleGSens system is specifically built
with the infrared sensor only (i.e. no OTAP) hence the sensors can be pro-
grammed only by direct interface. These devices do not provide any tamper
proof mechanism or access restrictions to the memory. As a matter of fact the
authors of [52] assert that it is possible for an attacker to compromise a sensor
(i.e. reprogram it); they even suppose that the attacker could get hold of the
cryptographic material in the node by doing this. This means that there is no
mechanism to prevent access to the memory of the device, both data and pro-
gram memory. Hence for the purposes of this analysis the attacker is supposed
to have access to the memory with certainty (i.e. probability 1). The time
needed depends on the attacker’s knowledge on how the system works. If the
attacker knows the system (and this is usually the case) then she should be able
to reprogram the system in a matter of minutes.
Device Physical Access - This action is needed for Reprogramming, as to
reprogram a sensor the attacker needs physical access. To get it, it has first to
approach a sensor undetected, disable the infrared sensor and then physically
access the device. As stated earlier the FleGSens system has a trespass detection
protocol which detects a trespass only if two movements are detected within a
10 seconds window. Technical specifications which would help to understand
what is considered a movement and what is not are not available, hence we will
simply assume that with a movement it is possible to cover 50cm of space. If we
consider that an infrared sensor can detect a movement 10m away, the attacker
needs 10/0.5 = 20 movements to reach the device and be able to disable the
sensor (e.g. by covering it with an IR opaque material). If a movement takes 2
seconds the attacker needs 20×(2 + 10) = 400 s which is roughly 7 minutes. The
time reward for this action is then set to 7 minutes with a transition probability
of 1.
Remote Energy Reduction - This is the most interesting action as it con-
cern an intervention that it was not addressed before and that operates over
the energy of the device. With this action the attacker stimulate the sensor
activity thus making it reduce its energy. She can do this by transmitting data
to the sensor, (any data) as a radio device in general consumes energy just by
receiving transmissions. Specifically according to [56] the energy depleted per
bit received in a IEEE 802.15.4 device at 250 Kbit/s is 133.20 nJ/bit.
The attacker can choose to transmit three types of data:
I. A legitimate old transmission.
II. A forged transmission, which will be discarded as it is not authentic.
5.2 FleGSens: a WSN System for Area Monitoring 115
III. A malformed transmission, which does not satisfy the integrity check and
is therefore discarded at the MAC layer.
With the first two types of transmissions the node loses energy by receiving
and processing the packet as well. This processing consists in performing the
cryptographic actions to validate the message. The energy cost for cryptography
can be high if the cryptographic operations are performed by the processor. For
common sensors, for example, this value ranges from 10 to 40 µJ for a single
128-bit AES block (see [24] for details). This is not the case for the iSense mote,
since it performs all cryptographic operations on an hardware dedicated chip.
In this case the energy consumption is in the order of tens of pJ/bit (these data
are taken from [47]).
With the third transmission the node consumes energy simply by receiving the
transmission. Even if data do not make sense for it, the sensor wastes energy
by simply receiving them.
For this action the probability for the first two types of transmissions is set to
0.97 which is the probability of receiving a correct frame (it is the same as “fake
data injection” in the case of the insulin pump). The probability is set to 1 in
the case of the third transmission.
Considering that cryptography in the FleGSens system does not impact con-
siderably on the energy budget of the sensor, we can fairly treat all types of
transmissions as if they brought the same amount of energy depletion per bit
received. If this were not the case, if for example a cryptographic operation
would deplete energy in the order of µJ , an injected transmission which is not
received correctly (P = 1 − 0.97) would still deplete the energy amount corre-
sponding to the reception of the bit (as a transmission of the third type). As a
minor remark, the system prevents replay attacks but does not check for them,
hence replaying a transmission does not raise any alarm.
The iSense sensors are equipped with a CR2477 battery. This battery has a
charge of 1000mAh and a supply voltage of 3 V . Considering than 1Ah = 3600C
this translates into:
1× 3600C × 3V = 10800 J
Hence the sensor has enough energy to receive:
10800
133.2× 10−9 ×
1byte
8bit
× 1
230
= 9.44GByte
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Given that the rate of transmission is 250 Kbit/s the battery can be depleted
in 84 hours. If you add the fact that other things may affect the battery life,
then this time could even be smaller.
As in the case of eavesdropping the attacker should not find any difficulty in ex-
ecuting this attack as she has only to transmit arbitrary data. Furthermore she
can boost the signal she transmits, thus increasing the range of the transmission
and affecting more sensors at once.
This kind of attack goes undetected since the “Node Failure Detection Protocol”
detects failed nodes when they have already failed (i.e. battery depleted).
Regarding the time unit, since FleGSens makes use of AES-128, and the mini-
mum block size is 128 bit, the time unit is the time needed to transmit a AES
block, hence
128bit
250Kbit
s = 0.512ms.
5.2.3 Analysis of the Model
The model can be analysed in a similar way to what has been done earlier for
the insulin pump system. The results here will show fixed numbers and not
probability of success as a function of time; this is due to the fact that there
is not a temporal dependency in the interventions for the FleGSens system for
two reasons:
• It is not a highly localised system and the range of devices is higher.
• Devices transmit at a high rate (every 2 seconds), hence the event of an
eavesdropper passing by and not detecting a transmission is most unlikely.
Time comes in when the attacker depletes the energy of a device; we will see it
in the analysis of the energy reduction intervention.
Energy Reduction - This is the first intervention to be analysed as its results
are needed for Destruction; as a matter of fact Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 shows
that Energy Reduction can imitate Destruction since when a battery is depleted
the device is as good as destroyed. Specifically the results obtained in this
intervention will be then used as input for Destruction.
Figure 5.15 shows the intervention with the inactive states. The transition
probability P (A1,S → A4,S) has different values depending on the type of trans-
mission the attacker is forging. As already said above, in the case of FleGSens
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Figure 5.15: FleGSens: Energy Reduction Intervention
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Figure 5.16: Energy Reduction of a Sensor with different values of Energy De-
pletion
it does not make sense to compute it as the energy depleted by processing the
data is negligible with respect to the amount of energy depleted by receiving the
bits. Anyway for completeness and for use in cases where the energy reduction
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by processing is significant, data with different energy depletion values were
computed. Figure 5.16 shows the value of the depleted energy as a function
of time T (expressed in time units). As it is possible to see when the energy
for processing increases, the amount of depleted energy increase as well, and
noticeably. The values used for the processing energy are comparable with the
ones in [24].
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Figure 5.17: FleGSens: Destruction Intervention
Destruction - This intervention is modelled as in Figure 5.17: the active
states are those that represent remote destruction of a device, this is achieved
by depleting the energy of the sensor completely. As specified in the previous
section the crashing of the sensor is not modelled as the attacker would be
detected, hence invalidating the purpose for destroying the sensor itself.
In this intervention state A2,S represent the destruction of a single device, while
state A3,S the destruction of multiple devices. They differ only in the time
needed to accomplish the intervention. The time to deplete a sensor is 84 hours
(see 116), which is the time reward for the transition A0,2 → A2,S (84 hours u
6× 108 TU4). When the attacker targets multiple nodes (state A3,S), some of
them could be on the edge of the transmission range, hence they would receive
only a part of the transmissions aiming at reducing their energy, therefore the
attacker has to take more time to deplete the energy of these devices otherwise
they would have less energy but they would still be active.
Reprogramming - As already said in Section 5.2.2, Reprogramming can be
performed only with a physical access to the device. Hence the active states are
4Remember that 1TU = 0.512ms.
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only the ones in the first branch.
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Figure 5.18: FleGSens: Reprogramming Intervention
Figure 5.18 shows the intervention with the related transition probabilities and
time rewards expressed in time units. Specifically the transition INIT → A0,1
represents “Device Physical Access” (cf. page 114) and A0,1 → A1,S “Memory
Write Access” (page 113).
To successfully perform the attack the attacker needs around 8 minutes. With
respect to this intervention and the FleGSens system there is an important
observation to make: the analysis performs is valid for any attacker the analyst
might consider, since there is no remote way to reprogram the node and the
attacker wants to stay undetected.
5.2.4 Discussion
The way the analysis was performed in the case of the FleGSens system is quite
different from the Insulin Pump System: in the latter the analysis showed a
probability of success that is strongly dependent on the time the attacker has to
perform the attack. For the FleGSens system this is not true anymore, at least
for the interventions the analysis focused on. Here carrying out an intervention
is a matter of time and not of probabilities. This is because device location is
not a critical action anymore. This can be explained by observing that:
• The FleGSens system is a WSN surveillance system, spread throughout a
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specific area, which is supposed to be known by the attacker (legitimate
assumption as every surveilled area usually is identified by some sign).
• Devices transmit with high frequency (every 2 seconds), thus making de-
vice location trivial.
Usually WSN are designed so that they are energy efficient with minimal com-
munication activity. Hence in a typical WSN locating a device would still pose
similar problems to the insulin pump. FleGSens was designed to be energy ef-
ficient to some extent (the clustering organisation for example), but not on the
communication level, this has consequences on device location and eavesdrop-
ping in general.
About the reprogramming of devices, the fact that there is no tamper mechanism
that prevent access to the devices and the program memory seems not protected
in any way, makes the reprogramming only a matter of time. The designer
probably thought that an attacker would be detected by the sensor way before
she had accessed it and perhaps did not perceive this as a serious threat.
There is another aspect that has not been discussed but that deserve to be
mentioned: the system establishes routing paths that goes from each sensor
to the gateways. Messages are forwarded along these paths. If the attacker
managed to reprogram a sensor, she could tamper with the routing algorithm
and create malformed path so that messages do not arrive at destination, thus
bringing the system down all at once. The routing algorithm is not specified in
the literature [52], hence a specific analysis was not possible, but still the threat
exist and it is very serious in the opinion of the writer.
5.3 Summary
This chapter presents the quantitative analysis of the two case studies presented
in Chapter 2. This is done in three steps: the construction of interventions, the
probability extraction and the analysis using the PRISM model. The results
of the first system show a similar behaviour across all interventions, this is due
to the fact that these are based on the location of the target device, which
is critical for the insulin pump system. For the FleGSens system the most
interesting result is the destruction of a node by depleting its energy, which is
the imitation of the Destruction intervention made by Energy Reduction (cf.
Table 2.1).
Chapter 6
Final Remarks
This chapter summarises the results of the analyses performed in Chapter 5.
Furthermore it lays out an iterative approach that the analyst can use to address
the security weaknesses found in a system and it illustrates how the model can
assist in the early steps of the secure design of ubiquitous systems. The last
part of the chapter compare the work done in this thesis with the related work
presented in Chapter 1.
6.1 Commenting the Results
In the previous chapter, two ubiquitous systems, namely the insulin pump sys-
tem and the FleGSens system have been analysed. The analysis focused on
specific interventions and actions that the author considered most interesting.
Throughout the two systems analyses the interventions which were analysed in
detail were:
• Destruction.
• Eavesdropping.
• Data Knowledge.
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• Disturb/Partial Data Modification.
• Full Data Modification.
• Reprogramming.
• Node Injection.
• Energy Reduction.
The Energy Control intervention was not analysed as none of the two systems
had energy harvesting capabilities, which enable a device to recharge its batter-
ies. Nevertheless Energy Control and Energy Reduction are very similar, and
the probability extraction process works in a similar way as well. The only
difference is that in Energy Control the analyst has to accommodate for the
recharge rate of the batteries, its timing and all the features that depends on
the type of energy source. This should be slightly more difficult compared to
the process performed for Energy Reduction (cf. page 115) but still on the same
level of difficulty.
Comparing the results of the two analyses, the attacker’s abilities are affected
by three main aspects:
1. The dimension of the system, which affects device location.
2. The protection of transmissions with security properties such as confiden-
tiality or integrity, which inhibit for example fake data transmission or
eavesdropping.
3. The physical security of a device with mechanisms such as tamper proof.
With respect to the results given in Chapter 5, the first one produces the most
noticeable effect. In the case of highly localised systems, like the insulin pump,
the identification of the target and its localisation is the most critical action,
the one that takes more time. On the other hand, with widespread systems,
localising a device may not be a difficult task at all, it depends mostly whether
the attacker is looking for a specific device, nevertheless it should not pose much
of a problem. The first line of defence for an ubiquitous system therefore regards
methods aiming to inhibit the localisation of devices, if not all of them, the most
critical ones.
The protection of transmissions is another important measure to limit the at-
tacker in her actions. The two analysed systems address this problem in two
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different ways. The insulin pump system does not have any protection at all,
just a CRC code to verify the integrity of a transmission and a PIN code, which
is transmitted in clear and hence can be read by the attacker. There is no
cryptographic key or mechanism which prevents the attacker to forge a mes-
sage. This is a serious shortcoming and it should have been addressed in the
design phase. The FleGSens system implements authentication, integrity and
freshness mechanisms which ensure the origin of a message, its validity and that
it was not modified in any way. The messages however are not confidential,
hence an attacker may access confidential information, like where and when a
trespass occurs, or even worst exploit the location protocol of the network thus
building a map of the whole network. Considering the fact that the additional
cost of implementing confidentiality is not high (the sensors already possess a
key shared with gateways and the energy for encryption is negligible since it is
done by a dedicated low power chip), the designers probably did not perceive
this as a problem as it actually is.
With respect to the third aspect, the physical security of a device, both systems
can be improved; the FleGSens system would benefit more from this. In fact in
the insulin pump system all devices are on the body of the patient and physically
accessing them may prove difficult. On the other side the FleGSens devices
are deployed over uncontrolled areas, and they could be accessed easily, given
that the attacker is not detected. Furthermore the FleGSens sensors provide a
JTAG interface that ease the access to the programming and data memory of the
device. Securing a device physically is not an easy task, anyway countermeasures
should be put in place so that if a device is physically compromised, at least its
rendered useless (by wiping clean its memory for example).
6.2 Addressing Security Through an Iterative
Approach
As explained in Chapter 5 each analysis was performed in three steps: inter-
ventions construction, probability extraction and analysis. But after having
analysed a system and identified the weakest parts of it, the analyst may decide
to implement security patches and see how they affect the overall security. Fig-
ure 6.1 shows the flow diagram for this process. The original steps described in
Chapter 5 are labelled as “Basic Steps”. For a bare analysis of the security of
a system the analyst may just perform these steps. On the other hand, when
a solution to possible security threats has to be produced, the analyst can rely
on the process shown in the figure:
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Figure 6.1: Analysis and Patch Process Flow Diagram
1. Identify the parts of the system which are weak.
2. Devise a security patch.
3. Perform the whole analysis from the probability extraction again.
4. Produce a final assessment of the security of the system, when he is sat-
isfied with the analysis or when he deems it right.
What happens in this process is that the probabilities change and the weakest
point moves from a part of the system to another. Furthermore by performing
this iterative process, the analyst may uncover new vulnerabilities which were
ignored in the first analysis since the weaknesses of the unpatched system posed
a higher risk and hid the newly discovered vulnerabilities.
As an example we can consider Device Injection in the insulin pump case, look-
ing at the results in Figure 5.13 injecting a device in the “not-supported” case
can be neglected with respect to the “supported” one. When the latter is ad-
dressed by a security patch then the former may become of greater importance
and the analyst may decide to address it as well.
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6.3 Using the Model in the Design Phase
Having a method to analyse the security of an ubiquitous system efficiently and
effectively is indeed very important. Nevertheless the case studies proposed out-
line how the lack of implementing security from the very first moment, the design
phase, has made the system vulnerable, especially the insulin pump system. If
the designers were made aware of the attacker model, even to a qualitative level,
they would have probably produced a more secure and robust system.
The writer strongly believes that one of the main objectives that a security re-
searcher should have, is to make people aware of security: what security is, what
are its advantages, what are the different features that compose it and what are
the risks that incur when it is neglected. This work, and specifically Chapter 2,
apart from people belonging to the security community, is also addressed to
people who wish to learn about security and specifically attacker capabilities.
As a matter of fact, the proposed model can be used in the design phase of an
ubiquitous system to identify what are the parts of the system that needs to be
secured and also what are the ones that do not pose any significant threat and
that may be left as they are.
Attacker 
Identiﬁcation
Basic System 
Design
Identiﬁcation of 
Security Measures
Assets 
Identiﬁcation
Costs/Beneﬁts 
Analysis
Qualitative 
Analysis
Final Design
Critical for Secure Design
Figure 6.2: Securing a System by Design
There is no specific way to do this, any system designer can find its own; a
possible process is illustrated in Figure 6.2. It consists of the following steps:
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1. Identification of assets that need to be secured.
2. Design of a system with no security.
3. Identification of the Attacker: Strength, Presence and Time.
4. Qualitative evaluation of the system against each intervention and the
identified attacker.
5. Definition of proper security measures.
6. Analysis of the costs and the benefits of implementing them.
With the first step the designer identifies what are the assets that need to be
secured. The word asset here identifies both physical or abstract entities like
for example:
• A device (e.g. a glucose sensor).
• Data which have to be confidential or whose integrity must be preserved.
• Functionalities of the system whose outcome needs to be ensured so there
is no way for a malicious party to tamper with them.
• Other assets specific to the system’s purpose.
It is not always true that all assets needs to be protected, if for example data
confidentiality is considered of greatest importance while the communication
system is not, then a designer may want to implement only traffic encryption,
neglecting the physical security of the communication infrastructure. If then
availability and real time communication becomes a strong requirement then
the designer may also consider the physical security of the devices.
With the second step the system designer specifies a basic system with no se-
curity which implements all the functionalities and the entities required by the
target system.
With the third step the designers begin to explore the security dimension of
its target system. He does this by defining the type of attacker that may be
interested in attacking the system, namely what kind of resources she may have
and her strength with respect to time and presence.
In the fourth step the qualitative model defined in Chapter 3 comes into play.
Specifically the designer has to perform a qualitative analysis of the interventions
against the attacker defined in the previous step and the system itself. This
analysis is very similar to the one performed in Chapter 3, Section 2.3. During
this step the designer should always keep in mind the three aspects defined in
Section 6.1, namely the dimension of the system, the protection of transmissions
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and the physical protection of devices. This analysis has to be performed against
every device of the system.
In the fifth step, given the weaknesses found with the analysis, the designer
has to define appropriate changes to the design which implement the correct
security measures. This process could easily end in defining new assets or new
entities which carry out only tasks related to the security of the system. These
can be for example authentication servers, secure tokens, Intrusion Detection
and Prevention Systems, Firewalls etc. In addition such security measures may
also regard other aspects which are collateral to the design, such as monitored
physical access to devices (e.g. devices stored in secure locations which can
be accessed only by authorised personnel), tamper proof mechanisms, or other
types of physical measures. It could also be that a weakness of the system
can be addressed simply by choosing a different technology, for example the
use of random spread spectrum frequency hopping mechanisms to counteract
eavesdropping.
Finally, after the security measures have been identified, the designer may have
to perform an analysis of the costs and the benefits, both from an implementa-
tion and an economical point of view, and decide for the final design of a system
accordingly.
The steps highlighted in Figure 6.2 are considered critical with respect to a
secure design of the system for the following reasons:
• The correct identification of the assets to protect is clearly a crucial step,
as neglecting to recognise key assets may endanger the whole system.
• The identification of the attacker who may attack the system is also of
major importance, as the security measures put in place maybe insufficient
if the identified attacker were weaker than the real one.
• The qualitative analysis has to be performed thoroughly otherwise vulner-
abilities may be incorrectly addressed or be left not addressed.
• By identifying security measures the designer specifies how the threats are
addressed, hence these need to be correct for he system to be secure.
6.4 Considerations About Related Work
In Chapter 1 Section 1.4, the relevant related work has been introduced and
discussed. In this section the writer is going to connect the work done in this
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thesis with the related work by discussing similarities and new aspects with
respect to each of the work cited in Section 1.4.
With respect to the Dolev-Yao model [29], the attacker defined in this thesis
has all the abilities the Dolev-Yao has, although she is limited in her actions:
The Dolev-Yao was an omnipotent and omnipresent attacker, here the attacker
is limited by its strength in presence and time, she cannot perform multiple
actions together, very much like the model defined by Creese et al. in [23]
and [22], and some of the actions may even be impossible. This limitations
are accounted for during the probability extraction; as a matter of facts this
process deals with the actual abilities of the attacker, taking into account her
shortcomings. As an example take an attacker in a wireless network who wants
to inject data and who has only one wireless card; in this case the attacker
cannot eavesdrop and inject data at the same time, and this is indeed taken
into account by the analyst. Furthermore the structure of the PRISM model
itself allows for a transition at a time; multiple concurring actions have to be
explicitly modelled, hence the analyst has to decide whether or not the attacker
may perform two or more actions at the same time.
Considering the Bellare-Rogaway [13] and the Rubin-Shoup model [55], which
provide the attacker with the ability of recovering session keys, the attacker
model defined in this work has a similar approach as it provides the attacker
with the ability of getting hold of cryptographic material as well. These two
models are indeed focused on checking protocol security, nevertheless, with re-
spect to the Dolev-Yao model, the corresponding real world these two models
refer to is closer to the one this thesis refers to as well. Furthermore the idea
that cryptographic material can be extracted from the memory of devices is
very similar to the probabilistic oracles defined in the Rubin-Shoup model (cf.
Section 1.4).
The work done by Basin et al. in [10] and [11] connects to this thesis as it checks
the correctness of “physical security protocols”. This is done by considering
features like time and localisation, which limits the attacker in her ability to
compromise the system. This thesis extends this features in a more broad and
comprehensive way by defining attacker’s presence and time with respect to
her strength. In addition this extension bridge over the physical world and
enables the attacker to actions such as gaining physical access to a device. This
connects [10, 11] to [12], all three by Basin et al., where the authors consider
the possibility of compromised devices resulting in leakage cryptographic keys
at a protocol level.
As a final consideration the work presented in this thesis can be put in rela-
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tionship with the science of Risk Analysis 1, which concerns with evaluating
the probability of some dangerous events to happen. This thesis resembles risk
analysis very much, specifically in the process of probability extraction and the
quantitative analysis of the model.
With respect to the above mentioned related work, this thesis has specific major
contributions:
• The identification of the attacker’s actions, considering her spatial and
temporal boundaries with respect to her strength.
• The definition of a quantitative model and a methodology to analyse the
security of ubiquitous systems.
• The definition of the probability extraction process, which provides the
quantities for checking the model.
• The implementation of a model to compute eavesdropping probabilities in
a scenario where eavesdroppers and targets are mobile.
To the writer’s knowledge this is the first work that aims at producing a quan-
titative attacker model in such a comprehensive way as it has been done in this
thesis.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter the writer discussed the results of the analyses presented in the
previous chapter. With respect to such analyses, the attacker abilities are mainly
affected by three aspects: the system dimension, the protection of transmissions
and the physical security of the devices composing the system. Afterwards an
iterative approach to address the security threats of a system by using the
model was illustrated. This process iterates the analysis with the application
of security patches to the system. In addition, motivated by the fact that the
analysed system presented severe security flaws, a methodology to help system
designers in implementing security in the early phases of system design was
presented. At the end, in the final part of the chapter, the writer makes a
comparison of the work presented in this thesis and the related work described
in Chapter 1.
1If the reader whishes to know more about the subject please refer to [53].
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
Technology has experienced, in the last ten to twenty years, an incredible devel-
opment where the act of computing has gradually moved from desk size devices
to small computing devices which “weave themselves in the fabric of every-
day life” (Mark Weiser, [63]). Smart buildings, automotive, devices for health
applications, environment monitoring, all these technologies make use of an
ubiquitous computing component.
In this thesis the problem of defining an attacker model for Ubiquitous Systems
has been addressed and a method to apply it to real cases has been developed.
The attacker is defined by three dimensions: a)Interventions, b)Presence and
c)Time. These define: a) what the attacker can do, b) what space she can in-
fluence and c) for how long she influences the system. We call this attacker the
“Cyber Physical Attacker” as she can attack a system from a physical perspec-
tive as well as a cyber one. The attacker is also defined by her strength which is
directly connected to presence and time. Up to this point the model describes
the attacker from a qualitative point of view.
To use the model for a more thorough analysis, the author developed an imple-
mentation of the model in PRISM [42], a probabilistic model checker for systems
that express both probabilistic and non-deterministic behaviour.
In order to perform a quantitative analysis of the system, the analyst has to
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perform three steps:
1. Construction of interventions.
2. Probability extraction.
3. Analysis of the PRISM model.
The first specifies how the interventions apply to the system under analysis,
probability extraction computes the probabilities that are used as input for the
PRISM model, and the final step is the analysis itself using PRISM.
The most critical step is the one of Probability Extraction. It is also the most
time consuming one. In this process the analyst has to find the probabilities for
the single actions that compose interventions. In doing this, he could make use
of other models, such as the mobility model the author developed (cf. Chap-
ter 4). This model computes the eavesdropping probabilities in a scenario where
attacker and target move within a defined space, according to a pattern which
can be both probabilistic or deterministic. The analyst could use also models
which predict the status of the energy reservoir of a device either by modelling
its batteries or its energy resources in general. The analyst’s experience plays an
important role as well. As ubiquitous technologies differ very much from each
other, the approach used for extracting a probability for a specific action could
be completely different from system to system. The two case studies proposed
in Chapter 5 for example have two different ways to address “Device Physical
Access”. In the FleGSens system the analyst makes use of the infrared sen-
sor specifications to compute the time the attacker needs to access the device
whereas, in the insulin pump, it is more a social problem since it is a matter of
stealing a device from someone. If you think about the fact that these are two
very different technologies, the first is a WSN for area monitoring while the sec-
ond is a WBAN for health applications, then the fact that the analyst has to use
two different approaches does not come as as surprise since one system is meant
to interact directly with people whereas the other carries out an unsupervised
task.
From the analysis performed in Chapter 5, we have noticed in Chapter 6 that
the attacker abilities of attacking an ubiquitous system depend greatly on three
aspects:
1. The physical dimension of the system.
2. The protection of transmissions.
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3. The physical security of the devices.
These aspects emerged prominently in the analysis of the two proposed systems
but, given the manifold nature of ubiquitous systems, other different aspects
may be influential for other cases for example the nature of the energy source
in an energy harvesting system.
In Chapter 6 in addition we have seen that the model can serve two purposes:
first it can be used as a tool to help the analyst to discover what and where are
the weaknesses of a system and possibly how to address them, and second as a
support tool for system designers who wish to implement security form the very
beginning of their design. One makes use of the quantitative model while the
other uses the qualitative one. Table 7.1 summarises these two purposes.
Qualitative Model Quantitative Model
Chapters: 2 3 and 4
User: System Designer Security Analyst
Application: Used during the design phase
to identify where and to
which extent implement secu-
rity.
Used as a support tool for the
analysis of the security of a
system.
Table 7.1: Purpose of the Model
With the quantitative model, the analyst decides which parts of the system
he wants to analyse and then he constructs the interventions and performs the
analysis accordingly. The analyst has to choose what kind of attackers he wants
to perform the analysis against, specifically what is their strength in terms of
time and presence; this will then have influence on the probability extraction
process. As we have seen in Chapter 5, the usage of the model can be very
fine-grained depending on the purposes of the analyst. Furthermore the analyst
can use an iterative approach where at each iteration he corrects the security
weaknesses found and look for new ones that may arise. This process terminates
when the analyst is satisfied with the overall security of the analysed system.
The qualitative model can be used to help system designers and engineers to
implement security from the beginning in their system. In Chapter 6 the author
explained how the model description given in Chapter 2 could be invaluable for
people who have little or no knowledge about securing a system and who are
called to design systems where security can be critical (the example of the insulin
pump is striking). Unfortunately it is not rare that people that are called to
design IT systems have little knowledge about security or, even worse, that they
implement it in a very wrong way. This happens often, especially in the sector
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of health care, environment monitoring and in the automotive industry. In these
sectors in fact, the focus is on the main requirements: safety of the equipment
and the user, real-time behaviour, energy efficiency, operational availability etc.
hence the security of the system itself is somehow set aside; without thinking
that one attack may destroy the system, invalidating all the main requirements
at once. Part of the problem, as [21] stresses in the case of medical applications,
lies in the fact that the computer security community is often disjoint from
the other communities, especially in the biomedical sector and to some extent
within the wireless sensor network community as well. Part of the problem is
also that designers are usually not aware of security in general, hence they rely
on technologies which are known to be vulnerable to a series of threats (such
as for example Bluetooth [30]) and whose implementation in security critical
applications should be carefully considered.
A summary of the contents and the main contributions for each chapter follows:
• Chapter 2:
1. Definition of the attacker model.
2. Definition of the relationship between dimensions.
3. Qualitative analysis of two case studies.
• Chapter 3:
1. Quantitative implementation of the model.
2. Presence and Time in the model.
• Chapter 4:
1. Definition of Probability Extraction.
2. Definition and Implementation of a mobility model for eavesdropping.
3. Practical example: eavesdropping the insulin pump.
4. Guidelines to probability extraction.
5. Discussion over the analyst role in probability extraction.
• Chapter 5:
1. Qualitative analysis of two case studies.
• Chapter 6:
1. Discussion over the results of the analyses performed in the previous
chapter.
2. Description of a method to address the security of a system through
an iterative approach.
3. Discussion on how the model can be used in the design phase.
each
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Future Work
There are three main topics for future work:
1. Augmentation of the model with a study on the willingness of the attacker
to attack.
2. Investigation of a way to make the process of probability extraction more
automatic.
3. Study of how the use of different communication technologies impacts on
the attacker capabilities.
1. During the analysis of the model, we have encountered situations where the
attacker had two or more possible ways to achieve an intervention, each carrying
its own benefits as well as risks. In this work we have been interested only in
computing the success probability of every action the attacker might perform.
To take a step further, the willingness of the attacker to carry out these actions
should be investigated. There are already several studies that focus on this
aspect, and most of them are based on game theory (for a reference on network
security and game theory see [4]). The basic idea is to model a game with two
players: the attacker and the defender. Each of them has a strategy unknown
to the other and they can make the following decisions:
• The attacker decides whether or not perform an attack, based on the
knowledge of what are the benefits of the attack (i.e. what she gains) and
what are the risks (i.e. what happens if she is caught).
• The defender chooses how strongly he wants to defend the system, based
on the cost of the defence (i.e. what are the losses if the attacker wins)
and how much effort he has to put into defending the system.
Given this analysis, the model may be augmented in such a way that the most
likely actions the attacker might perform are singled out and highlighted to
the analyst who can then focus on them. Furthermore actions which are very
unlikely could be discarded at will, thus simplifying the analysis.
In [38] a connection between game theory and attack-defence trees is defined
(for attack defence trees see Chapter 1, Section 1.4). These are powerful graph
representations of security threats that help in finding attack-defence patterns.
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The use of attack-defence trees in connection with game theory should be inves-
tigated as it could improve and simplify the definition of the games, bringing to
more significant results.
The use of game theory would help the analyst to understand what are the parts
of the system worth analysing or worth defending, and what are the actions the
attacker most likely would take.
2. Probability extraction is a key process as it decides the probabilities to
input into the PRISM model. We have seen in Chapter 4 that this process can
be generalised for some actions, particularly the author explained the way to
extract probabilities for eavesdropping. Other actions unfortunately are strongly
dependent on the technology the system under analysis is composed of, hence the
analyst has to rely on other methods and mainly on his experience to perform
probability extraction (cf. Table 4.4). In order to provide the analyst for a
more effective analysis for such actions, probability extraction should be further
investigated, a classification of the technologies available for Ubiquitous Systems
would be a logical step towards a study on extracting probability from them.
Furthermore, as the usage of energy harvesting technologies is going to be more
and more common, a study of the security implications with respect to those
actions that aim at exploiting the energy of a device, should be carried out.
3. The development of new technologies has addressed several threats that
were discovered in the past, but it also opened new ones. Considering EH-
WSNs, the example made in Section 2.2.2, at page 24, is a striking one; the fact
that a EH-WSN node has an amount of energy that can increase could raise
new threats that were not present in the earlier technology, when not dealt with
accordingly. As another example, considering the problem of eavesdropping in
the case of the insulin pump system, the use of body coupled communication
(BCC, see [8]) would have mitigated the threat posed by an eavesdropping
attacker.
Given these examples a study of the security implications that the application
of different wireless technologies have, would add details to the attacker pos-
sibilities of performing specific actions, more importantly it would give system
designers an important tool to evaluate the security requirements of their system
against underlying technologies. A good starting point would be to start from
the standard technologies presented in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.2), and draw a
list of the security properties that each technology offers, and their applicability
to ubiquitous systems.
Appendix A
Prism Language
This appendix contains a resume´ of the PRISM language. For a thorough ref-
erence please visit www.prismmodelchecker.org.
A.1 The Modelling Language
The PRISM modelling language can model four types of Markov models already
defined in Chapter 3:
1. Discrete Time Markov Chains.
2. Continuous Time Markov Chains.
3. Markov Decision Processes.
4. Probabilistic Timed Automata.
The type of model is usually specified at the beginning of the model description
with one of the following keywords:
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dtmc || ctmc || mdp || pta
A model can then have global variables. These can be either integer or Boolean.
They are defined with a statement like:
global y : [1..10] init 1; // integer
global b : bool init true; // boolean
Constants can also be defined. Beside integer and boolean these can also be
double (i.e. decimal) values. They are defined by a statement like:
// constants
const int radius = 12; // integer
const double pi = 3.141592; // double
const double area = pi * radius * radius;
// double value computed by the given
formula const bool yes = true; // boolean value
By the example it is possible to see that constants can be defined using other
ones.
The core of a PRISM model is called “module”. It is defined by a set of local
variables which represent its local state and a set of commands which express its
behaviour. Each command has a label, a guard and an update part. The label is
used to synchronise actions across different modules, a guard is a predicate that
needs to be satisfied in order to execute the command and the update describe
the new values the variables assume and with which probability or rate. A
module is defined by a statement like this:
module dummy
x:[0..6] init 0; // local variables
// Commands
[] x!=6 -> 1:(x’=x+1);
[reset] x=6 -> 1:(x’=0);
endmodule
// Command structure:
[label] guard -> rate:( update)
[label] guard -> probability :( update)
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A PRISM model can be augmented with formulas. These are used to simplify
the model definition within the modules. A formula can be composed of a
mathematical expression, a boolean expression or some basic functions such as
log, min or max1. A formula can be defined by the following statements:
formula double_x = x*x;
formula Max = max((x1 -x_s1 >0 ?x_1 -x_s1:x_s1 -x_1),
(y_1 -y_s1 >0?y_1 -y_s1:y_s1 -y_1));
A.2 Rewards and Properties
A PRISM model can also be augmented with Rewards structures. These assign
reward values for a transition or for the time spent in a state. They are defined
by a statement like:
rewards "NameOfReward"
true : 1;
x=3 : k*2;
[reset] true : 1000;
endrewards
This reward structure behaves differently when the time is discrete or continu-
ous. In the first case it assigns:
1. Line 1: it assigns 1 for every state visited.
2. Line 2: it assigns k times 2 for every state where x equals 3. k can be
both a variable or a constant.
3. Line 3: it assigns 1000 for every transition labelled “reset”.
When the time is continuous:
1. Line 1: it assigns 1 times the time spent in the state for each state visited.
2. Line 2: it assigns k times 2 times the time spent in a state for each state
where x equals 3. k can be both a variable or a constant.
1For a complete list refer to http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/manual/
ThePRISMLanguage/Expressions.
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3. Line 3: has the same behaviour as the previous case.
A PRISM model can than be checked against three type of properties identified
by the operator they use:
1. The P operator.
2. The R operator.
3. The S operator.
These have been already explained in Chapter 3.
The P operator computes a probability of an event occurring. The R operator
computes properties based on reward structures. The S operator computes the
steady state probabilities of the model.
These are specified by:
P query [ pathprop ]
S query [ pathprop ]
R query [ rewardprop ]
The query of operators can either express a bound on a value or ask for a
quantitative result, e.g.:
P<.8 [ F x=1 ]
P=? [ F x=1 ]
The first computes whether or not the probability of x being equal 1 is less than
0.8, while the second asks for the exact probability.
The “pathprop” assume different values for the P and S operator. In the latter
it simply refer to a state of the model, in the first it can describe different
properties, these are:
• X : ”next”
• U : ”until”
• F : ”eventually” (sometimes called ”future”)
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• G : ”always” (sometimes called ”globally”)
• W : ”weak until”
• R : ”release”
For a complete description please refer to http://www.prismmodelchecker.
org/manual/PropertySpecification/ThePOperator .
The R operator works differently from the other two, as it expresses reward
based properties. Specifically “rewardprop” can assume 4 different values:
1. reachability reward”: F prop
2. ”cumulative reward” : C¡=t
3. ”instantaneous reward” : I=t
4. ”steady-state reward” : S.
The first one is used to compute the expected reward to reach a specific state.
The second one is used to compute the reward accumulated within a time t.
The third reports the value of the reward at the instant t. Finally the fourth
one gives the value of the reward at the steady state.
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Appendix B
Mobility Model
This appendix contains details about the model developed to compute eaves-
dropping probabilities in a scenario where both the eavesdropper and the target
station are moving.
The model is built and analysed with the PRISM tool. The PRISM model can
easily reach a thousand lines of description, hence a program to generate the
PRISM model file has been implemented using MATLAB [45]. MATLAB is
a framework for numerical computation and visualisation which makes use of
extended libraries, among which are libraries for mathematics and statistics. It
has a programming language which resembles C/C++ in its structure although
it is substantially different: it is interpreted by the MATLAB framework which
deals with memory management, type assignments and similar so that the pro-
grammer can focus only on the algorithm, leaving typical problems, such as
segmentation faults or exception handling, to the framework.
MATLAB is the choice that best suites the purpose, since it provides strong and
complex mathematical functions which ease the implementation of the different
probabilistic features the model has.
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B.1 The Model Generator
The model generator is implemented as a MATLAB function which takes the
following parameters as input:
1. X-by-Y space dimension.
2. The file name of the prism model.
3. An X-by-Y matrix defining the area the target can move over, called
target freedom.
4. The initial position of the target and if needed also a most likely position.
5. An X-by-Y matrix defining the area the eavesdropper can move over, called
eave freedom.
6. The initial position of the eavesdropper.
7. A boolean value which tells whether the eavesdropper follows a sequential
path or a random one.
8. Transmission and retransmission probabilities: P (Tx|NoTx), P (Tx|Tx).
9. Eavesdropping probabilities by distance between the eavesdropper and the
target.
10. The step size for both the eavesdropper and the target.
The matrix of the areas covered by the eavesdropper has two forms: if the
movement is sequential the path is identified by a series of sequential numbers
ranging from 1 to a number representing the length of the path. If the movement
is random, zeros represent points where the eavesdropper cannot move over,
while ones points he can. The target mobility is purely random hence his matrix
can be only in the form of zeros and ones.
The model generator supports an arbitrary number of eavesdroppers and targets,
nevertheless increasing them easily produces models that cannot be analysed
with PRISM, this is due to their size in terms of number of states and transitions.
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B.1.1 Target Movement
In this model the target can be set to move in two ways:
1. Purely random: the movement probability is sampled from a uniform
distribution.
2. Normally distributed over a space, with a focal point.
With the first, the movements of the target are modelled using a probabilistic
distribution which is uniform in every direction. With the second one the target
moves within an area, and his movement is biased towards a target point. This
is modelled with a normal 2D distribution with the mean centred in the target
point. This is exactly how the patient’s movements were modelled in Chapter 4
(see Figure 4.3).
B.1.2 Eavesdropper Movement
The eavesdropper can move in two ways:
1. Sequentially, following a path.
2. Randomly following a probabilistic distribution.
The first refers to a scenario where the eavesdropper is searching an area follow-
ing a specific path. This would obviously be the normal strategy for most the
eavesdroppers. The second movement is similar to the one the target makes,
the eavesdropper moves following a probabilistic distribution.
As MATLAB provides a complete probabilistic framework, the model can be
easily augmented to include any kind of probability distribution may be required
for the movement of the eavesdropper or the target.
B.1.3 Following the Target
The case were the eavesdropper follows the target (cf. Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3)
is modelled in a different way. The space is smaller, defined by the eavesdropping
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range, for example a 5x5 space, and even though both in the real world target
and eavesdropper are moving, since the target is followed by the eavesdropper,
its position can be modelled as fixed in the centre while the eavesdropper moves
throughout the whole space in a probabilistic fashion. In this thesis we focused
on the case when the eavesdropper moves following a 2D normal distribution
centred on the target position, this to model the fact that he wants to be always
as close as possible to the target. Indeed other probability distributions can be
freely chosen depending on the case under analysis.
B.2 Generating the PRISM code
After whole the paramenters have been set or computed, the model genera-
tor builds a matrix that for each moving entity (i.e. eavesdropper or target)
and for each point in the space, contains the transitions probabilities for every
movement. Afterwards the actual file generation begins.
The model is a Discrete Time Markov Chain. Each entity is composed of two
independent modules:
• Target:
– Movement module.
– Transmission module.
• Eavesdropper:
– Movement module.
– Eavesdropping module.
The firs one models the movement of each entity. The second one models the
transmission and the eavesdropping. These two modules are syncronised in the
actions so that everytime the target transmits, if the eavesdropper is in range,
he eavesdrops a transmission according to the eavesdropping probability given
for the distance between the two.
The distance is computed by a formula (cf. PRISM language Appendix A)
which is generated by the model generator.
At the end the model generator provides also the reward structures needed to
check the model.
Appendix C
Abstracts of Published Papers
Toward a Threat Model for Energy-Harvesting
Wireless Sensor Networks
Security is a crucial matter for Wireless Sensor Networks. With the recent in-
troduction of Energy-Harvesting nodes, it has gained even more importance. By
exploiting the ability of scavenging energy from the surrounding environment,
the lifespan of a node has drastically increased. This is one of the reasons why
security needs a new take in this topic. Traditional solutions may not work in
this new domain. Brand new challenges and threats may arise and new solu-
tions have to be designed. In this paper we present a first taxonomy of attacks,
focusing on how they change in the energy-harvesting context compared to reg-
ular sensor networks. We also discuss existing security solutions specific for the
energy harvesting world and comment on the trend that this topic may follow in
the future. Finally, we draw a comparison between the cyberphysical attacker
we define in our model and adversary models belonging to security protocols
verification literature.
Alessio Di Mauro, Davide Papini, Roberto Vigo and Nicola Dragoni
4th International Conference on Networked Technologies, Dubai 2012
148 Abstracts of Published Papers
Introducing the Cyber-Physical Attacker to
Energy-Harvesting Wireless Sensor Networks
Cyber-Physical Systems based on Wireless Sensor Networks are pervading our
everyday life, ranging from industrial to military applications. Due to the criti-
cality of the tasks performed by these systems, and to the increasing number of
fields in which they are employed, their security is a central concern. What is
more, with the recent introduction of Energy-Harvesting nodes, securing such
a system is even harder. An EH-node is able of scavenging energy from the
surrounding environment, thus extending its lifespan, but this new feature in-
troduces a new target for attackers. Traditional approaches to WSN security
may not work in this new domain: new solutions have to be designed to cope
with brand new challenges. A taxonomy of attacks is presented in this paper,
which focuses on highlighting the novelties of the energy-harvesting context
compared to regular sensor networks. We also discuss existing solutions spe-
cific to the energy harvesting world, and comment on the trend that this topic
is likely to follow in the future. Finally, we sketch a comparison between the
cyber-physical attacker we define and adversary models belonging to security
protocols verification literature.
Alessio Di Mauro, Davide Papini, Roberto Vigo and Nicola Dragoni
Journal of Networking Technology, Volume 3, Number 3, September 2012
Security Challenges for Energy-Harvesting
Wireless Sensor Networks
Security is a crucial matter for Wireless Sensor Networks. With the recent in-
troduction of Energy-Harvesting nodes, it has gained even more importance. By
exploiting the ability of scavenging energy from the surrounding environment,
the lifespan of a node has drastically increased. This is one of the reason why
security needs a completely new take in this topic. Traditional solutions may
not work in this new field. Brand new challenges and threats may arise and
new solutions have to be designed. In this paper we present a taxonomy of at-
tacks focusing on how they change in the energy harvesting scenario compared
to regular sensor networks. We also discuss existing security solutions specific
for the energy harvesting world and comment on the trend that this topic may
follow in the future.
Alessio Di Mauro, Davide Papini and Nicola Dragoni
2nd International Conference on
Pervasive and Embedded Computing and Communication Systems, Roma 2012
149
Lightweight MAC-Spoof Detection Exploiting
Received Signal Power and Median Filtering
Abstract. IEEE 802.11 networks are subject to MAC-spoof attacks. An attacker
can easily steal the identity of a legitimate station, even Access Points, thus
enabling him to take full control over network basic mech- anisms or even access
restricted resources. In this paper we propose a method to detect this kind of
attack based on signal power monitoring. The main contribution of our work
is the introduction of a median fil- ter that enables the detection of the attack
by looking at the variance of the signal power. We take into account two types
of references for the samples, time and number of frames, and compare their
detection capabilities. Our experimental results show that the spoofing attack
is successfully detected with both type of references. Moreover the median filter
helps to reject false positives.
Davide Papini
5th Nordic Workshop on Dependability and Security NODES11, Kgs. Lyngby
Int. J. Critical Computer-Based Systems, Extended Version, To Appear
(SC)2: a System to Secure Off-Card
Contract-Policy Matching in
Security-by-Contract for Open
Multi-Application Smart Cards
The Security-by-Contract (SxC) framework has recently been proposed to sup-
port software evolution in open multi-application smart cards. The key idea lies
in the notion of contract, a specification of the security behavior of an applica-
tion that must be compliant with the security policy of the smart card hosting
the application. In this demonstration we show (SC)2 (Secure Communication
over Smart Cards), a system developed to address a key issue of the SxC frame-
work, namely the secure outsourcing of the SxC contract-policy matching service
to a Trusted Third Party (TTP). (SC)2 secures the communication between a
smart card and the TTP that provides the SxC matching service.
Nicola Dragoni, Eduardo Lostal and Davide Papini
12th IEEE International Symposium on
Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks, Pisa 2011
150 Abstracts of Published Papers
(SC)2: Secure Communication over Smart Cards
How to Secure Off-Card Matching in
Security-by-Contract for Open
Multi-Application Smart Cards
TheSecurity-by-Contract(SxC) framework has recently been proposed to sup-
port software evolution in open multi-application smart cards. The key idea lies
in the notion of contract, a specification of the security behavior of an appli-
cation that must be compliant with the security policy of the card hosting the
application. In this paper we address a key issue to realize the SxC idea, namely
the outsourcing of the contractpolicy matching service to a Trusted Third Party
(TTP). In particular, we present the design and implementation of (SC)2 (Se-
cure Communication over Smart Cards), a system securing the communication
between a smart card and the TTP which provides the SxC matching service.
Nicola Dragoni, Eduardo Lostal, Davide Papini and Javier Fabra
4th International Symposium on
Foundations & Practice of Security, Paris 2011
Securing Off-Card Contract-Policy Matching in
Security-By-Contract for Multi-Application
Smart Cards
The Security-by-Contract (SxC) framework has recently been proposed to sup-
port applications’ evolution in multi-application smart cards. The key idea is
based on the notion of contract, a specification of the security behavior of an
application that must be compliant with the security policy of a smart card. In
this paper we address one of the key features needed to apply the SxC idea to
a resource limited device such as a smart card, namely the outsourcing of the
contract-policy matching to a Trusted Third Party. The design of the overall
system as well as a first implemented prototype are presented.
Nicola Dragoni, Eduardo Lostal, Davide Papini and Javier Fabra
4th International Conference on Mobile Ubiquitous Computing, Systems,
Services and Technologies, Firenze 2010
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